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SUMMARY
In this thesis we study the application of modular static analysis to prove program
safety and detection of program errors. In particular, we shall consider imperative
programs that rely on numerical invariants. The analyses proposed in this thesis benefit
from the relationship between a modular analyzer and a precise disjunctive domain.
A modular analyzer requires a precise abstract domain to reason about the symbolic
method inputs. On the other hand, a modular analyzer has a local scope and therefore
favors more complex invariants than those that are usually involved in global analyzers.
The thesis makes three main contributions. Firstly, to handle the challenges of
disjunctive analyses, we introduce the notion of affinity to characterize how closely
related is a pair of disjuncts. Finding related elements in the conjunctive (base) domain
allows the formulation of precise hull and widening operators lifted to the disjunctive
(powerset extension of the) base domain. We have implemented a static analyzer based
on the disjunctive polyhedral analysis where the relational domain and the proposed
operators can progressively enhance precision at a reasonable cost.
Secondly, we designed a modular analyzer that combines forward and backward anal-
yses. The forward analysis aims to infer method postconditions, but it also discovers
invariants that are useful in the backward derivation of sufficient preconditions. To
increase the efficiency of the analysis, we designed a technique to strengthen precondi-
tions and trade precision for speed. Rather than deriving one program precondition for
proving program safety, our analysis derives individual preconditions for each check and
goes one step further by performing aggressive optimizations of checks.
Our final objective is to support either a proof of the absence of bugs in the case of
a valid program or bug finding in the case of a faulty program. We propose a dual static
analysis that is designed to track concurrently two over-approximations: the success and
the failure outcomes. The overlap between the two outcomes signifies imprecision in
analysis and can be used to guide abstraction refinement. More interestingly, due to the
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS
concurrent computation of outcomes, we can identify two significant input conditions:
a never-bug condition that implies safety for inputs that satisfy it and a must-bug
condition that characterizes inputs that lead to true errors in the execution of the
program. As a result, our analysis can identify a part of the alarms as being true errors
and reduces the manual effort of analyzing alarms to a smaller group of may-bugs.
xiii
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the last century computer-driven systems have become increasingly important
in our daily lives. Their reliance on software systems implies that any fault in the
software may cause the entire system to misbehave. Use of flight control systems coupled
with digital computers has been adopted under the concept “fly-by-wire” on board of
Airbus and Boeing planes and similarly the “drive-by-wire” initiative promises to be
followed by the automotive industry. Two extreme failure examples are a spacecraft
explosion caused by a floating-point conversion error (Ariane 5 failure, 1996 [99]) and
the Mars Climate Orbiter crash in 1999 caused by an incorrect conversion between
Imperial units and metric units [143]. Errors are even more obvious in software that
is less safety-critical. “Blue screens of deaths” or “segmentation faults” are errors that
cause frustration and countless hours of lost productivity. It was estimated that the
costs of having an inadequate infrastructure for software testing in the United States
are between USD 22.2 billion and USD 59.5 billion, approximately 0.2 to 0.6 percent of
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [133]. The tremendous cost of software
errors has led to increasing interest in methods for automatic analysis and software
verification.
1.1 Background
Before dissecting the various techniques for program analysis, we should recognize that
a related approach for preventing software errors is to design programming language of
increasing sophistication, where (some kinds of) programmer errors are fully prevented
[48, 86, 31]. While this approach is worthy to follow, it does not promise to solve the class
of errors that exist in the current generation of software. Many software applications
are written using the C programming language that was developed in the seventies.
The widespread adoption of the C language is due to its flexibility as it encourages
programmers to take control over low-level access to memory and allows constructs
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that map efficiently to machine instructions. To quote from Bjarne Stroustrup, “C
makes it easy to shoot yourself in the foot”. Unfortunately, this ease of committing
errors becomes prevalent in the current software systems when considering their ever
increasing complexity.
To solve these difficulties, various techniques promise to provide automated support
for detection of software errors ranging from testing to static analysis. Systematic testing
or concrete state space exploration [59, 111] attempts to search through all the feasible
paths of the programs. While testing can uncover serious errors, it cannot offer guaran-
tees that no more bugs remain undiscovered in the program. On the other hand, static
analysis [37, 43] uses abstraction to interpret exhaustively all the feasible program paths
and compute which are the concrete program states that can be reached by execution.
Static analysis sidesteps the undecidable problem of computing the reachable concrete
states by using over-approximation to (potentially) reachable abstract states. Due to
approximation, static analysis may report false positives that are possible bugs that do
not exist in practice. Regardless of the inherent imprecision in static analysis, many
software properties have been verified and we list only some of the most impressive
results obtained:
• Verification against runtime errors including out-of-bound array accesses: Astre´e
[12] for the flight control software of Airbus A340 and A380; C Global Surveyor
[145] for the flight software of the Mars Path-Finder and the Deep Space 1 missions;
ESPX [76] for preventing buffer overflows in future versions of Microsoft products.
• Ensuring proper usage of resources: ESP [46] for verifying file I/O in the gcc
compiler; Saturn [148] for finding incorrect usage of lock related functions through
the Linux kernel.
• Verifying consistency of complex data structure operations including circular linked
lists, sorted linked lists, priority queues, red-black trees [115, 18].
• Finding errors in critical device drivers: Slam [5], Blast [80] and Static Driver
Verifier [6] for safety properties; Terminator [34, 32] and Mutant [9] for liveness
properties (e.g. termination).
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From the properties enumerated previously, our study will focus on checking for
out-of-bound array accesses as an example of assertion checking. We aim to provide
a sound static analysis, meaning that if a property of a program is verified, then the
program execution is guaranteed not to violate that property. To achieve soundness,
we shall be content with the possibility of reporting alarms that may be false positives.
However, to minimize their number, we emphasize on the precision of our analysis and
on the modularity principle as a way to achieve precision regardless of the size of the
program to analyze. This principle of performing separate local analyses and composing
their results was also argued by Cousot and Cousot in their paper on “Modular Static
Program Analysis” [40]:
“The central idea is that of compositional separate static analysis of program
parts where very large programs are analyzed by analyzing parts (such as meth-
ods) separately and then by composing the analyses of these program parts to
get the required information on the whole program. Components can be analyzed
with a high precision whenever they are chosen to be small enough.”
In their paper [40], Cousot and Cousot give some guidelines for designing modular static
analyses. The first proposal, the worst-case separate analysis consists in considering
that absolutely no information is known on the interfaces of program parts. As a second
approach, the separate analysis with user-provided interfaces asks the user to provide
information about the interfaces of each program part. While pragmatic, these proposals
give up precision in the first case and automation in the second case. The current thesis
focuses on the third proposal, the symbolic relational separate analysis. We attempt to
study its applicability to the analysis of software errors and to realize its potential. With
this proposal, each program part is analyzed by giving symbolic names to all external
objects used or modified in that part. The interaction between the local and the external
objects is recorded symbolically and represents a summary or interface of the current
program part. Wherever that program part is invoked, the computed summary can be
used and the analysis proceeds without sacrificing precision. This analysis has smaller
local scope and therefore can be very precise.
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1.2 Contributions of this Thesis
This thesis makes three main contributions. Firstly, we present a new disjunctive abstract
domain meant to enhance analysis precision at a reasonable cost. Secondly, we propose
a modular technique for deriving preconditions sufficient to guarantee program safety.
With these two techniques, we are able to derive both postconditions and preconditions
and realize a completely modular analyzer for proving program safety. Since an analyzer
that aims to prove program safety may report alarms that correspond in part to false
positives, there is a need to (manually) classify the feasibility of alarms. Our third
proposal is a dual static analysis that can identify (automatically) a part of the alarms
as being true errors. More specifically, the dual static analysis identifies both a never-
bug condition that implies program safety and a must-bug condition that leads to true
errors (modulo program termination). The imprecision of static analysis results in a
may-bug condition that characterizes inputs leading to either possible errors or false
positives.
After we briefly described our contributions, we will show examples to motivate our
goals and list the challenges that need to be overcome.
1.2.1 Disjunctive Abstract Domain
We shall highlight various techniques to discover static invariants that hold at each
program point. A static invariant can be computed either using a forward or a backward
analysis. A forward derivation traverses the statements of the program in the same order
in which they execute, while a backward derivation does the traversal in the reverse order.
In a forward analysis, a static invariant is usually computed assuming any inputs to the
program. Therefore it represents an over-approximation of the concrete program state
computed using particular program inputs. While including some unfeasible concrete
states results in an over-approximating invariant, it is also possible to exclude some
feasible states and compute an under-approximating invariant. 1
The discovered invariants are used to prove the safety of either implicit checks (e.g.
array bound checks where the index used to access an array must be within the bounds
1The crossbreeding of over/under approximations with forward/backward derivations leads to four
analyses akin to the classical dataflow analyses [117, Section 2.3].
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of the array) or explicit checks introduced using the language construct assert. To
prove safety of checks, a forward analysis compares the computed invariant at the check
point with the check to be satisfied. We will illustrate this process using the following
example adapted from [136]:
void foo (int x) {
l0 : int y; bool b;
l1 : if (x > 0) { y = x; }
l2 : else { y = −x;
l3 : }
l4 : b = (y > 10);
l5 : assert(b⇒ (x < −10 ∨ 10 < x));
}
Figure 1.1: Simple example
The method foo computes the absolute value of the integer parameter x and assigns it
to the variable y. The boolean flag b is set to true when the value of the variable y is
bigger than 10. It can easily be observed that the assertion at label l5 is satisfied for any
execution of the program and for any value of the parameter x. We will illustrate two
facts that may influence the ability of a static analyzer to prove this assertion: firstly,
the precision of the abstract domain and secondly, whether the invariants are derived
using a forward or a backward analysis.
The abstract domain defines a class of properties that can be used to compute and
represent program invariants. There exists a wide variety of abstract domains that could
be used to capture the numerical properties that interest us. These domains balance
expressive power with computational cost. Two seminal papers introduced the abstract
domains of intervals [36] and polyhedra [43]. The interval abstract domain is able to
capture invariants stating that the variable y is positive at label l2 (after the assignment
statement is executed). In general, the form of interval invariants is a conjunction of
constraints of the form ±x ≤ c, where x is some program variable while c is a constant.
Analysis using the interval domain is efficient, but it loses precision by not capturing
constraints that relate multiple program variables. 2 The polyhedron abstract domain
is able to capture a more general form of invariants, as conjunctions of linear inequalities
2For this reason, the interval domain is called non-relational .
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relating multiple variables: a1x1+ . . . anxn ≤ c. In this format, program variables are
represented by xi, while ai and c are arbitrary constants.
Label Conjunctive (polyhedron) domain Disjunctive (polyhedron) domain
l0 > >
l1 x>0 ∧ y=x x>0 ∧ y=x
l2 x≤0 ∧ y=−x x≤0 ∧ y=−x
l3 y≥x ∧ y≥−x x>0 ∧ y=x ∨
x≤0 ∧ y=−x
l4 y≥x ∧ y≥−x b=true ∧ y>10 ∧ y=x ∨
b=true ∧ y>10 ∧ y=−x ∨
b=false ∧ y≤10 ∧ x>0 ∧ y=x ∨
b=false ∧ y≤10 ∧ x≤0 ∧ y=−x
l5 check cannot be proven check can be proven
Figure 1.2: Program state approximated at each label via forward analysis with
conjunctive and disjunctive abstract domains
For our example from Figure 1.1, the invariants obtained using a forward analysis
with the conjunctive polyhedron domain are shown in the second column of Figure 1.2.
The forward derivation starts at label l0 with a special element >, meaning that all the
program variables, x, y and b are unconstrained. At label l1, after the evaluation of the
assignment from the first branch, an invariant would capture the formula (x>0 ∧ y=x).
Abstract domains like the interval or the polyhedron are imprecise when capturing in-
variants at join points that follow, for example, conditional statements. In particular, at
label l3, the invariant after the conditional statement represents the over-approximation
of the invariants from the two branches. The invariant at label l3 computed with the
interval domain is determined to be y≥0. With the increased precision of the polyhedron
domain, a refined invariant could be obtained at label l3: (y≥x ∧ y≥−x). Neither of
these two invariants is precise enough to capture the fact that the variable y represents
the absolute value of the variable x. At the next step, the invariant at label l4 is not
able to capture the relation between the variables x, y and b. Consequently, the check
at label l5 cannot be proven.
A numerical abstract domain can be refined by adding elements that allow disjunctive
properties to be represented precisely. This refinement can be done systematically [39]
and results in a powerset extension of the base conjunctive domain. After illustrating the
forward analysis with a conjunctive domain, we will compare it with the derivation shown
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in the last column of Figure 1.2 based on a disjunctive domain. While the invariants
at labels l0, l1 and l2 are unchanged, the disjunctive domain captures more precisely
the state at label l3. The invariant captures each branch via a separate disjunct as
((x>0∧ y=x)∨ (x≤0∧ y=−x)). Further, the conditional assignment at label l4 assigns
a true value to b provided the value of y is bigger than 10; otherwise b is assigned false.
Consequently, the invariant at label l4 captures the relations between the variables x, y
and b with four disjuncts. Using this invariant, the check (b⇒ (x<−10 ∨ 10<x)) from
label l5 can be proven: the two disjuncts where b is true satisfy the property that the
absolute value of x is bigger than 10.
While we illustrated the need for disjunctive invariants using forward analysis, we
can argue that a disjunctive abstract domain is also useful for backward analysis. In
fact, the example from Figure 1.1 was used in [136] to show that the backward analysis
can be more effective than a forward analysis. For this particular example, the backward
analysis can indeed prove the check using a conjunctive domain!
Label Over-approximation from ¬(chk) Under-approximation from chk
l5 b=true ∧ −10≤x≤10 b=false ∨
b=true ∧ x<−10 ∨
b=true ∧ x>10
l4 y>10 ∧ −10≤x≤10 y<10 ∨
y>10 ∧ x<−10 ∨
y>10 ∧ x>10
l3 (same as l4) (same as l4)
l2 ⊥ (x<−10 ∧ −10≤x≤10) > (x≥−10 ∨ x<−10)
l1 ⊥ (x>10 ∧ −10≤x≤10) > (x≤10 ∨ x>10)
l0 ⊥ (check can be proven) > (check can be proven)
Figure 1.3: Program state approximated at each label via backward analysis
The second and third columns from Figure 1.3 show the invariants that are inferred
using backward analysis. This analysis starts with the location of the check to be
proven l5, where error states and safe states can be clearly identified. The error states
correspond to the negation of the check (b=true ∧ −10≤x≤10), while the safe states
correspond to the check formula, written in disjunctive normal form as (b=false) ∨
(b=true ∧ x<−10) ∨ (b=true ∧ x>10).
An over-approximating backward analysis starts with the error states and aims to
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prove that no program inputs may lead to the error states (a may analysis). The error
state from label l5 may be reached from label l4 provided that (y>10 ∧ −10≤x≤10).
The backward derivation continues with the two conditional branches. Contradictions
are obtained on each branch, represented with the special element ⊥ that stands for the
unsatisfiable invariant false. To reach the error state from the label l2, it is necessary
that x satisfies the following constraint: (x<−10∧−10≤x≤10), which is impossible since
this constraint is unsatisfiable. Similarly for the other branch, at label l1 the constraint
(x>10∧−10≤x≤10) cannot be satisfied by any value for the input variable x. Since the
error states cannot be reached from any of the two conditional branches, they cannot
be reached from the beginning of the method at label l0 and thus, the check is proven
safe.
Despite the success in proving this particular example starting with the error states,
conjunctive invariants may not be sufficient in general for backward analysis. This fact is
illustrated using the combination between backward analysis and under-approximation
as pioneered by Suzuki and Ishihata [144]. For this derivation, the starting invariant
at label l5 is the check to be proven. The aim of this under-approximating analysis is
to prove that all inputs must lead to the safe states (a must analysis). For the current
example, such an analysis fails when using a conjunctive domain: it computes only im-
precise under-approximations at each program point (the false invariant). On the other
hand, the third column of Figure 1.3 shows that the check can be proven if disjunctive
invariants are available for analysis. As a summary to the various forward/backward
analyses presented, we argue the general usefulness of a disjunctive abstract domain.
While a disjunctive domain is able to prove more checks due to its increased preci-
sion, the precision comes with a higher cost that hindered the adoption of disjunctive
abstract domains. A disjunctive domain has an exponential number of elements when
compared to the base conjunctive domain. Another potential problem shows in the case
of recursive programs, where, unlike the simple non-recursive example from Figure 1.1,
the disjunctive analysis may result in an unbounded number of disjuncts. One well-
known approach to control the number of disjuncts during analysis is to use a domain
where the number of disjuncts is syntactically bounded. In this setting, the challenge is
to find appropriate disjuncts that can be merged without (evident) losses in precision.
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Another challenge is to ensure the termination of analysis, by adapting the techniques
based on widening operators from the conjunctive [37, 43] to the disjunctive setting.
To handle these challenges in disjunctive analysis, we introduce in Chapter 3 the
notion of affinity to characterize how closely related is a pair of disjuncts. Finding related
elements in the conjunctive (base) domain allows the formulation of precise hull and
widening operators lifted to the disjunctive (powerset extension of the) base domain. We
have implemented a static analyzer based on the disjunctive polyhedral analysis where
the relational domain and the proposed operators can progressively enhance precision
at a reasonable cost.
1.2.2 Deriving Preconditions for Modular Static Analysis
A main challenge for static analysis is its extension from the intraprocedural setting
used for our previous examples to interprocedural analysis where calls to procedures can
be handled precisely and efficiently. A simple approach for solving this challenge is to
assume method specifications in the form of pre- and post-conditions are available in
the program. In this case, the intraprocedural analysis can be extended straightforward
to the interprocedural setting. For the situation when pre- and post-conditions are not
available, there are two main approaches to analyzing the program.
The global approach attempts to mimic the execution of a program in the order in
which method calls and return instructions are processed. The analysis starts with the
“main” method and traverses the call graph in top-down order. This approach has the
advantage of exploiting the context (program invariant) of a call to the method mn when
analyzing the callee, the method mn. Unfortunately, this approach discards the natural
boundaries from the method declarations since invariants combine information from the
call context with information local to the callee. This may lead to an explosion in the
size of the invariants: elaborate techniques are reported in Astre´e to process precisely
and efficiently invariants relating tens of thousands of variables [12]. We will illustrate
this global approach to interprocedural analysis using the program fragment shown in
Figure 1.4. In this program, the method at the top of the figure declares two arrays,
initializes them and then computes the minimum element from each array.
A typical global static analyzer derives invariants for a method in each of its call contexts.








int bmin = getmin(b, 20);
. . .
void initarray (int a[], int n) {
l0 : int i = 0;
l1 : while (i < n) {
l2 : a[i] = input(); //assert(0<=i && i<len(a));
l3 : i = i+ 1;
l4 : }
}
int getmin (int a[], int n) { . . . }
Figure 1.4: Example for interprocedural analysis
In our example, the method initarray is analyzed twice, corresponding to the call
contexts of initarray(a, 10) and initarray(b, 20). In each call context, the assertion at
label l2 is proven safe, but the effort of proving the assertion is duplicated. Furthermore,
the invariants that need to be inferred inside the method initarray could be larger than
required since they take into account all the information from the call context.
A second alternative for analyzing interprocedural programs is a modular approach
that performs local analysis within the boundaries of a method. A method mn is analyzed
without assuming anything about its call contexts and an abstraction of the relation be-
tween values at the entry and at the method exit is computed [38, 141]. This abstraction
represents a summary of the method body and therefore this approach is also denoted
as summary-based analysis [118, 148]. Throughout this thesis, we will use the attributes
summary-based and modular interchangeably for such an approach to analysis.
One advantage of this modular approach is that it minimizes the analysis redun-
dancy, since the method summary is computed once and used at all the call sites. The
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summary-based approach promises more scalability, since it only computes smaller, lo-
cal invariants. The summary-based analysis processes the methods from a program in
bottom-up order of the call graph. Recursion requires simultaneous handling of methods
in the same strongly connected component of the program call graph. While the mod-
ular approach promises more scalability than a global approach, it poses an important
challenge. Analyzing a method body without the information provided by the call con-
text requires a more complex abstract domain. For example, reasoning about the code
of initarray method when the array a and the variable n have symbolic (rather than
fixed) values is more challenging.
There are many related works that use modularity in static analysis. We give a brief
account of these related works, starting with the general approaches to interprocedural
analysis proposed by Cousot-Cousot [38] and Sharir-Pnueli [141]. Reps et al [132] showed
how to do precise interprocedural analysis with finite abstract domains and distributive
transfer functions. Modular aliasing analyses have also been proposed [19, 21] and
recently Yorsh et al [152] showed how to combine finite typestate with aliasing analysis.
Closer to our focus on numerical properties, Mu¨ller-Olm et al [109] and Gulwani-Tiwari
[69] presented precise interprocedural analyses with linear equalities. Precise analysis
can be obtained only for programs that have non-deterministic conditionals; other classes
of conditionals make the precise problem undecidable even for a finite height domain
like that of linear equalities. Predicate abstraction domain is another instance of a finite
domain that has been extended to a polymorphic [7] or compositional setting [85]. Other
numerical abstract domains employed in interprocedural analysis are linear congruences
[110] and polyhedra analysis [140, 63]. Seidl et al [140] have focused on analysis with
a restricted form of polyhedra (simplices) that can be implemented efficiently, while
Gopan-Reps [63] recently proposed an analysis for summarizing low-level libraries.
Our proposal shares the modularity principle with all these works, but we apply
it in a more fine-grained abstract domain, that of disjunctive polyhedra. Further-
more, most summary-based analyses have focused on computing an over-approximation
for each method body, including in this category summary-based alias analyses [19,
21]. On the other hand, in addition to over-approximations we also derive under-
approximations modularly in the form of preconditions sufficient to guarantee the safety
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of the method body. There has been considerably less success in deriving modular under-
approximations. Recent efforts independent of our work include [108] in the context of
modular assertion checking and [152] proposing a framework for generating procedure
summaries restricted to finite-height abstract domains. In contrast to sufficient precon-
ditions, another class of analyses generates preconditions necessary (but not sufficient)
for ensuring the safety of a method [15, 123].
For the example from Figure 1.4, our modular analysis generates a summary for the
initarray method that includes a precondition (n≤len(a)) sufficient for guaranteeing
the safety of the assertion at label l2. Compared to the global analysis requirement of
re-analyzing the method’s body for each call context, with a modular analysis it is only
needed to check the precondition (n≤len(a)) at each call site.
Our proposal benefits from the symbiotic relationship between a modular analyzer
and a precise disjunctive domain. Firstly, a modular analyzer requires a precise abstract
domain to reason about the symbolic method inputs. On the other hand, a modular
analyzer has a local scope and therefore favors more complex invariants than those
that are usually involved in global analyzers. Based on this observation, we designed a
modular analyzer that combines forward and backward analyses and can be practical and
precise. The forward analysis aims to infer method postconditions, but it also discovers
invariants that are useful in the backward derivation of sufficient preconditions.
1.2.3 Dual Static Analysis
Static analysis uses abstraction on program states to prove program safety. Due to
approximation, static analysis may report false positives that are possible bugs that
do not exist in practice. High incidents of false positives can make static analysis
tools impractical to use for finding and eliminating bugs. Manual inspection of alarms
(possible bugs) can be a very time-consuming process and may take several days even
for simple alarms in a large program [136].
Since finding all errors and establishing program safety has proven difficult, from
a pragmatic angle researchers have been concerned with methods to find some of the
errors from a program. Traditionally, program testing [89] has been used for detecting
faulty programs. More recently, model checking or concrete state space exploration
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[59, 111] has been successfully applied to detect the presence of program errors. As this
systematic testing may not terminate in a reasonable amount of time, a limit is set in
practice on the number of paths that are covered. On the whole, the bugs that are
discovered are sound (they are guaranteed to occur in some concrete execution), but
some bugs may remain undiscovered.
Synergistic approaches for both proving safety and finding bugs usually rely on a
combination of over and under approximation. Model checking based on abstraction
refinement is often referred as CEGAR (counterexample-guided abstraction refinement)
[29] and tools like SLAM [5] or BLAST [80] are based on this paradigm. In a first step,
SLAM and BLAST perform a forward-directed overapproximating search for possible
bugs. If no bugs are found, then the safety of the program has been proven. Otherwise,
starting with a possible bug, a counterexample trace is analyzed backward via symbolic
reasoning in order to derive its weakest liberal precondition. If the counterexample is
shown to be feasible, then a true bug is reported. If the counterexample is shown to
be infeasible or spurious, the abstraction is refined and the search process is iterated.
Due to the infiniteness of the concrete state space, the process may not converge while
continuously refining the abstract domain. Only true bugs are reported provided that
the backward analysis is complete, for example in the context of the ACTL∗ fragment of
Computational Tree Logic [29] or of the theory of linear arithmetic with uninterpreted
functions [80]. However, in general the backward analysis is incomplete: in the presence
of division operators represented as uninterpreted functions the analysis may report false
positives.
To support the automatic analysis of false positives arisen from static analysis, we
propose a dual static analysis that is designed to track concurrently two over-approxi-
mations: the success and the failure outcomes. The overlap between the two outcomes
signifies imprecision in analysis and can be used to guide abstraction refinement. More
interestingly, due to the concurrent computation of outcomes, we can identify two signif-
icant input conditions: a never-bug condition that implies safety for inputs that satisfy
it and a must-bug condition that characterizes inputs that lead to true errors in the
execution of the program. As a result, our analysis can identify a part of the alarms as
being true errors and reduces the manual effort of analyzing alarms to a smaller group
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of may-bugs.
1.3 Thesis Overview
The aim of this thesis is to investigate techniques that would broaden the class of
applications to which modular static analyses approaches are applicable.
Firstly, to handle the challenges of disjunctive analyses, we introduce in Chapter 3 the
notion of affinity to characterize how closely related are two disjuncts. Finding related
elements in the conjunctive (base) domain allows the formulation of precise hull and
widening operators lifted to the disjunctive (powerset extension of the) base domain. We
have implemented a static analyzer based on the disjunctive polyhedral analysis where
the relational domain and the proposed operators can progressively enhance precision
at a reasonable cost. This chapter is based on a paper that was first presented at the
11th Annual Asian Computing Science Conference - ASIAN 2006: Corneliu Popeea and
Wei-Ngan Chin - “Inferring Disjunctive Postconditions” [123].
Secondly, our proposal from Chapter 4 exploits the relationship between modular
analysis and a precise disjunctive domain. We designed a modular analyzer that com-
bines forward and backward analyses and can be practical and precise. The forward
analysis aims to infer method postconditions, but it also discovers invariants that are
useful in the backward derivation of sufficient preconditions. To increase the efficiency
of the analysis, we designed a technique to strengthen preconditions and trade precision
for speed. Rather than deriving one program precondition for proving program safety,
our analysis derives individual preconditions for each check and goes one step further by
performing aggressive optimizations of checks. We formalise our technique as a depen-
dent type system that uses type annotations for communicating information between
the inference and the optimization phases. This work was presented at the ACM SIG-
PLAN Symposium on Partial Evaluation and Semantics-Based Program Manipulation -
PEPM 2008: Corneliu Popeea, Dana N. Xu, Wei-Ngan Chin - “A Practical and Precise
Inference and Specializer for Array Bound Checks Elimination” [127].
Finally, we aim to support either a proof of the absence of bugs in the case of a
valid program or bug finding in the case of a faulty program. In Chapter 5, we propose
a dual static analysis that is designed to track concurrently two over-approximations:
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the success and the failure outcomes. The overlap between the two outcomes signifies
imprecision in analysis and can be used to guide abstraction refinement. More interest-
ingly, due to the concurrent computation of outcomes, we can identify two significant
input conditions: a never-bug condition that implies safety for inputs that satisfy it and
a must-bug condition that characterizes inputs that lead to true errors in the execution
of the program. As a result, our analysis can identify a part of the alarms as being true
errors and reduces the manual effort of analyzing alarms to a smaller group of may-bugs.
This chapter is an extension of the paper: Corneliu Popeea, Wei-Ngan Chin - “Dual
Static Analysis” [125].
Before presenting the details of these extensions of static analysis, the next chapter
presents the Imp language, a subset of the C language. By focusing on a smaller lan-
guage, this thesis will introduce the key technical difficulties in modular static analysis.
The experimental results that will be described subsequently handle a larger subset of
the C language.
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CHAPTER II
CORE LANGUAGE, SEMANTICS AND
ABSTRACTION
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the core language that we use for analysis,
called Imp, and give some preliminary notions needed for the further technical develop-
ments. We will first introduce the syntax of Imp in Section 2.1 and its concrete semantics
in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we will describe our analysis framework and show how to
compute an abstract semantics for the Imp language based on a traditional conjunctive
domain. We will explain the main features of our analysis framework: forward reason-
ing rules used to extract constraint abstractions and how to compute an approximate
solution of these constraints using a fixed point process.
2.1 Syntax of Imp Language
In this section we will describe a small language, called Imp, that is a first-order sequen-
tial imperative language. This language retains only few constructs from the better-
known C language and its purpose is to make program analyses easier to formulate and
prove soundness. Despite its simplicity, the language can be used to encode recursive
methods over data-types like integers. Therefore, the language is Turing-complete and
interesting properties over programs written in Imp are undecidable in general [134].
This fact makes static program analyses both interesting and challenging.
The syntax of our Imp language is shown in Figure 2.1. A program P written in
this language consists of a set of methods, either user-defined or primitive methods. All
methods have a return type and a list of parameters; each parameter has an optional
ref keyword, a type and a name. The ref keyword indicates the parameter passing
mechanism: when ref appears in the parameter declaration, then the parameter is
meant to be passed-by-reference (any change in its value is visible to the caller); when
the ref keyword is missing, the parameter is passed-by-value and any change to its value
in the callee is not reflected to the caller.
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P ::= prim∗ meth∗ (program)
prim ::= t mn (([ref] t v)∗) where Φ (primitive method)
meth ::= t mn (([ref] t v)∗) {e} (user-defined method)
t ::= bool | int | float | void | t[] (type)
e ::= v | k | v:=e | e1; e2 | l : mn(v∗) | t v ; e (expression)
| if v then e1 else e2 | l : error
k ::= true | false | kint | kfloat | () (constant)
Figure 2.1: Syntax of the language Imp
Types represented by t can be either basic types or array type. User-defined method
declarations include a method body represented by an expression e. The Imp language is
expression-oriented and uses a normalised form: only variables are allowed as arguments
to a method call or a conditional test. This normalization can be done with the help
of a simple pre-processor and for brevity we may show examples in a form that is not
normalized. Expression forms include assignment, sequence of expressions, method call,
local variable declaration, conditional and an error construct.
The error construct allows the program to terminate in case of an error situation.
Statically computing the conditions under which the error constructs are guaranteed
to be unreachable reduces to proving program safety and is the focus of this thesis. The
error construct is prefixed by a label l that uniquely identifies it. A more conventional
way to check that a condition holds is to use assert e. This form is equivalent to a
conditional expression in our language: if e then () else error.
An important feature of our core language is the presence of primitive method decla-
rations that lack a method body, but are instead given a symbolic description (summary)
Φ. Primitive methods can be used to encode the following:
• Various operators for integer values (plus,minus, multiply,divide), for bool val-
ues (or, and, not) and for comparison operators (lt or <, lte or ≤).
• Potentially unsafe operators that handle array values. The primitive newarr re-
turns an array value, len returns the length of its array parameter. The primitive
sub returns an array element from a specified index, while assign updates the
specified array element with a given value. For example, an array access a[i] is
viewed as sub(a, i), while an array update a[i]:=v is converted to the primitive
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call assign(a, i, v).
• Calls to (external) library methods for which the analysis does not have access to
the code that implements the library.
In most of the cases, the description Φ of the primitive operators can be automatically
derived. This formula may include a safety precondition (for example, bound checks
for array operations), or simply represent the input-output relation (for primitive nu-
merical operations like plus or multiply). The syntax of the formulae depends on the
underlying constraint solver. Throughout this thesis we will use various fragments of
Presburger arithmetic [128] and introduce their syntax in Section 2.3.
2.1.1 Other Language Features
Other core languages have been proposed for analysing C-like languages and we enumer-
ate some of them here: Ckit [8], CIL [114], CoreC [151], Core-Expressions [119]. The
goal of these projects is to capture a large subset of the C language. Our goal is not so
ambitious and we only discuss informally how some language features can be analyzed
in the context of Imp. More details on supporting these and other features can be found
in our technical report on a core language named µCIL [124].
Loops : Both while and for loops from C programs can be converted to tail-recursive
methods, where variables used inside loops are promoted as method parameters.
Variables used inside a loop may change value and the change has to be reflected
across the loop body. For this purpose, the method parameters are passed by
reference, using the ref keyword from Imp. Our translation always ensures that
the ref parameters are all different and non-aliased. Constructs that interrupt
the normal control-flow in a loop, like continue, break and return, can also
be handled by our translation to tail-recursive methods. To illustrate the loop
conversion, we use a simple example that assigns 0 to those elements in the array
a from the range i to 1 (see Figure 2.2).
Global variables : Initialization of global variables can be moved to a newly-created
function globinit. Global variables can then be made available to each method
as parameters.
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while (i > 0) {
assign(a, i, 0);
i:=i−1 }
void g(int[] a, ref int i)
{ if (i≤0) then ()
else { assign(a, i, 0); i:=i−1; g(a, i) } }
Figure 2.2: Example of loop translation
Floating-point values : Even though float values are supported in Imp, this does
not imply that our program analyses will handle them precisely. The constraint
language that we use is based on the integer domain and does not capture values
of float variables. Specialized techniques for handling rounding errors in floating-
point computations have been proposed for static analysis in [102, 105].
Integer overflow : C programs do not manipulate perfect integers, but bounded-
domain machine integers. Solutions to handle integer overflow detection have
been proposed elsewhere via specific abstract domains [106, Chapter 7].
Structure values and aliasing : We have made some explorations on how to anal-
yse structure values in the context of verification of functional and object-based
programs [122, 25]. However, the subsequent chapters of this thesis do not discuss
these language features.
Imp language is meant to facilitate program analysis of first-order sequential impera-
tive programs. Therefore, it does not support features like higher-order functions or
concurrency primitives.
2.2 Concrete (Operational) Semantics
In this section, we define a small-step operational semantics for our core imperative
language. Our machine configuration is being represented by 〈s, e〉 where s denotes the
current stack and e denotes the current program code.
Stack : s ∈ Stack = V ar →fin V alue
V alues : δ ∈ V alue = Float unionmulti Int unionmultiBool unionmulti V oid
Each reduction step can then be formalised as a small-step transition of the follow-
ing form: 〈s, e〉↪→〈s1, e1〉. The rules are standard and presented in Figure 2.3. As an




δ = default(t) fresh x ρ = [v 7→x]
〈s, t v; e〉↪→〈[x7→δ]+s, ret(x, ρe)〉
[D−ERROR]
〈s, l : error〉↪→〈s,⊥〉
[D−PRIM]
mn ∈ Primitives
〈s′, δ〉 = exec〈s, l : mn(v1, ..vn)〉
〈s, l : mn(v1, ..vn)〉↪→〈s′, δ〉
[D−CALL]
t0 mn((ref ti wi)m−1i=1 , (ti wi)
n
i=m){e}
s′ = [wi 7→ s(vi)]ni=m+s
〈s, l : mn(v1, ..vn)〉↪→〈s′, ret({wi}ni=m, [vi/wi]m−1i=1 e)〉
[D−IF−1]
s(v) = true
〈s, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, e1〉
[D−IF−2]
s(v) = false
〈s, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, e2〉
[D−ASSIGN−1]
〈s, v := δ〉↪→〈s[v 7→ δ], ()〉
[D−SEQ−1]
〈s, δ; e2〉↪→〈s, e2〉
[D−RET−1]
〈s, ret(v∗, δ)〉↪→〈s−{v∗}, δ〉
[D−ASSIGN−2]
〈s, e〉↪→〈s′, e′〉
〈s, v := e〉↪→〈s′, v := e′〉
[D−SEQ−2]
〈s, e1〉↪→〈s′, e′1〉
〈s, e1; e2〉↪→〈s′, e′1; e2〉
[D−RET−2]
〈s, e〉↪→〈s′, e′〉
〈s, ret(v∗, e)〉↪→〈s′, ret(v∗, e′)〉
[D−ASSIGN−3]
〈s, e〉↪→〈s′,⊥〉







Figure 2.3: Operational semantics
example, a conditional expression is evaluated depending on the test value. If the value
is a boolean constant, then either the rule [D−IF−1] (if the constant is true) or the rule
[D−IF−2] applies. If the value is not of boolean type, then in principle the execution
would be stuck with a type error. We rely on the fact that the source program is well-
typed and such errors cannot occur. For any given complete execution, we expect one
of three possible outcomes: 〈s, e〉↪→∗〈s1, δ〉 for success, 〈s, e〉↪→∗〈s1,⊥〉 for failure, or
〈s, e〉6↪→∗ for non-termination.
To ease the formulation of the correctness relation between the concrete and the
abstract semantics, we extend the source language with a construct to represent the















Figure 2.4: Overview of analysis framework
intermediate result of a method call: the evaluation of the expression ret(v∗, e) proceeds
first with the method’s body e (rule [D−RET−2]) and, after its reduction to a value, the
parameters passed by value v∗ are removed from the current stack (rule [D−RET−1]). If
the evaluation of the body reaches an error, then the rule [D−RET−3] throws the error
to the caller.
2.3 Abstract Semantics
The operational semantics introduced in the previous section is not suitable for auto-
mated static analysis due to its undecidability. We will use the abstract interpretation
framework [37] to compute an approximation of this semantics, a sound and decidable
abstract semantics for Imp programs. This section presents an overview of our ap-
proach and an introduction to our modular static analysis framework based on forward
reasoning rules, constraint abstractions and fixed point approximation.
2.3.1 Overview
An overview of our analysis framework is shown in Figure 2.4. The input to our analysis
is an Imp program, consisting of a group of methods that are first analysed to obtain
a call graph. A call graph contains one directed edge from each caller method to the
corresponding callee method. Recursive methods are represented as a strongly connected
component (SCC) in the graph.
Our analysis traverses the call graph in reverse topological order (bottom up) and
each method (or group of methods) is analysed assuming unknown initial values. Specif-
ically, each method is passed to the forward reasoning process and an intermediate con-
straint representation is derived in the form of a constraint abstraction. If the method
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is non-recursive, then a method summary (that includes a postcondition and a pre-
condition) can be immediately derived. If the method is recursive, then the constraint
abstraction is passed on to a fixed point approximation process parameterized by an
abstract domain. In the case of mutually-recursive methods, the fixed point process is
done simultaneously for the corresponding constraint abstractions.
Most summary-based analyses compute an over-approximation of the set of reachable
states: summary-based alias analyses [19, 75] or analyses computing method postcon-
ditions [38, 123]. For software verification purposes, it is required to compute also an
under-approximation for method precondition. In the case of tail recursive methods
(including loops), the precondition can be derived from the over-approximation phase
without an additional fixed point computation. However, more general recursion pat-
terns complicate the fixed point process. To support general recursion, our analysis uses
a feedback loop since the postcondition is required for a second fixed point computation.
After a summary is derived for the current method, the analysis proceeds with the next
method in the call graph order. An inspirational line of works for our developments is
the generic framework for inference of size relations in functional programs proposed by
Chin, Khoo et al [23, 24, 25].
2.3.2 Forward Reasoning Rules
The goal of the forward reasoning process is to collect from each method a constraint
abstraction that is amenable to fixed point computation. This process is built around
a static judgement with roots in Hoare logic [82, 1]. Given a formula φ1 describing the
current state and an expression e, the judgement derives a formula φ2 describing the
state after the expression e is evaluated:
`{φ1} e {φ2}
The computation of φ2 assuming a given formula φ1 is what gives the forward character
to the reasoning process. Next, we will explain two aspects concerning the formulae φ1
and φ2: their syntactic form and their semantic meaning.
The syntactic form of φ is based on the first order theory of linear arithmetic (Pres-
burger arithmetic) with support for recursive constraint abstractions (see Figure 2.5).
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The choice of the domain is influenced by the numerical properties that we want to cap-
ture. A set of recursive constraint abstractions is denoted by Q and amenable to fixed
point computation as explained in more detail later. The existential quantifier ∃v · φ is
used for eliminating intermediate variables when computing postconditions, while the
universal quantifier ∀v · φ is used for eliminating intermediate variables when comput-
ing preconditions (see Chapter 4). The operator ¬φ is used in Chapter 5 to derive the
complement of a formula φ. An equality constraint (a1v1+ · · ·+anvn = a) can be rep-
resented as a conjunction of constraints: (a1v1+ · · ·+anvn ≤ a ∧ a1v1+ · · ·+anvn ≥ a).
A strict inequality (a1v1+ · · ·+anvn < a) can also be represented using an axiom from
integer arithmetic: (a1v1+ · · ·+anvn+1 ≤ a). We also use the syntactic shorthands
true = s ∧ ¬s and false = s ∨ ¬s for some predicate s.
φ ::= s | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | (formula)
∃v · φ | ∀v · φ | ¬φ | q〈v∗〉
s ::= a1v1+ · · ·+anvn ≤ a (linear inequality)
Q ::= {( q〈v∗〉 = φ)∗} (constraint abstraction)
q, v ∈ V AR (identifier)
a ∈ Z (integer constant)
Figure 2.5: Syntax of formulae and constraint abstractions
For the non-recursive integer constraints, we make use of a complete decision proce-
dure for Presburger arithmetic implemented in the Omega Test [129]. The Omega Test
is an extension of Fourier-Motzkin variable elimination to integer arithmetic. Despite
its doubly-exponential worst case complexity, the Omega Test has been shown to be
efficient in practice [129, 131].
The syntax of φ formulae gives us some flexibility in choosing the abstract domain
used in the fixed point process. For fixed point computation, we have experimented
with various subdomains of the theory of linear arithmetic like the conjunctive domains
of octagons [104] and polyhedra[43] and the disjunctive domain of polyhedra [123].
The semantic meaning of a formula φ is an abstraction for a set of traces [35, 30, 135].
Such a transition formula ranges over two sets of logical variables: unprimed variables
represent the values of program variables at the beginning of the current method, named
prestate; primed variables represent the values of program variables at some program
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point in the method (poststate). A simple example of an assignment expression follows:
`{x′=x ∧ y′=y}x = y+1 {x′=y+1 ∧ y′=y}
The input formula does not assume anything about the initial values of the variables
x and y. Additionally, the values of the variables at the beginning of a method are
unchanged: (x′=x ∧ y′=y). After the assignment expression is abstractly evaluated, the
postcondition formula describes the state after the assignment relative to the state at the
beginning of the method. The trace semantics forms the basis of our modular analysis. It
allows individual reasoning about each method and a subsequent composition between
the method abstraction and its call contexts. For example, if the call context would
initialize x and y to the values 10 and respectively 20, then the state after the assignment
can be resolved using trace composition to the formula (x′=21 ∧ y′=20).
The most important rule in our forward reasoning process is the one that handles a
method declaration and computes the method postcondition φpo:
[METH]
W={vi}ni=1 `{nochange(W )} e {φ}
X={v1, .., vn, res, v′1, .., v′m−1} V={v′i}ni=m Q={mn〈X〉 = ∃V · φ}
φpo = fix(Q)
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) {e} ⇒ φpo
The first line of the rule uses the expression judgement to traverse the method body e,
where W is a set of logical variables representing the inputs to the method mn. Using
the (possibly recursive) postcondition φ, a constraint abstraction Q is constructed for
the current method: mn〈X〉 = ∃V · φ. It has as arguments the variables from X, both
inputs and outputs of the method. Updates to the parameters that are passed by value
V should not be visible in the postcondition and thus are existentially quantified. A
non-recursive constraint abstraction mn〈X〉 = φ can be seen as a function which when
given some variables Y applies the substitution [X → Y ] on the constraint φ [73]. In
the case when the constraint abstraction is recursive, the third line of the [METH] rule
invokes a fixed point process. The fixed point process computes an approximation to the
least fixed point of the constraint abstraction function. This approximation represents
the postcondition φpo of the original method mn.
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Example 2.1 : We illustrate the process of collecting a constraint abstraction using
the simplest possible recursive method shown in Figure 2.6. The method mn is given
an integer argument x that is decremented to 0 in case it is positive, otherwise being
left unchanged. For exposition purposes, the example uses a recursive method and a
parameter that is passed by reference.
void mn (ref int x) {
if (x > 0) then {
x := x− 1;
mn(x);
} else { () }
}
Figure 2.6: Simple recursive example
The intended semantics of the method mn is represented as a constraint in terms of
the initial value of the parameter x and the latest value of the parameter x′ as follows:
(x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ x′=0). The first step in computing this semantics is to collect a
constraint abstraction which is close to the syntactic definition of the method mn:
mn(x, x′) = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ ∃x1 · (x1=x−1 ∧mn(x1, x′))) (2.1)
This view of the method mn has two parameters, namely the logical variables x and x′.
Next, we will show how to compute an approximation for the fixed point of the
constraint abstraction.
2.3.3 Fixed Point Approximation
We briefly review the method based on Kleene’s fixed point iteration and its application
to the polyhedron abstract domain [43]. Let (L,≤) be a complete lattice, and denote
by (P,⇒) the lattice of polyhedra. We write ⊥ for its least element (in P, the empty
polyhedron or its representation, the formula false), and > for its greatest element
(in P, the entire n-dimensional space or its representation, the formula true). The
least upper bound and the greatest lower bound operations in the lattice of polyhedra
are, respectively, the convex polyhedral hull and the set intersection, the first being
denoted by ⊕. A function f that is a self-map of a complete lattice is monotone if
x ≤ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y). In particular, the constraint abstraction functions derived
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by our analysis are monotone self-maps of the polyhedra lattice.
The least fixed point of a monotone function f can be obtained by computing the
ascending chain f0 = ⊥, fn+1 = f(fn), with n≥0. If the chain becomes stationary, i.e.,
if fm = fm+1 for some m, then fm is the least fixed point of f . In the case of a lattice
infinite in height (as the lattice of polyhedra), an ascending chain may be infinite, and
a widening operator must be used to ensure convergence. A widening operator ∇ is a
binary operator to ensure that the iteration sequence f0 = ⊥, fk+1 = f(fk) followed
by fn+1 = fn∇f(fn), with n > k, converges. In this case, the limit of the sequence is
known as a post fixed point of f . A post fixed point is a sound approximation of the
least fixed point, and the criterion to verify that x is a post fixed point for f is that
x ≥ f(x). For the polyhedron domain, the standard widening operator was introduced
in [43]. Intuitively, the result of the widening φ1∇φ2 is obtained by removing from φ1
those conjuncts that are not satisfied by the next iteration φ2.
The post fixed point result represents the method postcondition, a conservative
representation of the method transfer function. As mentioned before, the fixed point
process is parametric in the abstract domain. Consequently, the method postcondition
approximates more closely the concrete semantics when the abstract domain is more
fine-grained.
For fixed point computation, the constraint abstraction can be viewed as a function
that takes an abstract element in some lattice L and returns another abstract element.
Compared to the syntactic view from Equation 2.1, we now use a more semantic view
for the constraint abstraction function:
mn(φ) = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ ∃x1 · (x1=x−1 ∧ φ[x→x1, x′→x′])) (2.2)
The argument φ represents an abstraction of the traces from the beginning to the end
of the method (a constraint in terms of x and x′). Using the least element of the lattice
false(⊥), the abstract element mn1 is computed as mn(false), considering that the
recursive branch is never executed. The next iteration computes mn2 as mn(mn1) and
the iteration process continues further. The element mn1 represents the abstraction of
traces through the method mn for 0 recursive calls. The result of the next iteration
mn2 represents the abstraction of traces through the method mn for 1 recursive call.
At the limit, the least fixed point of the constraint abstraction function mn represents
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the abstraction of traces through the method mn for all possible recursive calls. As
might be expected, the least fixed point may or may not be computable, depending on
the abstract domain that is used. For the conjunctive polyhedra domain, the compu-
tation yields the following post fixed point: (x′≤x ∧ x′≤0). The disjunctive abstract
domain that will be introduced in Chapter 3 computes a more precise post fixed point:
(x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ x′=0).
We also note that the constraint abstraction body can be written using the least
fixed point operator from a fixpoint calculus [53, 142]. In such a formalism, the method
postcondition can be denoted as follows:
φpo = µX · ((x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ ∃x1 · (x1=x−1 ∧X[x→x1, x′→x′]))) (2.3)
Finally, we observe that the recursive method mn is tail-recursive and therefore it can
be written simply as a loop. One of the advantages of our approach based on trace
semantics and constraint abstraction formalism is that it analyzes more general patterns
of recursion with the same algorithm used for tail-recursive methods (including loops).
2.3.4 Method Summary
Other than the derivation of postcondition, method summaries used in software verifi-
cation require additional computations. We highlight three kinds of method summaries.
Algorithms towards their inference will be formalized in subsequent chapters.
• The inference of a method produces a summary composed of a postcondition
and a precondition necessary for safety. The precondition necessary for safety
can be trivially derived from the postcondition. Despite the simplicity of this
precondition inference, this approach can help eliminate a considerable number
of checks in our experiments. However, the precondition derived in this manner
requires a separate verification stage to ensure its soundness. We will formalize
this approach in Chapter 3.
• The inference of a method produces a summary composed of a postcondition and a
precondition sufficient for safety. We use an additional fixed point computation, in
order to derive preconditions sufficient for safety (for the case of general recursion).
Individual preconditions are derived for each check, which makes them useful not
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only for proving safety, but also for aggressive optimization of the checks. The
computation of such method summaries will be described in Chapter 4.
• The inference of a method produces a summary composed of a postcondition and
a precondition necessary for error. This derivation is useful for proving safety and
also for finding true errors that are guaranteed to occur during program execution
(modulo termination). The same technique has potential in guiding abstraction
refinement and for identifying preconditions sufficient for non-termination. These
aspects will be further elaborated in Chapter 5.




Polyhedral analysis [43] is an abstract interpretation used for automatic discovery of
invariant linear inequalities among numerical variables of a program. Convexity of this
abstract domain allows efficient analysis but also loses precision via convex-hull and
widening operators. To selectively recover the loss of precision, sets of polyhedra (dis-
junctive elements) may be used to capture more precise invariants. However a balance
must be struck between precision and cost.
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of affinity to characterize how closely re-
lated is a pair of polyhedra. Finding related elements in the polyhedron (base) domain
allows the formulation of precise hull and widening operators lifted to the disjunctive
(powerset extension of the) polyhedron domain. We have implemented a modular static
analyzer based on the disjunctive polyhedral analysis where the relational domain and
the proposed operators can progressively enhance precision at a reasonable cost.
3.1 Background
Abstract interpretation [37, 39] is a technique for approximating a basic analysis, with
a refined analysis that sacrifices precision for speed. Abstract interpretation relates the
two analyses using a Galois connection between the two corresponding property lat-
tices. The framework of abstract interpretation has been used to automatically discover
program invariants. For example, numerical invariants can be discovered by using nu-
merical abstract domains like the interval domain [36] or the polyhedron domain [43].
Such convex domains are efficient and their elements represent conjunctions of linear
inequality constraints.
Abstract domains can be designed incrementally based on other abstract domains.
The powerset extension of an abstract domain [39, 58] refines the abstract domain by
adding elements that allow disjunctions to be represented precisely. Unfortunately, anal-
yses using powerset domains can be exponentially more expensive compared to analyses
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on the base domain. One well-known approach to control the number of disjuncts dur-
ing analysis is to use a powerset domain where the number of disjuncts is syntactically
bounded. In this setting, the challenge is to find appropriate disjuncts that can be
merged without (evident) losses in precision. Our work was done at the same time
with (and independently from) a related technique for disjunctive static analysis that
has been proposed and implemented in [138]. Their analysis is formulated for a generic
numerical domain and an heuristic function based on the Hausdorff distance is used to
merge related disjuncts. Besides combining related disjuncts, recent interest has been
shown in tackling another difficulty in disjunctive analysis, that of defining a convergent
widening operator [2, 68].
In this chapter, we develop a novel technique for selective hulling to obtain precise
fixed-points via disjunctive inference. Our framework uses a fixed-point algorithm guided
by an affinity measure to find and combine disjuncts that are related. We also develop
a precise widening operator on the powerset domain by using a similar affinity measure.
We have built a prototype system to show the utility of the inferred postconditions and
the potential for tradeoff between precision and analysis cost.
This chapter is organized as follows: an overview of our method with a running
example is presented in Section 3.2. The proposed disjunctive abstract domain is de-
tailed in Section 3.3 by introducing an affinity measure, a selective hull and a widening
operator. Section 3.4 introduces a set of reasoning rules that collect a (possibly recur-
sive) constraint abstraction from each method/loop to be analyzed. Those recursive
constraint abstractions are the subject of disjunctive fixed-point analysis. Section 3.5
shows how boolean constraints can be handled in our framework. Our experimental re-
sults and interesting examples are presented in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7. Section 3.8
argues the correctness of our analysis, while Section 3.9 presents related work.
3.2 Overview of Fixed-Point Analysis
To provide an overview of our method, we will consider the following example.
x:=0;upd:=False;
while (x < N) do {
if (randBool()) then {
3.2. Overview of Fixed-Point Analysis 33
l:=x;upd:=True
} else { () };
x:=x+1 }
This program computes the index l of a specific element in an array of size N . The
array content has been abstracted out and only the updates to the index variables l and
x have been retained. The call to the method randBool abstracts whether the current
element indexed by x is found to satisfy the search criterion. Whenever the criterion is
satisfied, the index variable l is updated, as well as the boolean flag upd. An assertion at
the end of the loop could check that, whenever an element has been found (upd=true),
its index l is a valid index of the array (0≤l<N). The aim of our static analysis is to
infer disjunctive invariants that can help prove such properties.
A static analysis can be formulated as a state-based analysis: guided by the program
state at the beginning of the loop, it computes the loop postcondition as a program
state approximation [43, 68, 138]. As an alternative, our method is related to trace-
based analysis [30] and computes the loop summary as a transition formula from the
prestate (before the loop) to the poststate (after the loop body).
Our analysis is formulated in two stages. Firstly, it collects a constraint abstraction
from the method/loop body to be analyzed. This abstraction can be viewed as an
intermediate form and is related to the constraint abstraction introduced in [73]. As a
second step, an iterating process will find the fixed-point for the constraint abstraction
function.
For the running example, the constraint abstraction named wh represents the input-
output relation between the loop prestate (in terms of X, the unprimed variables
x,N, l, upd) and the loop poststate (in terms of X ′, the primed variables x′, N ′, l′, upd′).
wh(X,X ′) = ((nochange(X) ∧ x′<N ′)◦{l,upd}
(l′=x ∧ upd′=1 ∨ nochange(l, upd))◦{x}
(x′=x+1)◦Xwh(X,X ′))
∨ (nochange(X) ∧ x′≥N ′)
The nochange operator is a special transition where original and primed variables are
made equal: nochange({}) =df true; nochange({x}∪X) =df (x′=x)∧nochange(X). The
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composition operator (φ1◦W φ2) is left-associative and composes the input-output rela-
tions φ1 and φ2 updating W variables as specified by φ2 formula. Formally:
Definition 3.1 (Compose with Update). Given φ1, φ2, and the set of variables to
be updated X={x1, . . . , xn}, the composition operator ◦X is defined as:
φ1 ◦X φ2 =df ∃ r1..rn · ρ1 φ1 ∧ ρ2 φ2
where r1, . . . , rn are fresh variables;
ρ1 = [x′i 7→ ri]ni=1 ; ρ2 = [xi 7→ ri]ni=1
Note that ρ1 and ρ2 are substitutions that link each latest value of x′i in φ1 with the
corresponding initial value xi in φ2 via a fresh variable ri.
With these two operators, the effects of the loop sub-expressions are composed to
obtain the effect of the entire loop body. The 1st line of the constraint abstraction
corresponds to the loop test that is satisfied. The 2nd line stands for the body of the
conditional expression from the loop. Note that the boolean constants false and true
are modeled as integers 0 and 1. The 3rd line represents the assignment that increments
x by 1 composed with the effect of subsequent loop iterations (the occurrence of the wh
constraint abstraction). The 4th and last line stands for the possibility that the loop
test is not satisfied.
After some simplifications, the constraint abstraction reduces to:
wh(X,X ′) = ∃X1·( (x1=x+1 ∧N1=N ∧ l1=x ∧ upd1=1 ∧ wh(X1, X ′))
∨ (x1=x+1 ∧N1=N ∧ l1=l ∧ upd1=upd ∧ wh(X1, X ′))
∨ (x′=x ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x′≥N ′))
where X1 denotes the local variables (x1, N1, l1, upd1).
The analysis goal is then to compute a fixed-point approximation for the constraint
abstraction function. This function takes as argument a transition depending on X,X ′
and its result is also expressed as a transition dependent on the same variables. Both
transitions can either be approximated by polyhedra or, more precisely, by sets of poly-
hedra. The first case is akin to the polyhedral analysis from [43] and is reviewed next.
For the second case, we will use our running example to show how to compute a dis-
junctive loop postcondition.
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3.2.1 Computing Fixed-Points in the Polyhedron Abstract Domain
We will use the method based on Kleene’s fixed-point iteration applied to the polyhedron
abstract domain (see Section 2.3.3 for basic notations and a simpler example) for our
running example. The fixed-point iteration starts with the least element of the abstract
domain represented by the false formula. The first approximation wh1 is a transition
formula that considers that the loop test fails and the loop body is never executed:
wh1 = (x′=x ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x′≥N ′)
The next iteration is a three-disjunct formula that cannot be represented in the
polyhedron domain. An approximation for the disjunctive formula is computed using
the convex hull operator. A formula in disjunctive normal form φ = ∨ni=1di can be viewed
as a set of disjuncts: setd(φ) = {di}ni=1. We use either infixed or prefixed operators on
these disjuncts. For example, given φ=d1∨d2 then ⊕(φ) = ⊕({d1, d2}) = d1⊕d2.
wh2 = (x′=x+1 ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=x ∧ upd′=1 ∧ x′≥N ′)
∨ (x′=x+1 ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x′≥N ′)
∨ (x′=x ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x′≥N ′)
wh′2 = ⊕(wh2) = (x≤x′≤x+1 ∧N ′=N ∧ x′≥N)
wh′3 = ⊕(wh3) = (x≤x′≤x+2 ∧N ′=N ∧ x′≥N)
The iterating sequence will not converge since the inequality x′≤x will be translated at
the following iterations into x′≤x+1, x′≤x+2 and so on. Convergence is ensured by the
widening operator which simplifies as follows:
wh′′3 = wh′2∇wh′3 = (x≤x′ ∧N ′=N ∧ x′≥N)
This result proves to be a post fixed point for the wh function. However, the result is
rather imprecise as it does not capture any information about the value of l or the flag
upd at the end of the loop. Intuitively, such information was present in wh2 and wh3,
but approximated by the convex hull operator to obtain wh′2 and wh′3. Next, we outline
a method to compute disjunctive fixed-points able to capture this kind of information.
3.2.2 Computing Fixed-Points in a Disjunctive Abstract Domain
The two ingredients that we use to compute disjunctive fixed-points are counterparts
to the convex hull and widening operators from the conjunctive case. Both operators
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ensure a bound on the number of disjuncts allowed in the formulae.
We first propose a selective hull operator ⊕m parameterized by a constant m that
takes as argument a disjunctive formula and collapses these disjuncts into a result with
at most m disjuncts. The crux of this operator is an affinity measure to choose the two
most related (affine) disjuncts from a disjunctive formula. Formally:
Definition 3.2 (Selective Hull). Given φ = ∨ni=1di, and let di,dj be the most related
disjuncts as determined by their affinity, we define the selective hull operator as follows:
⊕m(φ) =df if n ≤ m then φ
else ⊕m (setd(φ) \{di, dj} ∪ {di ⊕ dj})
Note that the convex hull operator from the polyhedron domain ⊕ is equivalent to
⊕1 since it reduces its disjunctive argument to a conjunctive formula with one disjunct.
The affinity measure aims to quantify how close is the approximation d1⊕d2 from the
disjunctive formula d1∨d2. Intuitively, it works by counting the number of inequalities
(planes in the n-dimensional space) from the disjunctive formula that are preserved in
the approximation d1⊕d2. Since it counts the number of inequalities (relations between
variables), this affinity measure is able to handle the relational information captured by
the formulae in the polyhedron domain.
As an example, consider wh2 and wh3 obtained previously. The result of selective
hull with m=3 the bound on the number of disjuncts is computed as follows:
wh′′′2 = ⊕3(wh2) = wh2
wh′′′3 = ⊕3(wh3) = (x≤x′≤x+2 ∧N ′=N ∧ x≤l′≤x+2 ∧ upd′=1 ∧ x+2≥N)
∨ (x≤x′≤x+2 ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x+2≥N)
∨ (x′=x ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x≥N)
The second operator needed in the disjunctive abstract domain is a widening opera-
tor. We propose a similar affinity measure to find related disjuncts for pairwise widening.
For the two disjunctive formulae wh′′′2 = (d1∨d2∨d3) and wh′′′3 = (e1∨e2∨e3), the most
affine pairs will distribute the widening operator:
wh′′′2 ∇3wh′′′3 = (d1∨d2∨d3)∇3(e1∨e2∨e3) = (d1∇e1) ∨ (d2∇e3) ∨ (d3∇e3)
= (x′=N ∧N ′=N ∧ x≤l′≤N ∧ upd′=1)
∨ (x′=N ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x≤N)
∨ (x′=x ∧N ′=N ∧ l′=l ∧ upd′=upd ∧ x>N)
3.3. Disjunctive Abstract Domain 37
This result proves to be a post fixed point for the wh function in the powerset domain.
The first disjunct captures the updates to the variable l, thus l′ can safely be used as
an index for the array of size N . The last two disjuncts capture the cases where, either
the loop was executed but the then branch of the conditional has never been taken
(x≤N ∧ upd′=upd), or the loop has not been executed (x>N).
Note that our disjunctive fixed-point computation works not only for loops, but also
for general recursion. Our analysis also supports mutual recursion where fixed-points
are computed simultaneously for multiple constraint abstraction functions.
Since the computed fixed-point represents a transition, the analysis does not rely
on a fixed initial state and can be implemented in a modular fashion. While modular
analysis may expose more disjuncts (because no information is assumed about the initial
state) and benefits more from our approach, disjunctive analysis has been shown to be
also useful for global static analyses [68, 138].
3.3 Disjunctive Abstract Domain
Derived from the polyhedron abstract domain (P,⇒), we introduce a new disjunctive
abstract domain (℘m(P),⇒) able to represent sets of polyhedra with fixed cardinality
m. The partial order, the least and the greatest element are similar to those from the
base polyhedron domain. Fixed-point analysis in the polyhedron domain [43] attempts
to obtain a conjunctive formula result with the help of convex-hull and widening oper-
ators. A challenge for disjunctive fixed point inference is to apply hulling and widening
selectively on related disjuncts whenever needed. We propose a planar affinity measure
to be used by these two important operators in the disjunctive abstract domain.
3.3.1 Planar Affinity and Selective Hulling
In this section, we propose a qualitative measure called affinity to determine the suit-
ability of two disjuncts for hulling. To identify disjuncts, we expect formulae obtained
during fixed-point analysis to be in disjunctive normal form (DNF). For example, the
simplification of a formula φ in our prototype is performed with the help of Omega
library [88]. The result in DNF form φ = ∨ni=1di can be viewed as a set of disjuncts:
setd(φ) = {di}ni=1. Each disjunct di = ∧mj=1cij is a conjunction of linear inequalities and
equalities. It can be represented as a set of conjuncts setc(di) = {cij}mj=1.
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Measuring the affinity between disjuncts benefits from a canonical form of each dis-
junct. Representing such linear arithmetic formulae in canonical form can be done by
removing constraints that are trivially redundant, syntactically redundant and semanti-
cally redundant [95]. The original algorithm is applicable to a set of linear inequalities.
In addition, a linear equality can be split in two inequalities, while disequalities (or neg-
ative constraints) can also be handled by a more elaborate algorithm [96]. With Omega
Library, the simplification of constraints from a disjunct can be done with various trade-
offs between precision and efficiency. More expensive tests can ensure that redundant
constraints are eliminated [88, page 24]. Alternative to the constraint form, polyhedra
can be represented using the double-description method [107]. An advantage of this
double representation is that some operators like the set intersection can be computed
efficiently in constraint form, while other operators like the convex hull can be computed
efficiently in generator form [43, 3]. For our purposes, we use only the constraint form
and rely on Omega for efficient simplification at the expense of some redundancy in
formulae.
In order to obtain the affinity between two disjuncts φ1 and φ2, we have to compute
two main expressions (i) φhull = φ1⊕φ2 and (ii) φdiff = φhull∧¬(φ1∨φ2). Furthermore,
we also require a heuristic function heur that indicates how closely related is the ap-
proximation φ1⊕φ2 from the original formula φ1∨φ2. With this, we can formally define
the affinity measure using:
Definition 3.3 (Affinity Measure for Hulling). Given a function heur that returns
a value in the range 1..99, the affinity measure can be defined as:
hull affin(φ1, φ2) =df if φdiff=false then 100
else if φhull=true then 0
else heur(φ1, φ2)
The precise extreme (100) indicates that the convex-hull operation is exact without any
loss of precision. The imprecise extreme (0) indicates that the convex-hull operation is
inexact and yields the weakest possible formula true. In between these two extremes,
we will use an affinity measure to indicate the closeness of the two terms by returning
a value in the range 1..99.
This formulation of the affinity measure can be instantiated with various heuristic
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functions. We propose the use of a planar affinity measure that computes the fraction
of planes from the geometrical representation of the original formula that are preserved
in the hulled approximation:
Definition 3.4 (Planar Affinity for Hulling). Given two disjuncts φ1, φ2 and the
convex-hull approximation φhull = φ1⊕φ2, we first compute the set of conjuncts mset
using the following: mset = {c ∈ (setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)) | φhull =⇒ c}. The planar affinity
measure is shown below :
p-heur(φ1, φ2) =df
|mset|
|setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)| ∗ 98 + 1
The denominator |setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)| represents the number of planes corresponding
to the original formulae (from both polyhedra φ1 and φ2). Some of these planes are
approximated by the hulling process, while others are preserved in the approximation
φhull. The number of preserved planes is represented by the cardinality of mset and
indicates the suitability of the two disjuncts for hulling.
Example 3.1 : To illustrate the use of this measure for selective hulling, consider the
following disjunctive formula (obtained from the example on page 26):
F3 = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x=1 ∧ x′=0) ∨ (x=2 ∧ x′=0)
Firstly, the three disjuncts (denoted respectively by d1, d2 and d3) are converted to a
canonical form. As with other operators on polyhedra (e.g. the standard widening
operator from [77]), this minimal form requires that no redundant conjuncts are present
and, furthermore, each equality constraint is broken into two corresponding inequalities
as follows:
d1 = (x≤0 ∧ x′≥x ∧ x′≤x)
d2 = (x≥1 ∧ x≤1 ∧ x′≥0 ∧ x′≤0)
d3 = (x≥2 ∧ x≤2 ∧ x′≥0 ∧ x′≤0)
We compute three affinity values, one for each pair of disjuncts from φ. Note that
the cardinality of the set of conjuncts (setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)) is considered after removing
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duplicate conjuncts that appear both in φ1 and φ2.
d1 ⊕ d2 = (x′≤x ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≤x−1) mset(d1, d2) = {x′≤x, x≤1, x′≤0}
p-heur(d1, d2) = 3/7 ∗ 98 + 1 = 43
d1 ⊕ d3 = (x′≤x ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≤x−2) mset(d1, d3) = {x′≤x, x≤2, x′≤0}
p-heur(d1, d3) = 3/7 ∗ 98 + 1 = 43
d2 ⊕ d3 = (x≥1 ∧ x≤2 ∧ x′≥0 ∧ x′≤0) mset(d2, d3) = {x≥1, x≤2, x′≥0, x′≤0}
p-heur(d2, d3) = 4/6 ∗ 98 + 1 = 66
Based on these affinities, the most related pair of disjuncts is {d2, d3}. Even more,
this pair of disjuncts satisfy the exact test from Definition 3.3 (there is no loss of precision
by hulling d2 and d3) and therefore their affinity is 100. Computing the affinities between
each pair of disjuncts has in general a quadratic cost in the number of disjuncts and we
represent the results using a diagonal matrix of affinities:
d1 d2 d3
d1 - 43 43
d2 - - 100
d3 - - -
The above matrix is used to choose the two most affine disjuncts for hulling, d2 and d3.
If this operation leaves more disjuncts than the allowed bound m, then other disjuncts
are subsequently chosen for hulling. For the current example, the selective hull of φ
captures a precise relation between x and x′ and is computed as follows:
⊕2(F3) = ⊕2(d1 ∨ d2 ∨ d3) = d1 ∨ (d2 ⊕ d3) = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x≥1 ∧ x≤2 ∧ x′=0)
Related to our affinity measure, Sankaranarayanan et al [138] have concurrently
introduced a heuristic function that uses the Hausdorff distance to measure the dis-
tance between the geometrical representations of two disjuncts. The Hausdorff dis-
tance is a commonly used measure of distance between two sets. Given two polyhe-
dra, P and Q, their Hausdorff distance can be defined using the following function:
h-heur(P,Q) =df maxx∈P {miny∈Q{d(x, y)}} where d(x, y) is the Euclidian distance be-
tween two points x and y. This heuristic was deemed as hard to compute in [138] and,
as an alternative, a range-based Hausdorff heuristic was used.
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Because it reduces the relational constraints among variables to non-relational ranges
bounded by constants, we can argue that a range-based heuristic is less suitable for a
relational abstract domain like the polyhedron domain. Furthermore, we present an






























































Figure 3.1: Pairs of disjuncts with similar Hausdorff distance
The pairs of disjuncts {F1,F2} and {F3,F4} from Figure 3.1 may have similar h-heur
values; on the other hand, the affinity based on p-heur precisely indicates that the second
pair {F3,F4} is more suited for hulling. In Section 3.6, we will compare experimentally
these two heuristic functions when inferring postconditions for a suite of benchmark
programs.
3.3.2 Widening Operator
The standard widening operator for the convex polyhedron domain was introduced in
[43]. For disjunctive fixed point inference, a (powerset) widening operator for sets of
polyhedra is required. Given two disjunctive formulae φ1 and φ2, the challenge is to find
pairs of related disjuncts {di, ei} (di∈φ1, ei∈φ2) such that the result of widening di wrt
ei is as precise as possible.
For this purpose, Bagnara et al [2] introduced a framework to lift a widening operator
over a base domain to a widening operator over its powerset domain. The strategy used
by the powerset widening based on a connector starts by joining (connecting) elements
in φ2 to ensure that each such connected element approximates some element from
φ1. Secondly, it chooses related pairs {di, ei} based on the logical implication relation,
where di ⇒ ei. Mostly concerned with convergence guarantees for widening operators,
the framework from [2, 4] does not give a recipe for defining connector operators able to
find related disjuncts. Later, the generic widening operator definition was instantiated
for disjunctive polyhedral analysis by Gulavani et al in [68]. However, their proposal uses
a connector operator that relies on the ability to find one minimal element from a set of
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polyhedra. In general, the most precise result cannot be guaranteed by a deterministic
algorithm, since the polyhedron domain is partially ordered. To overcome this problem,
we propose an affinity measure to find related disjuncts for pairwise widening.
The strategy that we adopt for widening is to choose related pairs {di, ei} based on
their affinity. After pairwise widening, we subject the result to a selective hull operation
provided it contains more disjuncts than φ1. In general, there may be more disjuncts
in φ2 than in φ1. A reason for non-convergence of the powerset widening operator is
that some element from φ2 is not involved in any widening computation and included
unchanged in the result. Our operator (similar to the connector-based widening) dis-
tributes each disjunct from the arguments φ1 and φ2 in a widening computation and
thus ensures convergence. Formally, we define the widening operator as follows:
Definition 3.5 (Widening Operator). Given two formulae φ1=
∨m
i=1 di and φ2=
∨n
i=1 ei,
the powerset widening operator ∇m is defined as follows:
φ1∇mφ2 = ⊕m({di∇ei | di∈φ1, ei∈φ2})
where di is the best match for widening ei as found by the widen affin measure.
Similar to the affinity from Definition 3.3, the widen-affinity aims to find related
disjuncts, but proceeds by indicating how closely related is the approximation φ1∇φ2
from the original formula φ1:
Definition 3.6 (Affinity Measure for Widening). Given two disjuncts φ1, φ2 and
their widening φwiden = φ1∇φ2, the affinity for widening is defined as:
widen affin(φ1, φ2) = if φwiden∧¬φ1=false then 100
else if φwiden=true then 0
else heur(φ1, φ2)
The planar affinity measure from Definition 3.4 can be used for widening, provided we
redefine mset to relate φ1, φ2 with the approximation φwiden as follows:
mset = {c ∈ (setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)) | φwiden ⇒ c}
Example 3.2 : To illustrate the use of this measure for disjunctive widening, consider
the following two formulae obtained during successive iterations of fixed-point analysis
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for the example on page 26:
F3 = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (1≤x≤2 ∧ x′=0) (d1 ∨ d2)
F4 = (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (1≤x≤3 ∧ x′=0) (e1 ∨ e2)
After splitting the equality constraints, each disjunct can be written as follows:
d1 = (x≤0 ∧ x′≤x ∧ x′≥x)
d2 = (1≤x ∧ x≤2 ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≥0)
e1 = (x≤0 ∧ x′≤x ∧ x′≥x)
e2 = (1≤x ∧ x≤3 ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≥0)
We compute affinity values for each pair of disjuncts, one from F3 and another from F4:
d1∇e1 = (x≤0 ∧ x′≤x ∧ x′≥x) mset(d1, e1) = {x≤0, x′≤x, x′≥x}
p-heur(d1, e1) = 3/3 ∗ 98 + 1 = 99
d1∇e2 = (x≤0 ∧ x′≤x) mset(d1, e2) = {x≤0, x′≤x}
p-heur(d1, e2) = 2/7 ∗ 98 + 1 = 29
d2∇e1 = (x≤2 ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≥0) mset(d2, e1) = {x≤2, x′≤0, x′≥0}
p-heur(d2, e1) = 3/7 ∗ 98 + 1 = 43
d2∇e2 = (1≤x ∧ x′≤0 ∧ x′≥0) mset(d2, e2) = {1≤x, x′≤0, x′≥0}
p-heur(d2, e2) = 3/5 ∗ 98 + 1 = 60
These affinity values can be arranged in a matrix. The affinity between d1 and e1 is





The above matrix is used to choose the most affine disjuncts for widening. Accordingly,
the widening operator is computed as follows:
F3∇2F4 = (d1 ∨ d2)∇2(e1 ∨ e2) = (d1∇e1) ∨ (d2∇e2) =
= (x≤0 ∧ x′=x) ∨ (x>0 ∧ x′=0)
To conclude this example, we observe that the result of the widening operator satisfies
the post fixed point condition and therefore is a safe approximation for the postcondition
of the method from Figure 2.6. Comparatively, the postcondition computed using a
conjunctive abstract domain is less precise: (x′≤x ∧ x′≤0).
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3.3.3 Higher-Order Planar Affinity Measure
In the previous sections, we defined two affinity measures, one for hulling (Definition
3.3) and one for widening (Definition 3.6). Both affinity measures aim to predict the loss
of precision induced by an abstract operator (e.g. hulling or widening) when applied to
the two arguments φ1 and φ2. The accuracy of the prediction depends crucially on the
heuristic function that is used (e.g. planar affinity or Hausdorff distance).
One important benefit of the planar affinity is that we can formulate it as a higher-
order operator and use it to predict the loss of precision induced by an arbitrary abstract
operator op:
p-heur(op, φ1, φ2) =df
|{c ∈ (setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)) | φ1 op φ2 =⇒ c}|
|setc(φ1) ∪ setc(φ2)| ∗ 98 + 1
With this definition, we can use the planar affinity for other abstract operators, like the
greatest lower bound operator or the narrowing operator.
3.4 Forward Reasoning Rules
To complement the fixed-point analysis presented in the previous section, we pro-
pose a set of forward reasoning rules for collecting a constraint abstraction for each
method/loop. Some primitive methods may lack a method body and be given instead
a formula φ: the given formula may include a safety precondition (for example, bound
checks for array operations), or simply represent the input-output relation (for primitive
numerical operations like add or multiply). The reasoning process is modular, starting
with the methods at the bottom of the call graph.
We shall use the core imperative language introduced previously in Chapter 2. The
constraint language is based on the theory of linear arithmetic and denoted by φ formu-
lae. We shall assume that a type-checker exists to ensure that expressions and constraints
used in a program are well-typed.
The rule [METH] associates each method mn with a constraint abstraction of the
same name. Namely, mn(v∗, w∗) = φ, where v∗ covers the input parameters, while
w∗ covers the method’s output res and the primed variables from pass-by-reference
parameters. The fixed point analysis outlined in the previous section is invoked by
fix(Q) and returns φpo, the input-output relation of the method. To derive suitable
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postconditions, we shall subject each method declaration to the following rule:
[METH]
W={vi}ni=1 V={v′i}ni=m `{nochange(W )} e {φ}
X={v1, .., vn, res, v′1, .., v′m−1} Q={mn(X) = ∃V · φ} φpo = fix(Q)
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) where mn(X){e} ⇒ φpo
The inference uses a set of Hoare-style forward reasoning rules of the following form
`{φ1} e {φ2}. Given a transition φ1 from the beginning of the current method/loop to
the prestate before e’s evaluation, the judgement will derive φ2, a transition from the
beginning of the current method/loop to the poststate after e’s evaluation. A special
variable res is used to denote the result of method declaration as well as that of the
current expression under program analysis. Due to our use of primed variables and
existential linking of values that are passed around, the forward rules essentially derive
an SSA-like translated formula. Each intermediate value is captured by a unique variable
and the translated formula is purely declarative.
The reasoning rules are shown in Figure 3.2. The [ASSIGN] rule captures imperative
updates with the help of the prime notation. The [SEQ] rule captures flow-sensitivity,
while the [IF] rule captures path-sensitivity. The [CALL] rule accumulates the effect of
the callee postcondition using the composition operator: φ ◦W φpo. This rule postpones
the checking of the callee precondition to a later stage. The two rules [METH] and
[WHILE] compute a postcondition (indicated to the right of the ⇒ operator) which will
be inserted in the code and used subsequently in the verification rules. The result of
these rules is a definition for each constraint abstraction. As an example, consider:
void mnA(ref int x, int n) where (mnA(x, n, x′))
{ if x>n then x:=x−1; mnA(x, n) else () }
After applying the forward reasoning rules, we obtain the following constraint abstrac-
tion:
mnA(x, n, x′)=(x>n∧(∃x1·x1=x−1∧mnA(x1, n, x′)))∨(x≤n∧x′=x)
Note that the forward rules can be used to capture the postcondition of any recursive
method, not just for tail-recursive loops. For example, consider the following recursive
method:
int mnB(int x) where (mnB(x, res)) { if x≤0 then 1 else x:=x−1; 2+mnB(x) }








`{φ} e {φ1} φ2 = ∃res·(φ1◦{v}v′=res)
` {φ} v:=e {φ2}
[BLK]
`{φ} e {φ1}
` {φ} t v; e {∃v′·φ1}
[IF]
`{φ∧v′=1} e1 {φ1}
` {φ∧v′=0} e2 {φ2}
` {φ} if v then e1 else e2 {φ1∨φ2}
[SEQ]
`{φ} e1 {φ1}
` {∃res·φ1} e2 {φ2}
` {φ} e1; e2 {φ2}
[CALL]
W={vi}m−1i=1 distinct(W )




` {φ}mn(v1..vn) {φ ◦W φpo}
[WHILE]
X=freevars(v, e) `{nochange(X)∧v′=1} e {φ1}
φ2=(φ1◦Xwh(X,X ′)) ∨ (nochange(X)∧v′=0)
Q={wh(X,X ′) = φ2} φpo = fix(Q)
`{φ} while v do e {φ◦Xφpo} ⇒ φpo
Figure 3.2: Forward reasoning rules
Applying forward reasoning rules will yield the following constraint abstraction:
mnB(x, res)=(x≤0∧res=1)∨(x>0∧(∃x1, r1·x1=x−1∧mnB(x1, r1)∧res=2+r1))
The next step is to apply fixed point analysis on each recursive constraint abstraction.
By applying disjunctive fixed point analysis, we can obtain:
mnB(x, res)=(x≤0∧res=1)∨(x≥0∧res=2∗x+1)
3.4.1 Verification of Preconditions
Once a closed-form formula has been derived via fixed-point analysis, we shall return
to checking the validity of preconditions that were previously skipped. The rules for
verifying preconditions are similar to the forward rules for postcondition inference, with
the exception of three rules, namely:
[VERIFY−CALL]
t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)
n
i=m) where φpo
W={vi}m−1i=1 Z={res, v′1, .., v′m−1}
φpr=∃Z·φpo φ =⇒ [vi 7→v′i]ni=1φpr
`{φ}mn(v1..vn) {φ ◦W φpo}
[VERIFY−WHILE]
X = freevars(v, e) ρ = X 7→X ′
φpr = ∃X ′·φ2 φ =⇒ ρφpr
`{φ∧ρφpr} e {φ′}
` {φ} while v do e where φ2 {φ ◦X φ2}
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[VERIFY−METH]
W={vi}ni=1 Z={res, v′1, .., v′m−1}
φpr=∃Z·φpo `{φpr∧nochange(W )} e {φ}
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) where φpo {e}
The [VERIFY−CALL] rule checks that the precondition of each method call can be
verified as statically safe by the current program state. If it cannot be proven statically
safe, a run-time test will be inserted prior to the call site to guarantee the safety of the
precondition during program execution. The precondition derived for recursive methods
is meant to be also satisfied recursively. The [VERIFY−METH] rule ensures that each of
its callees is either statically safe or has a runtime test inserted. The [VERIFY−WHILE]
rule uses X to denote the free variables appearing in the loop body; the substitution ρ
maps the unprimed to primed variables. This rule uses the loop formula φ2 to compute a
precondition φpr necessary for the correct execution of the loop body. The precondition
is checked for satisfiability using φ, the state at the beginning of the loop. We refer to
this new set of rules as forward verification rules. We define a special class of totally-safe
programs, as follows:
Definition 3.7 (Totally-Safe Program). A method is said to be totally-safe if the
precondition derived from all calls in its method’s body can be verified as statically safe.
A program is totally-safe if all its methods are totally-safe.
For each totally-safe program, we can guarantee that it never encounters any runtime
error due to unsatisfied preconditions.
3.5 Mixing Boolean and Integer Constraints
In the preceding sections, we have focused largely on the (linear) arithmetic constraint
domain. However, in our constraint sublanguage, we can provide support for boolean
variables to be captured explicitly. In general, there are two ways to handle boolean
constraints.
The simpler solution that we adopted is to map each boolean value into the integer
domain and then allow an integer-based solver to handle the combined formulae. For
example, we can map false to 0, true to 1 and ensure that each boolean variable v
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be bounded by 0≤v≤1 in the integer domain. Furthermore, the basic boolean oper-
ators would have their postcondition translated as follows (i) not(v)⇒(res=1−v), (ii)
or(v1, v2)⇒(res=max(v1, v2)) and (iii) and(v1, v2)⇒(res=min(v1, v2)). The main ad-
vantage of this approach is that it allows a simple integration for both the boolean and
integer constraints under a single framework. However, there are some problems with
this approach. Firstly, the resulting constraint may have many disjunctions due to the
use of min and max operators which are defined in terms of disjunctions. This can make
such formulae more difficult to handle. Secondly, when performing fixed point inference,
the integer-based solver may try to discover arithmetic relationships between boolean
and integer variables that are typically meaningless. Thus, from the point of inference,
a single domain may result in a more complicated analysis.
Another solution is to use a different boolean SAT solver to handle boolean con-
straints, and to allow this solver to coexist with the integer-based solver. Our proposal
is to support a formula
∨
(σ∧φ)∗ where φ is an integer constraint in conjunctive form,
while σ is an arbitrary boolean formula. We call each disjunct of this form a mixed
constraint. The formula may be subjected to a hulling operation to limit the size of the
outermost disjunction. Formally, we define hulling for a pair of mixed constraints as
follows:
(σ1∧φ1)⊕m (σ2∧φ2) =df (σ1∨σ2) ∧ (φ1 ⊕m φ2)
Note that approximation is carried out for integer constraint, while boolean constraint
may be kept precise. We can now define an affinity measure for mixed constraints. We
may give higher weightage to the affinity measure for boolean formulae as it is more
precise than the heuristic used for integer constraints:
Definition 3.8 (Affinity for Mixed Constraint). Let k be a weightage ratio we give
to prioritize boolean constraint over the integer constraint. We can define affinity for
mixed constraints as follows:
affin(σ1∧φ1, σ2∧φ2)=df (affin(σ1, σ2)×k+affin(φ1, φ2))/(k+1)
Given a boolean formula, we use #σ to denote the number of truth assignments
in σ that can be obtained by a counting SAT algorithm. Let mn=min(#σ1,#σ2) and
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Benchmark Source Rec. m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5
Programs (lines) constr. (secs) (secs) post (secs) post (secs) post (secs) post
binary search 31 1 0.44 1.02 1 - - - - - -
bubble sort 39 2 0.78 0.89 1 - - - - - -
init array 5 1 0.17 0.24 1 - - - - - -
merge sort 58 3 1.42 3.39 3 3.76 1 3.91 1 4.48 1
queens 39 2 1.89 2.41 2 2.48 1 - - - -
quick sort 43 2 0.63 1.51 2 1.70 1 - - - -
FFT 336 9 8.24 10.17 5 11.62 3 11.90 1 12.15 1
LU Decomp. 191 10 10.27 13.41 8 14.44 3 - - - -
SOR 84 5 1.46 2.41 3 3.49 1 3.64 1 - -
Linpack 903 25 28.14 33.23 20 35.04 2 - - - -
Figure 3.3: Statistics for postcondition inference. Timings include precondition verifi-
cation. (“-” signifies a time and post similar to those from the immediate lower value
of m)
mx=max(#σ1,#σ2)We can define affinity of two boolean formulae σ1 and σ2, as follows:
affin(σ1, σ2) =df if (σ1∧¬σ2) then 100
else if ¬(σ1∧σ2) then 0
else 99− ((#(σ1∨σ2)−mx)×98/mn)
With this extra definition for affinity, we may proceed to handle mixed constraints for
disjunctive fixed point analysis using the same framework as that for integer constraints.
3.6 Experimental Results
We have implemented the proposed inference mechanisms with the goal of analyzing
imperative programs. Our implementation includes a pre-processing phase to convert
each C-like input program to our core language. The entire prototype system was built
using Glasgow Haskell compiler [121] extended with the Omega constraint solving library
[129, 88]. Our test platform was a Pentium 3.0 GHz system with 2GBytes main memory,
running Fedora 4.
We tested our system on a set of small programs with challenging recursion, and also
the Scimark and Linpack benchmark suites [112, 51]. Figure 3.3 summarizes the statis-
tics obtained for each program. To quantify the analysis complexity of the benchmark
programs, we counted the program size (column 2) and also the number of recursive
methods and loops present in each program (column 3).
The main objective for building this prototype was to certify that the disjunctive
analysis can be fully automated and that it gives more precise results compared to a
conjunctive analysis. To this end, we experimented with different bounds on the number
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m of disjuncts allowed during fixed point analysis. For each value of m, we measured
the analysis time and the number of methods for which the postcondition was more
precise than using (m−1) disjuncts. For each analyzed program, we detected a bound
on the value of m: increasing m over this bound does not yield more precision for the
formulae. The analysis time remains constant for cases where m is bigger than this
bound, therefore the values beyond these bounds are marked with ”-”. Capturing a
precise postcondition for algorithms like binary search, bubble sort, or init array was
done with a value of m equal to 2. We found that queens and quick sort require 3
disjuncts, while merge sort can be inferred by making use of 5 disjuncts.
After experimenting with different bounds for m imposed by the user, we designed
a heuristic to obtain automatically a bound useful for both precise and efficient analy-
sis. Such a bound is computed separately for each recursive method. More specifically,
the corresponding constraint abstraction is unrolled for a fixed number of times (3 in
our implementation) and we count the number of non-adjacent disjuncts. Adjacent dis-
juncts, those with 100 affinity for hulling, are combined directly. This heuristic gives
useful bounds for most of the methods and keeps the cost of analysis low by using more
disjuncts only when needed. We found only few methods (in FFT and Linpack bench-
marks) where, due to multiplication and division operators, a high bound is generated.
For such cases, we normally force a high bound of 5 disjuncts, unless overridden by the
user.
We also evaluated the usefulness of the disjunctive fixed point inference for static
array bound check elimination. The results are summarized in the Figure 3.4. Column 2
presents the total number of checks (counted statically) that are present in the original
programs. Columns 4 and 8 present the number of checks that cannot be proved safe
by using conjunctive analysis (m=1) and, respectively, disjunctive analysis with m=5
and planar affinity. For comparison, column 6 shows results of analysis using the Haus-
dorff distance heuristic, where the number of checks not proven is greater than using
planar affinity. While the planar affinity is usually more expensive (column 7) than the
Hausdorff affinity (column 5) for our experiments, we found that the difference is minor
considering the additional checks that can be proven safe using our planar affinity.
Using the planar affinity, the two programs bubble sort and init array were proven
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Benchmark Static Conj.(m=1) Haus.(m=5) Plan.(m=5)
Programs Chks. (secs) pre (secs) pre (secs) pre
binary search 2 0.44 2 0.80 2 1.02 2
bubble sort 12 0.78 3 0.78 0 0.89 0
init array 2 0.17 2 0.22 0 0.24 0
merge sort 24 1.42 9 3.09 4 4.48 0
queens 8 1.89 4 2.37 2 2.48 2
quick sort 20 0.63 5 1.43 5 1.70 1
FFT 62 8.24 17 11.91 12 12.15 5
LU Decomp. 82 10.27 42 14.71 9 14.44 4
SOR 32 1.46 15 2.78 2 3.64 0
Linpack 166 28.14 92 31.99 65 35.04 52
Figure 3.4: Statistics for check elimination
totally safe with 2-disjunctive analysis. Merge sort and SOR exploited the precision of
4-disjunctive analysis for total check elimination. Even if not all the checks could be
proven safe for queens, quick sort, FFT, LU and Linpack benchmarks, the number of
potentially unsafe checks decreased gradually, for analyses with higher values of m. As
a matter of fact, our focus in this chapter was to infer precise postconditions and we
relied on a simple mechanism to derive preconditions. To eliminate more checks, we
could use preconditions sufficient for safety in the style of [28, 127]. In the next chapter,
we will propose a technique that is powerful enough to derive sufficient preconditions
and eliminate all checks in this set of benchmarks. However, we stress that, either kind
of prederivation we use, disjunctive analysis is needed for better check elimination.
In general, analysis with higher values for m has the potential of inferring more
precise formulae. The downside is that computing the affinities of m disjuncts is an
operation with quadratic complexity in terms of m and may become too expensive for
higher values of m. In practice, we found that the case (m=3) computes formulae
sufficiently precise, with a reasonable inference time.
3.7 Examples
In this section, we give details on the analysis of some interesting examples. Firstly, we
show how disjunctive fixed-point is able to obtain a precise result for the McCarthy’s
91 function (res = 91). Secondly, we show the pivot partitioning method from the
quicksort algorithm where we observe a gradual increase in precision for postconditions
computed with 1, 2 and 3 disjuncts. Lastly, we show an example where a modular
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analysis requires a more complex abstract domain compared to a global analysis with
fixed values for the method parameters. This last example is extracted from the FFT
benchmark and requires non-linear invariants.
3.7.1 McCarthy’s 91 Function
The McCarthy’s 91 function shown in Figure 3.5 returns the value 91 for all integer
arguments smaller or equal with 101. For arguments n bigger than 101, the function
returns (n − 10). Despite its simplicity, this example is challenging for static analysis
and was described in the context of various conjunctive domains in [38, 15, 93].
int f91(int n) {
if (n<=100) then {
f91(f91(n+11))
} else { n-10 }
}
Figure 3.5: McCarthy’s 91 function
Our disjunctive fixed-point analysis computes the following intermediate results:
F1 = (n≥101 ∧ res=n−10)
F2 = (n≥101 ∧ res=n−10) ∨ (n=100 ∧ res=91)
F3 = (n≥101 ∧ res=n−10) ∨ (n=100 ∧ res=91) ∨ (n=99 ∧ res=91)
The 2-disjunctive abstract domain is sufficiently fine-grained, since hulling all the dis-
juncts obtained from recursion is precise with 100% affinity. The postcondition com-
puted matches the exact semantics of the code:
(n≥101 ∧ res=n−10) ∨ (n≤100 ∧ res=91)
3.7.2 Quicksort Example
Figure 3.6 shows an excerpt from a quicksort algorithm. The method partition divides
the elements of the array a between the indexes l and h into two partitions: elements
smaller than the initial pivot value a[l] and elements greater than the pivot value. The
parameters of the method changeN are a, n, i, h and v: a is the array to sort; n represents
the last element smaller-or-equal than the pivot; i and h are the start and the end of
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the sequence remaining to be compared with the pivot and v corresponds to the value
of the pivot.
int partition(float[] a, int l, int h) {
int v := a[l];
int n := changeN(a,l,l+1,h,v);
swap(a,l,n); n }
int changeN(float[] a, int n, int i, int h, float v) {
if (i <= h) then {
if (a[i] < v) then {
swap(a,n+1,i);
changeN(a,n+1,i+1,h,v)
} else { changeN(a,n,i+1,h,v) }
} else { n } }
void swap(float[] a, int i, int j) {
float temp := a[i];
a[i]:=a[j]; a[j]:=temp }
Figure 3.6: Quicksort example
We present the postconditions inferred for the recursive method changeN with in-
creasing values of m (1, 2 and 3). While a lower bound for the result of the method
(res≥n) can be discovered using conjunctive analysis, inference with 2 and 3 disjuncts
are able to discover also upper bounds for res. The result res may be safely used as a
valid index for the array parameter only with the relation discovered by the 3-disjunctive
analysis: (0≤res<s), where s is used to denote the size of array a.
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Postcondition with 1−disjunct :
changeN(s, n, i, h, res) =(res≥n)
Postcondition with 2−disjuncts :
changeN(s, n, i, h, res) =(h<i ∧ res=n)
∨(0≤i≤h<s ∧ n≤res≤n+(h−i)+1)
Postcondition with 3−disjuncts :
changeN(s, n, i, h, res) =(h<i ∧ res=n)
∨(0≤i≤h<s ∧ res=n))
∨(0≤i≤h<s ∧ 0≤n+1<s ∧ n<res≤n+(h−i)+1 ∧ res<s)
For array bound check elimination, the precondition obtained from the 2-disjunctive
postcondition of the method changeN helps to prove statically-safe the array access
to a[i]: φpre = (h<i)∨(0≤i≤h<s), However, this precondition cannot guarantee the
safety of the array accesses inside swap(a, n+1, i) call. Consequently, in the optimized
quicksort program, a runtime test is needed to protect this call to the method swap.
The precondition φpre may be hoisted out for runtime testing at some of its call
sites. At first sight, the replacement of two checks 0≤i<s of array access a[i] by a more
complex condition (h<i)∨(0≤i≤h<s) may potentially cause performance degradation
during check hoisting. However, the array access occurs within a recursive method, and
we are effectively replacing multiple runtime checks by a single hoisted check.
As mentioned previously, the derivation of necessary preconditions may be comple-
mented by a sufficient precondition derivation technique. The following sufficient pre-
condition can be derived (with the use of disjunctive fixed point analysis) and helps prove
all checks in quicksort as statically safe: (h<i ∨ 0≤i≤h) ∧ (h<a) ∧(0≤n+1<a−(h−i))
3.7.3 Fast Fourier Transform Example
The third example shows a complex excerpt from the FFT benchmark (see Figure 3.7).
The code written in C language indicates with comments what are the values of the
relevant parameters: (len(data) = 2048) and (N = 2048). An invariant for the outer
loop is: (0≤bit<logn ∧ dual=2bit). Even with the help of this non-linear invariant,
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void FFT transform internal (int N, double *data, int direction) {
// len(data) is 2048
int n = N / 2; // N is 2048, n is 1024
int dual = 1;
int logn = int log2(n); // logn is 10
for (bit = 0; bit < logn; bit++, dual *= 2) {
// dual will have values of {1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512}
...
for (b = 0; b < n; b += 2 * dual) {
int i = 2 * b;
int j = 2 * (b+dual);
... data[j] ...






Figure 3.7: FFT example
it is tricky to obtain the inner loop invariant that is useful in proving the safety of
array checks: (0 ≤ b+dual < 1024). For example, the array check data[j+1] requires:
(0 ≤ 2∗(b+dual)+1 < 2048).
We use this example to show one complex example of the checks that cannot be
proven by our system. The verification task can be eased by specializing a copy of
the inner loop for each value of the dual local variable. Even in this simpler case,
analysis of the inner loop (shown in Figure 3.8 specialized for the value 2 of the local
variable dual) requires an existential invariant: (0≤b<1024∧∃k · (b=4k)). Inferring this
existential invariant is not possible using our disjunctive abstract domain, but would
be an interesting future work. It requires the extension of our abstract domain with
support for congruence relations introduced by Granger in [64, 65].
3.8 Correctness
In this section, we shall outline the proofs that state that our forward reasoning rules
are correct in the following ways:
1. the forward analysis algorithm terminates (lemma 3.1).
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for (b = 0; b < 1024; b += 4) {
...
int j = 2 * (b+4);
... data[j+1] ...
}
Figure 3.8: Inner loop of FFT example
2. its inferred postcondition is a safe approximation of the possible final program
state (lemma 3.2).
3. each program that has been verified as totally-safe never fails due to primitive
operations having unsatisfiable preconditions (lemma 3.4).
The first two aspects are directly related to the correctness of forward reasoning
rules, while the third aspect is concerned with the safety of totally-safe program whose
preconditions have been statically verified. We shall also highlight why it is sound to
use the inferred postcondition of each method for strengthening its method’s necessary
precondition.
When used with both unprimed and primed variables, φ actually denotes a transition
(or change) in abstract states. In this situation, we shall use two operators to distinguish
between the original and final abstract states, as follows:
Definition 3.9 (Prestate and Poststate). Given an abstract state transition φ, its
prestate PreSt(φ) captures the relation between unprimed variables of φ. Correspond-
ingly, its poststate PostSt(φ), captures the relation between primed variables of φ.
3.8.1 Termination of Analysis
As highlighted in Sections 3.4 and 3.3, our postcondition inference algorithm is being
organised into two main stages. In the first stage, a constraint abstraction is built for
each method. In the second stage, a fixed point analysis is applied to each constraint
abstraction that is recursive. The first stage always terminates since the forward rules
effectively perform a structural recursion over its input expression. Consequently, the
termination of postcondition inference is solely dependent on the termination of fixed
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point analysis. We can show the terminations for the disjunctive fixed point analysis,
as follows:
Lemma 3.1 (Termination of Disjunctive Fixed Point). Given an affinity measure,
we can show that disjunctive fixed point with an upper bound on the number of disjuncts
always terminates.
Proof : Related to the result of [43] in which widening is used to ensure that constraints
encountered during conjunctive fixed point have at most finite variations. Due to the
existence of an upper bound on the number of disjuncts, widening will eventually occur
for a disjunctive formulae with respect to an earlier formulae with an identical number
of disjuncts. This widening operation will be applied to the respective components (with
closest affinity) of two disjunctive formulae. It will ensure that there are finite variations
in the constraints encountered for each m-disjuncts formulae. Hence, there are at most
finite variations of the disjunctive formulae. The choice of the affinity measure does not
influence the termination of the fixed point analysis (only its precision).
3.8.2 Soundness of Postcondition Inference
The poststate that we infer is a conservative approximation of the program state that
we expect after executing the program. A related property is stated as Theorem 5.1,
and we refer to its complete proof in Chapter 5.
Lemma 3.2 (Soundness of Postcondition Inferred). Given an abstract state φ and
an expression e1, we may obtain a new poststate φ1 via our forward reasoning rules, as
follows: `{φ} e1 {φ1}. This inference is sound as we can show that the following holds,
namely : for all states s1 consistent with φ1, if 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉, then it must be the
case that the pair of states (s1, [res 7→δ]+sn) is soundly approximated by φ1.
3.8.3 Necessary Precondition
Postcondition inference expresses a possible abstract state and is conservative in that
whenever its program code terminates, its resulting program state is always captured
by the inferred postcondition. As a corollary, if an initial state s1 is not covered
by the prestate of the inferred postcondition, we can confirm that it fails either as
〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈error〉 from runtime error or as 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ from non-termination. Thus,
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strengthening the precondition of a method with the prestate of its method’s inferred
postcondition is safe to use for ruling out a class of definite errors, including those from
non-termination. The following lemma shows that necessary precondition is always safe
to use and never induces any false alarms.
Lemma 3.3 (Definite Errors from each Necessary Precondition). Consider an
inference `{φ} e1 {φ1} and an initial abstract state φ such that φ =⇒ nochange(V(e)).
For each state s1 consistent with φ, but not consistent with φ1, it is never the case
that 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉. This means that either 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈error〉 or 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not
terminate.
Proof : Follows as a corollary of Lemma 3.2 on the Soundness of Inferred Postcondi-
tion, where we require that s1 is consistent with φ1 whenever there is a possibility that
〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉.
A related property in the context of Chapter 5 is stated by the Corollary 5.5.
3.8.4 Totally-Safe Program
For programs that have been verified as totally-safe by our forward reasoning rules, we
can guarantee that run-time errors from primitive operations can never occur using the
following lemma:
Lemma 3.4 (Totally-Safe Program). Given a program that has been shown to be
totally-safe by the forward verification rules of Section 3.4, its execution will always
either make progress or terminate with a value, but will never result in any runtime
error.
Proof : Follows from a subject reduction condition that is ensured for each totally-safe
program code. Given any pair 〈s1, e1〉 such that s1 is consistent with φ. If the judgement
`{φ} e1 {φ1} holds, we can always show that either e1 is a value or 〈s1, e1〉↪→〈s2, e2〉 and
that `{φ2} e2 {φ′1} holds where φ′1 ⇒ φ1. This evaluation either terminates or makes
another evaluation step, but it can never fail due to runtime error. The result can be
proven by an induction over the small-step semantics of each totally-safe program code.
A related property in the context of Chapter 5 is stated by the Corollary 5.6.
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3.9 Related Work
Our analysis is potentially useful for software verification and for static analyses based
on numerical abstract domains.
Program verification may be performed by generating verification conditions, where
their validity implies that the program satisfies its safety assertions. Verification con-
dition generators assume that loop invariants are present in the code, either annotated
by the user or inferred automatically. Methods for loop invariant inference include
the induction-iteration approach [144] and approaches based on predicate abstraction
[56, 92]. Leino and Logozzo [98] designed a loop invariant computation that can be
invoked on demand when an assertion from the analyzed program fails. The invariant
that is inferred satisfies only a subset of the program’s executions on which the assertion
is encountered. Comparatively, our method infers a disjunctive formula that is valid for
all the program’s executions, with each disjunct covering some related execution paths.
We achieve this modularly, regardless of any subsequent assertions. Thus, our results
can be directly used in the inter-procedural setting.
Partitioning of the abstract domain was first introduced in [44]. Recently, Mauborgne
and Rival [103] have given strategies for partition creation and demonstrated their fea-
sibility through their use in Astre´e static analyzer [12]. Like them, we make the choice
of which disjunctions to keep at analysis time. However, the partitioning criterion is
different. In their case, the control flow is used to choose which disjunctions to keep.
Specifically, a token representing some conditions on the execution flow is attached to
a disjunct, and formulae with similar tokens are hulled together. In our case, the par-
titioning criterion is based on a property of the disjuncts themselves, with the affinity
measure aiming to hull together the most closely related disjuncts.
Various abstract numerical domains have been developed for static analysis based
on abstract interpretation. The form of invariants to be discovered is determined by
the chosen numerical domain: from the interval domain that is able to discover rela-
tions of the form (±x≤c), to the lattice of polyhedra that represents invariants of the
form (a1x1+..+anxn≤c), all these abstract domains represent conjunctions of linear in-
equalities. Our pre/post analysis is formalised in a manner that is independent of
the abstract domain used. It can therefore readily benefit from advances in constraint
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solving techniques for these numerical domains.
3.10 Summary
We have proposed a new method for inferring disjunctive postconditions. Our approach
is based on the notion of selective hulling as a means to implement adjustable precision
in our analysis. We introduced a simple but novel concept called affinity and showed
that planar affinity is superior to a recently introduced method based on Hausdorff
distance. We have built a prototype system for disjunctive inference and have proven its
correctness. Our experiments demonstrate the utility of the disjunctive postconditions
for proving a class of runtime checks safe at compile-time, and the potential for tradeoff
between precision and analysis cost.
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CHAPTER IV
DERIVING PRECONDITIONS FOR MODULAR
STATIC ANALYSIS
Array bound check optimization has been extensively investigated over the last three
decades [144, 43, 71], with renewed interests as recently as [13, 149, 52, 145, 116]. While
the successful elimination of bound checks can bring about measurable efficiency gain,
the importance of check optimization goes beyond this direct gain. In safety-oriented
languages, such as Java, all bound violation must be faithfully reported under precise
exception handling mechanism. Thus, check optimization is even more important for
run-time efficiency under such constraints. For example, the code motion technique is
severely hindered by potential array bound violations.
Most array optimization techniques (e.g. [144, 43, 147]) focus on the elimination
of totally redundant checks. To achieve this, whole program analysis is carried out to
propagate analysis information (e.g. availability) to each program point. Even for tech-
niques that handle partially redundant checks, such as partial redundancy elimination
(PRE)[14], the focus has been on either moving these checks or restructuring the con-
trol flows, but without exploiting path-sensitivity or interprocedural relational analysis.
These features are important for supporting precise analyses.
In this chapter, we propose a practical approach towards array bound checks op-
timization that is both precise and efficient. Our approach is based on the derivation
of a suitable precondition for each array check across the method boundary, followed
by program specialization to eliminate array checks found to be redundant. Successful
elimination of array checks depends on how accurately we are able to infer the states of
the program variables. To achieve accuracy, we employ the disjunctive abstract domain
developed in Chapter 3. We formalise our technique as a type system that uses type
annotations for communicating information between the inference and the specialization
phases. We use a form of dependent type [84, 147, 27] that can capture symbolic pro-
gram states using a relational analysis. The key contributions described in this chapter
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include:
• Forward with Backward Combination : We propose a novel combination of
forward plus backward analysis that can be practical and precise. This combina-
tion performs the more expensive forward fix-point analysis only once per method,
but proceeds to derive individual safety precondition for each check across pro-
cedural boundary. We provide the first formalization and implementation of this
combination technique for an imperative language. (Sections 4.3 and 4.4)
• Indirection Arrays : Our approach can analyse the bounds of elements inside
an array. This is important for eliminating array checks for a class of programs
where indexes are kept inside indirection arrays (Section 4.5). Past techniques on
array bound checks elimination have largely ignored this aspect.
• Smaller Preconditions : To obtain a practical analysis, we devise a new tech-
nique to make formulae smaller by suitable strengthening of preconditions (Sec-
tion 4.6). This approach trades (some) precision for speed and has been vindicated
by experiments with our prototype inference system.
• Integration with Specializer: We adopt a summary-based approach that gath-
ers preconditions, postcondition and unsafe checks for each method. While su-
mmary-based techniques have already been proposed for a number of program
analyses [19, 40, 148], their integration with program specializer is hardly investi-
gated. We show how a flexivariant specializer could be used to insert runtime test
for each array check that has been classified as unsafe (Section 4.7).
• Prototype : To confirm the viability of our approach, we have built a prototype
inference and specializer system (Section 4.8).
4.1 Overview
A key feature of our approach is the three-way classification of checks. Given a method
definition with a set of parameters V and a set of checks C, our approach will classify
each check (c ∈ C) that occurs at a location with a symbolic program state s, as follows:
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• c is safe if it is redundant under the program state s at the location of this check.
This holds if the following is valid:
(s⇒ c)
• c is partially-safe if it may become redundant under an extra condition. This holds
if there exists a satisfiable precondition pre (expressed in terms of variables from
only V ) such that:
(pre ∧ s⇒ c) (4.1)
The precondition can be derived using pre = (∀L · ¬s∨c), where L is the set of
local variables, denoted by vars(s, c)− V . The function vars returns the free vari-
ables used in s and c.
• c is unsafe, if false is the only precondition that can be found to satisfy (4.1). In
this case, the analysis will (conservatively) conclude that the check c may fail at
runtime.
Partially-safe checks are special in that they can be propagated across methods from
callees to callers. This mechanism can further exploit the program states at callers’
sites for the elimination of checks. While the above classification is general and may
be applicable to any kind of checks, in this chapter we shall be focusing exclusively on
array-related checks.
Let us highlight the above check classification using the foo example at the top of
Figure 4.1. In this example, randInt returns a random integer, while abs converts each
number into its positive counterpart. The set of parameters V at method boundary is
{a, j, n} where a is an array with indices from 0 to len(a)−1. The foo method contains
two array accesses at locations `1 and `2. The symbolic program states (sps) at these
sites may be affected by the type invariants 1, conditionals, imperative updates and by
prior calls. Computing the states for the method entry `0 and the locations `1 and `2,
we get:
1An example of a type invariant is that the size of an array a, denoted by len(a), is positive (a design
decision we took for our language).
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Float foo(Float[] a, Int j, Int n)
`0:{ Float v=0.0; Int i=j+1;
if (0<i<=n) then v=(`1:a[i]) else ();
Int m=abs(randInt());
v+(`2:a[m]) }wwÄ Inference
Float foo(Float[Ints] a, Intj j, Intn n)
where (j≤s−2) ∨ (n≤j ∧ j+1≥s) ;
{`1.H : (j≤s−2) ∨ (n≤j ∧ j+1≥s)}; {`2.H} {· · · }wwÄ Specialization
Float foo(Float[Ints] a, Intj j, Intn n)
where (j≤s−2) ∨ (n≤j∧j+1≥s); (j≤s−2) ∨ (n≤j∧j+1≥s)
`0:{ Float v=0.0; Int i=j+1;
if (0<i<=n) then v=(`1:a[i])else ();
Int m=abs(randInt());
v+(if (m<len(a)) then `2:a[m] else error) }
Figure 4.1: Inference and specialization : An example
sps(`0) = len(a) > 0
sps(`1) = sps(`0) ∧ i=j+1 ∧ 0<i<=n)
sps(`2) = sps(`0) ∧ i=j+1 ∧ m>=0
Based on the earlier classification of checks, we can establish that the low-bound checks
(at `1 and `2) are safe, since:
sps(`1)⇒(i >= 0) and sps(`2)⇒(m >= 0)
For the high-bound checks (denoted by `1.H and `2.H), we derive (the weakest) pre-
conditions through universal quantification of the local variables, as follows:
pre(`1.H) = ∀i, m · (¬sps(`1) ∨ i<len(a))
= ∀i, m · (¬(len(a)>0 ∧ i=j+1 ∧ 0<i<=n) ∨ i<len(a))
= len(a)<=0 ∨ (j<=len(a)−2 ∧ 1<=len(a))
∨(1<=len(a)<=j+1 ∧ n<=j)
pre(`2.H) = ∀i, m · (¬sps(`2) ∨ m<len(a))
= ∀i, m · (¬(len(a)>0 ∧ i=j+1 ∧ m>=0) ∨ m<len(a))
= len(a)<=0
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These derived preconditions may be the weakest, but they do not take into account
the type invariant and thus are larger than needed. The type invariant len(a) > 0
can be used to simplify pre(`2.H) to false and pre(`1.H) to (j<=len(a)−2 ∨ n<=j ∧
j+1>=len(a)). The last formula contains a disjunct (j<=len(a)−2) for satisfying
the check, and a second disjunct (n<=j ∧ j+1>=len(a)) for avoiding the check (when
the conditional test is unsatisfiable). In general, the simplification may drop disjuncts
that violate the type invariant (len(a)<=0) or remove conditions already present in the
type invariant (len(a)>0). We perform each simplification of a formula φ1 under type
invariant φ2 by the operation (gist φ1 given φ2) introduced in [130]. This gist opera-
tion yields a simplified term φ3 such that φ3∧φ2 ≡ φ1∧φ2. Informally, the operation
(gist φ1 given φ2) returns the new information from φ1 given that φ2 holds.
While a goal of our analysis is to obtain weaker preconditions for precision, this might
impact the scalability of our analysis. To obtain smaller (but stronger) preconditions,
we apply a similar simplification based on the gist operation, but more aggressive. For
example, simplifying pre(`1.H) with respect to the program state of the check ∃i·sps(`1)
yields a smaller precondition (j<=len(a)−2) without the disjunct that allows avoiding
the check. Our proposal trades off precision for performance and is crucial for overcoming
the intractability of solving large Presburger arithmetic formulae.
One feature of our optimization is its formulation in two stages: type inference
followed by specialization. The type inference stage processes methods in reverse topo-
logical order of the call graph. It computes post-states at each program point, classifies
checks and propagates preconditions as new checks at each method boundary. It also
marks all unsafe checks. These information are collected for each method declaration:
a postcondition ∆, a set of preconditions Φ, a set of unsafe checks Υ, and annotated
types τ0, .., τk.
τ0 m (τ1 v1, . . . , τk vk) where ∆; Φ; Υ {body}
For example, after type inference on the foo method, we would obtain the method
displayed in the middle of the Figure 4.1, where the unchanged method body is replaced
by {. . . }. During the actual inference, we use size variables instead of program variables.
For example, size variables s, j and n denote len(a), j and n respectively.
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The inference result is then used by the specialization stage to insert runtime tests
to guard unsafe checks and to derive target programs that are well-typed. Well-typed
specialised methods are decorated with a postcondition ∆ and a precondition φpre :
τ0 m (τ1 v1, . . . , τk vk) where ∆; φpre {body}
The precondition φpre is a conjunction of checks from Φ that are guaranteed safe at
each call site. For example, if pre(`1.H) is found to be safe when analyzing the call sites
of method foo, we can generate the specialised (and well-typed) method at the bottom
of Figure 4.1. Note that ∆ ≡ φpre holds for this particular example, but in general the
two formulae may be different. This is so as postcondition is computed using over-
approximation, while precondition is computed using under-approximation. Moreover,
postcondition may capture its method’s result(s), but not so for precondition.
Well-typed programs are safe in that no array bound errors are ever encountered
by any array access during program execution. This safety property is guaranteed by
either the program context (for array checks `1.L and `2.L), or the precondition of each
method (for array check `1.H) or the inserted runtime test (for `2.H). In the rest of this
chapter, we shall formalise a type inference system to derive well-typed programs for a
core imperative language.
4.2 An Imperative Language
To formalise our type inference we use as source language Imp, as introduced in Chap-
ter 2 (see Figure 2.1), where types, denoted by t do not have annotations. Imp has
support for assignments, conditionals, local declarations, method calls, and multidimen-
sional arrays. Typical language constructs, such as multi-declaration block, sequence,
calls with complex arguments can be automatically translated to constructs in Imp. In
addition, loops can be viewed as syntactic abbreviations for tail-recursive methods, and
are supported by our analysis with the help of pass-by-reference parameters.
4.2.1 Target Language
The target of our inference system is a corresponding imperative language with depen-
dent types where types may be annotated with size variables. For example, a boolean
value can be denoted by Boolb where b = 0 represents false and b = 1 represents true;
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meth ::= τ mn (([ref] τ v)∗) where ∆;Φ;Υ {e}
prim ::= τ mn ((τ v)∗) where ∆;Φ; C
τ, τˆ ::= τ | τ [Ints1 , . . . , Intsk ]
τ ∈ PrimAnnType
::= Void | Ints | Bools | Float
Φ ::= { (l+ : φ)∗ } (Labelled Preconditions)
Υ ::= { (l+)∗ } (Unsafe Checks)
C ::= { (l+ : e)∗ } (Labelled Runtime Checks)
` ∈ Label
`+ ::= ` | `1. · · · .`n (Label Sequences)
φ,∆ ∈ Formula (first order theory of linear arithmetic)
Figure 4.2: Inferred ImpI language
an integer value can be denoted by Intn with n to denote its integer value, while
Float[Ints] can denote an array of floats with s elements. Input-output relation be-
tween size variables from method parameters and result is captured after the where
keyword:
Intr randInt() where true; . . .
Intr abs(Inta v)
where (a<0∧r=−a ∨ a≥0∧r=a)∧(a′=a); . . .
Intr add(Inta x, Intb y)
where (r=a+b) ∧ nochange{a, b}; . . .
Boolr lessThan(Inta x, Intb y)
where (a<b∧r=1 ∨ a≥b∧r=0)∧nochange{a, b}; . . .
Note that true for randInt signifies that r is unbounded. Also, non-trivial size relations
can be supported through disjunctive formulae. The prime notation is used to denote
the state of size variables at the end of the method. Parameter values that are unchanged
across method calls are captured using the notation nochange{a, b}≡(a′=a∧b′=b) as a
shorthand for “no change in state”. This no-change in state occurs mostly for param-
eters that are passed by value. Pass-by-reference parameters are also supported in our
language using the ref keyword.
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Figure 4.2 summarises a language with dependent type, called ImpI , which is de-
signed to be the target of our inference. Each method declaration captures three infor-
mation: an input-output relation (postcondition) ∆, a set Φ that contains a precondition
for each partially-safe check, and a set of label sequences Υ, each sequence representing
the location of an unsafe check. The labels from Φ and Υ identify call sites from the
body of the current method. This is enabled in our language since every method call is
uniquely labelled . The suffix notation s∗ denotes a list of zero or more distinct syntactic
terms separated by appropriate separators, while s+ represents a list of one or more
distinct syntactic terms.
For a non-recursive method mn, the triple (∆,Φ,Υ) can be derived via inference of
the method body (since the triple for each method called in mn are already inferred.) To
support recursive methods, we make use of constraint abstractions. For each mutual-
recursive method, we first derive a (recursive) constraint abstraction Q of the form
q〈n∗〉 =φ. These abstractions are used by fix-point computation to provide a sound and
precise analysis for recursive methods. An adaptation of the fix-point approximation
from [43] is detailed via examples in Section 4.4. Besides constraint abstractions, our
language of constraints contains conjunctions and disjunctions of linear (in)equalities.
We make use of a Presburger solver [129] (with support for universal and existential
quantifications) to eliminate local variables or simplify formulae.
Primitive methods (denoted by prim in Figure 4.2) lack a method body and are
instead annotated with a postcondition and a set of preconditions to support type infer-
ence. A primitive is also annotated with a set of runtime tests C for use by the specializer:
if some precondition is not satisfied at a primitive call site, its corresponding runtime
test is to be inserted. Array operations are implemented as calls to primitive methods.
For example, 1-dimensional array operations with element type τ are shown below:
τ [Intr] newarr(Ints s, τ v) where (0<s ∧ r=s ∧ s′=s); {S: s> 0}; {S: s>0}
Intr len(τ [Ints] a) where (r=s ∧ s′=s); {}; {}
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τ sub(τ [Ints] a, Inti i)
where (0≤i<s ∧ nochange{i, s}); {L: 0≤i, H: i<s}; {L: 0≤i, H: i<len(a)}
Void assign(τ [Ints] a, Inti i, τ v)
where (0≤i<s ∧ nochange{i, s}); {L: 0≤i, H: i<s}; {L: 0≤i, H: i<len(a)}
The primitive newarr returns a new array with all elements initialized to the value v, len
returns the length of the array, sub returns an array element from the specified index
i, while assign updates the specified array element with the value v. For example,
an array access a[i] is (automatically) converted to sub(a, i), while an array update
a[i] = v is converted to the primitive call assign(a, i, v).
[Var]
Γ(v) = τ τ1 = fresh(τ)
φ = equate(prime(τ), τ1)
V ; Γ;∆ ` v ; v :: τ1,∆ ∧ φ, ∅, ∅
[Var−Assign]
V ; Γ;∆ ` e; e1 :: τ1,∆1,Φ,Υ
Γ(v) = τ ∆2 = assign(∆1, τ, τ1)
V ; Γ;∆ ` v:=e; v:=e1 :: Void,∆2,Φ,Υ
[If ]
Γ(v) = Boolb V ; Γ;∆ ∧ (b′ = 1) ` e1 ; e3 :: τ1,∆1,Φ1,Υ1
τ = fresh(τ1) V ; Γ;∆ ∧ (b′ = 0) ` e2 ; e4 :: τ2,∆2,Φ2,Υ2
ρi = rename(τi, τ) ∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∆3 = ρ1∆1 ∨ ρ2∆2 e5 = if v then e3 else e4
V ; Γ;∆ ` if v then e1 else e2 ; e5 :: τ,∆3,Φ1∪Φ2,Υ1∪Υ2
[Call]
Γ(vi) = τi ∀i ∈ 1..n τ = fresh(τˆ) U =
⋃k
i=1V(τi) ` = fresh()
(τˆ m(τˆ1 x1, . . . , τˆn xn) where ∆m; Φm; · · · ) ∈ P ∪ Pm Φm = {(`+1 : φ1), .., (`+k : φk)}
ρ = rename(τˆ , τ) unionmulti Σni=1{rename(τˆi, τi)} prei ≡s (∆ ≈> ρφi)↓V
mkChk(prei, `.`+i , Φˆi,Υi) ∀i ∈ 1..k Φˆ =
⋃k
i=1 Φˆi Υ =
⋃k
i=1Υi
V ; Γ;∆ ` m(v1..n); ` : m(v1..n) :: τ,∆ ◦U ρ(∆m), Φˆ,Υ
[Mtd−Declare]
md = t m(t1 v1, . . . , tk vk) {e} τi = fresh(ti) ∀ i = 1..n τ = fresh(t)
V =
⋃k
i=1V(τi) W = V ∪V(τ) Γ = {v1 : τ1, . . . , vk : τk}
∆init = init(Γ) V ; Γ;∆init ` e ; e1 :: τ,∆,Φ,Υ Q = {m〈W 〉 = ∆}
`I md ; τ m(τ1 v1, . . . τkvk) where m〈W 〉; Φ;Υ{e1} | Q
[MkChk−1]
pre ≡ true
mkChk(pre, `+, ∅, ∅)
[MkChk−2]
pre ≡ false
mkChk(pre, `+, ∅, {`+})
[MkChk−3]
¬(pre ≡ true ∨ pre ≡ false)
mkChk(pre, `+, {`+ : pre}, ∅)
Figure 4.3: Type inference rules
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4.3 Type Inference Rules
Our inference system analyses and propagates state information so as to determine if an
array check is safe and if a precondition is to be propagated to the method boundary . The
type judgment for the entire program is Pm `I P ; PI . It derives a program PI ∈ ImpI
from a program P ∈ Imp and a set of primitive declarations Pm.
The type judgement for expressions is specified as follows:
V ; Γ;∆ ` e; e1 :: τ,∆1,Φ,Υ
Here V is a set of size variables (called boundary variables) available at the boundary
of the method in which the expression e resides. Γ is a type environment mapping
program variables to their annotated types. The above judgement states that e will be
transformed into e1 during the inference: the target expression e1 will contain types
annotated with fresh size-variables and labels that uniquely identify method calls. Both
e and e1 have the same underlying type. Furthermore, successful evaluation of e (and
e1) requires the validity of preconditions Φ, and the inclusion of the runtime tests Υ.
Successful evaluation of e also changes the program state from ∆ to ∆1.
For convenience, our inference rules ensure that the size variables occurring in the
annotated type τ are unique; ie., V(τ)∩ V(Γ) = ∅ where FSV returns the set of free
size variables found. Some of the interesting inference rules are specified in Figure 4.3.
In these rules, we use s = fresh() and ` = fresh() to generate a new size variable and
a new label, respectively. For annotated types, τˆ = fresh(t) (or τˆ = fresh(τ)) returns
a new type τˆ with the same underlying type as t (or τ), but annotated with fresh
size variables. The function equate(τ1, τ2) generates equality constraints for the corre-
sponding size variables of its two arguments, assuming both arguments share the same
underlying type. For example, we have equate(intn, intm
′
) = (n = m′). The function
rename(τ1, τ2) returns a mapping instead, e.g. rename(intn, intm
′
) = (n 7→ m′). A
conditional constraint is expressed as ζ1 ¢ b¤ ζ2 =df if b then ζ1 else ζ2. For the rest of
this section, we highlight the important aspects of our inference system via examples.
4.3.1 Inferring Imperative Update
Let us consider an expression v := v+ u, a pre-state formula ∆ = (m′=2+n′∧n′=5) and
the type environment Γ = {u :: Intm, v :: Intn, . . .} . This example shows how the prime
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notation is used to capture the latest values of size variables at each symbolic state. It
also shows how updates are effected by a sequential composition operator, ◦X , where X
denotes a set of size variables that are being updated.
The following depicts the inference step for assignment:
Γ(v) = intn Γ(u) = intm
V ; Γ;∆ ` v+ u; v+ u :: intr,∆ ∧ r = n′ +m′, ∅, ∅
∆2 = assign(∆ ∧ r = n′ +m′, intn, intr)
V ; Γ;∆ ` v := v+ u; v := v+ u :: void,∆2, ∅, ∅
The function assign performs the necessary sequential composition:
assign(∆, τ, τ1) =def let X = V(τ) ; Y = V(τ1)
in ∃Y.(∆ ◦X equate(prime(τ), τ1))
For our example, the correct post-state of the assignment can be computed as follows:
∆2 = ∃r · ((∆ ∧ r=n′+m′) ◦{n}(n′=r))
= ∃r · ((m′=2+n′∧n′=5∧r=n′+m′) ◦{n}(n′=r))
= ∃r · (∃n0 ·m′=2+n0∧n0=5∧r=n0+m′∧n′=r)
= (m′=7 ∧ n′=m′+5)
More formally, sequential composition is defined as:
φ1 ◦X φ2 =def ∃R · ρ1(φ1) ∧ ρ2(φ2)
where X = {s1, . . . , sn} are size variables being updated
R = {r1, . . . , rn} are fresh size variables
ρ1 = {s′i 7→ ri}ni=1 ρ2 = {si 7→ ri}ni=1
4.3.2 Path Sensitive Inference
The [If ] rule attempts to track the size constraint of conditionals with path sensitivity.
The two conditional branches are distinguished by assuming the conditional-test result
to be either 1 or 0, representing the true or the false value, respectively. Given
e = if u then v else 5 and Γ = {v :: intn, u :: boolb}, the rule derives ∆3 combining
via disjunction the inference results of both branches. We replace both r1 and r2 (the
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resulting sizes from both branches) by the final resulting size r.
∆1 = ∆∧(b′=1) ∆2 = ∆∧(b′=0)
V ; Γ;∆1 ` v; v :: intr1 ,∆1 ∧ (r1=n′), ∅, ∅
V ; Γ;∆2 ` 5; 5 :: intr2 ,∆2 ∧ (r2=5), ∅, ∅
∆3 = ∆ ∧ ((b′=1 ∧ r=n′) ∨ (b′=0 ∧ r=5))
V ; Γ;∆ ` e; e :: intr,∆3, ∅, ∅
4.3.3 Precondition for Safety of Check
Precondition derivation is essential for the detection of safe checks across method bound-
aries. A check is proved safe when a call context implies the call’s preconditions. Oth-
erwise, the preconditions associated with a call are replaced by preconditions associated
with its caller. The generated preconditions are expressed in terms of the boundary
variables. The [Call] rule formalizes this process.
As an example, consider inferring a primitive call sub(z, j) under the type assump-
tion Γ = {v :: intv, z :: Float[intm], j :: intj} and the pre-state ∆ = (m′=m ∧ m′=10 ∧
j′=v′+2 ∧ v′=v+1 ∧ v′>5). Furthermore, let the set of boundary variables V be {v,m}
and j be a local variable. The two array-bound checks of the sub primitive, 0≤i and
i<s, are transformed into the following preconditions:
pre1 = (∆ ≈> ρ(0 ≤ i))↓V ≡s true
pre2 = (∆ ≈> ρ(i < s))↓V ≡s (v < 7)
where ρ = {s 7→ m, s′ 7→ m′, i 7→ j, i′ 7→ j′}. The substitution ρ replaces the size vari-
ables associated with the formal parameters of sub with those from the actual param-
eters of the call. The new preconditions are obtained by simplifying (≡s) the result of
the operations (≈>) and ↓V . The operator ≈> formulates the implication of an array-
bound check by the corresponding calling context. It ensures that all size variables are
expressed in terms of those of the call arguments, and primed variables are used in the
post-state of the caller:
∆ ≈> φ =def (∆⇒ ρ(φ)) where ρ = {s1 7→s′1, . . . , sn 7→s′n};
{s1, . . . , sn} = V(φ)
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The operator ↓V projects a constraint to the boundary variable set V through quan-
tification of (size variables from) the local variables. These variables are universally
quantified, so that the resulting precondition is strengthened (weakening via ∃ quanti-
fier is unsound in this case):
φ↓V =def ∀W · φ where W = FSV (φ)− V.
After its derivation, each precondition is classified by the relation mkChk(pre, A,B,C)
to determine if the corresponding array bound check can be eliminated safely, be left
as runtime check, or decided at a later stage (a partially-safe check). Here, A is a label
sequence leading to the specific bound-check, B outputs the check if it is partially-safe,
and C outputs the label sequence identifying the check if it should be left at runtime. For
the example above, we have mkChk(pre1, `.L, ∅, ∅) and mkChk(pre2, `.H, {`.H : pre2}, ∅),
where ` is a new label associated with the call sub(z, j). These mkChk clauses indicate
that the low-bound check is safe, while the upper-bound check is partially safe.
For recursive methods, we first employ a fixed-point computation to derive both the
method postcondition and a recursive invariant. The invariant captures a size relation
to relate the parameters of an arbitrary-nested recursive call with those of the first call.
Once the postcondition and the invariant are determined, we can compute the program
state at each program point and derive preconditions similarly to the non-recursive case.
Details are given next.
4.4 Recursion Analysis
Our type inference rules effectively determine both a postcondition and a set of precondi-
tions for non-recursive methods. For recursive methods, these rules derive a (recursive)
constraint abstraction that can be analyzed via fix-point analysis. The analysis steps are:
(i) determine a fix-point for the constraint abstraction, and derive the method postcon-
dition, (ii) determine an invariant for the recursive calls, and (iii) derive preconditions
for checks inside recursion.
4.4.1 Deriving Postcondition
The postcondition can be derived from a recursive constraint via a fix-point approxima-
tion procedure pioneered in [43] and adapted for a disjunctive domain in [138, 123]. Let
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us consider a constraint abstraction of the form q〈n∗, r〉 where n∗ denote inputs, while r
denotes its output. For simplicity and without loss of generality, let us assume we have
a constraint abstraction with two recursive invocations of the following form.
q〈n∗, r〉 = φ0∨φ1[q〈s∗, r1〉, q〈t∗, r2〉]
Note that φ1[ , ] is a formula with two holes containing the two recursive invocations,
while φ0 is the base case. The fix-point of such an abstraction can be formalised by the
following series:
q0〈n∗, r〉 = false
qi+1〈n∗, r〉 = φ0∨φ1[qi〈s∗, r1〉, qi〈t∗, r2〉]
For the above fix-point series to converge, we perform approximations via two techniques,
known as hulling and widening.
Hulling approximates a set of disjuncts
∨
φi with a conjunct φ such that (
∨
φi)⇒ φ.
This process can be refined by hulling selectively a subset of closely-related disjuncts.
We use the notion of affinity to characterize how closely related is a pair of disjuncts
[123]. This selective hulling process is denoted by
∨
φi ≡h φ.
Conjunctive widening takes a formula
∧
φi and drops (by replacing with true) those
constraints φi that are changed compared to the previous step. To apply the widening
operator to a disjunctive formula, we first look for pairs of disjuncts (from the current
and the previous step) to widen and then apply the conjunctive widening on these pairs
[123]. Let us denote widening by ≡w. We shall apply each fix-point approximation until
we obtain a formula qp〈n∗, r〉 such that qp+1〈n∗, r〉 ⇒ qp〈n∗, r〉. This test indicates that
a post fix-point qp〈n∗, r〉 has been reached.
Consider the simple summation program from Figure 4.4, where the constraint ab-
straction obtained from our inference rules is also given. To obtain a closed-form post-
condition, we apply fix-point analysis starting with false, the least element of the dis-
junctive polyhedron domain. Due to the use of widening, such fix-point approximation
always terminates. For brevity, we display related constraints like (j−1≤i ∧ 0≤i ∧ i≤j)
using the abbreviated form (j−1, 0≤i≤j).
sumvec0〈s, i, j〉 = false
sumvec1〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ (∃i1·i1=i+1∧false))
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Methods with Postconditions:
Float sumvec(Float[Ints] a,Inti i,Intj j)
where sumvec〈s, i, j〉, . . .
{ if i>j then 0.0 else {Int v= `1:sub(a,i);
v+`2:sumvec(a,i+1,j) } }
Float sum(Float[Ints] a) where sum〈s〉, . . .
{ Int l=`3:len(a); `4:sumvec(a,0,l-1) }
Constraint Abstraction :
sumvec〈s, i, j〉 ≡ (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ sumvec〈s, i+1, j〉)
Figure 4.4: Summation program
= (i>j)
sumvec2〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ (∃i1·i1=i+1∧i1>j))
= (i>j)∨(0≤i<s ∧ i=j)
sumvec3〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ (∃i1·i1=i+1
∧ (i1>j ∨ (0≤i1<s ∧ i1 = j))))
= (i>j)∨(0≤i<s−1 ∧ j=i+1)∨(0≤i≤s∧i=j)
≡h (i>j)∨(j−1, 0≤i≤j<s)
sumvec4〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ (∃i1·i1=i+1
∧ (i1>j ∨ (0≤i1<s−1 ∧ j=i1+1)∨(0≤i1≤s∧i1=j)))))
≡h (i>j)∨(j−2, 0≤i≤j<s)
≡w (i>j)∨(0≤i≤j<s)
sumvec5〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j)∨(i≤j ∧ 0≤i<s ∧ (∃i1·i1=i+1
∧ (i1>j ∨ (0≤i1≤j<s))))
= (i>j)∨(0≤i≤j<s)
Fix-Point Detected: sumvec5〈s, i, j〉 ⇒ sumvec4〈s, i, j〉
We reach the following fix-point in five iterations:
sumvec〈s, i, j〉 = (i>j) ∨ (0≤i≤j<s)
4.4.2 Deriving Recursive Invariant
Within each recursive method, we may have checks that must be optimized. To deal
with this, we compute another constraint, but this time, for just the input parameters
(excluding the results of method). More specifically, we build a one-step size relation
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to relate the parameters of the next recursive calls with those of the first call. This
relation is then analysed via fix-point analysis to derive a multi-steps relation, known as
recursive invariant. The latter can relate the parameters of an arbitrary recursive call
with those of the first call.
One-step relation can be directly extracted from each recursive constraint abstrac-
tion. Given the earlier constraint abstraction with two recursive invocations, q〈n∗, r〉 =
φ0∨φ1[q〈s∗, r1〉, q〈t∗, r2〉], we can obtain a one-step relation, named I, that attempts to
relate the input n∗ with that of its recursive call, nˆ∗, as shown below.
I〈n∗, nˆ∗〉 = φ1[
∧
(s = nˆ)∗, q〈t∗, r2〉] ∨ φ1[
∧
(t = nˆ)∗, q〈s∗, r1〉]
With this relation, we can now apply fix-point analysis to obtain:
I1〈n∗, nˆ∗〉 = I〈n∗, nˆ∗〉
Ii+1〈n∗, nˆ∗〉 = Ii〈n∗, nˆ∗〉 ∨ (∃z∗ · Ii〈n∗, z∗〉∧I〈z∗, nˆ∗〉)
We derive the following recursive invariant via fix-point analysis:
sumvecI〈s, i, j, sˆ, iˆ, jˆ〉 = (sˆ=s)∧(jˆ=j)∧(0≤i<iˆ≤s, j+1)
The recursive invariant is important for deriving safety preconditions of checks inside
recursive methods, as elaborated next.
4.4.3 Deriving Precondition
Our inference can derive preconditions for checks inside recursion. Due to recursion,
such checks may be encountered multiple times. We propose to separate out the check
of the first recursive call from the checks of the rest of the recursive calls. The reason for
this is that recursive invariant that we derive is applicable to all recursive calls, except
the first. Consequently, the program state for the first check and the program state for
the recursive checks are different. More specifically, consider a check c labelled as ` at
program context s in a recursive method m with invariant i. Its two preconditions can
be derived as follows:
preFst(`) = ∀L · (s⇒ c) where L = vars(s, c)− V
preRec(`) = ∀L · (s∧i⇒ c) where L = vars(s, c, i)− V
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preRec(`1.H) = (j<s)∨(s≤j∧i≤−1)∨(s≤j, i)
These preconditions are propagated to the caller of each sumvec call. Note that the
precondition for (rest of the) recursive checks for `1.L is totally safe, but the first check
of `1.L can be guarded by a condition (j<i)∨(0≤i). These different scenarios of array
checks can be exploited by program specialization, so as to maximise the elimination of
redundant checks whilst being mindful of the potential for code explosion. We describe
such a specialization process in Section 4.7.
4.5 Array Indirections
There is a class of programs which has been largely ignored in past work on array bound
checks elimination. This class of programs uses indexes that are stored in another array
(indirection array). Array indirections are used intensively for implementing sparse
matrix operations. For such matrices, only nonzero elements are stored; Additionally,
the indices of these elements are kept inside an indirection array. Luja´n et al [101]
proposed a solution to handle indirection arrays via a runtime mechanism. Our system
handles indirection arrays and relies entirely on compile-time analysis.
To support programs with indirection arrays, the bounds of their elements will have
to be captured using an additional size variable a via a new annotated type for integer
array Inta[Ints]. Precise tracking will allow us to analyse the indexes retrieved from such
integer arrays. As the array elements are being changed by the assign primitive, their
bounds may also change during program execution. Such size properties are therefore
mutable. To handle them safely, we require the support of an alias analysis, such as
the one proposed in [79], that could be used to identify may-aliases amongst the integer
arrays.
In addition to alias annotation, the main extra machinery is a set of enhanced prim-
itive declarations (preconditions and runtime tests are unchanged, so we replace them
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for brevity with . . .).
Inta[Intr] newarr(Ints s, Intv v)
where (0<s ∧ r=s ∧ a=v ∧ nochange{s, v}); . . .
Intr sub(Inta[Ints] a, Inti i)
where (0≤i<s ∧ r=a ∧ nochange{i, s, a}); . . .
Void assign(Inta[Ints] a, Inti i, Intv v)
where (0≤i<s ∧ (a′=v ∨ a′=a) ∧ nochange{i, s, v}); . . .
The array elements are updated by the newarr and assign primitives, and read
by the sub primitive. In particular, the formula (a′=v ∨ a′=a) captures a weak update
operation with a new approximation to the state of elements in the array. Furthermore,
we may even track the relation between array indexes and their elements by using
the annotated type Int(i,a)[Ints] with a new size variable i to denote index positions.
By using primitives with such type declarations, we can selectively support increased
precision for our analysis. Note that both the inference and the specializer work with the
above indirection array primitives as well as with the array primitives without indirection
from Section 4.2.1.
Let us illustrate how array indirections are analyzed via a simple example that
initializes an array with a range of integer values:
Void initarr (Inta[Ints] a, Inti i, Intj j, Intn n)
where initarr〈a, s, i, j, n〉
{ if i>j then () else {a[i]=n; initarr(a,i+1,j,n+1)} }
Using the fix-point analysis described in Section 4.4, we can obtain the following
postcondition which captures the initialization of the array elements:
initarr〈a, s, i, j, n〉 ≡ (i>j ∧ a′=a) ∨ (0≤i≤j<s ∧ (a′=a ∨ n≤a′≤n+j−i))
This postcondition captures an universal property about the elements of the array
a. The constraint (a′=a) indicates there is no change in the value of array elements.
Intuitively, it can be expressed in the universal fragment of the theory of arrays [16]
using the following constraint: ∀ix · (0 ≤ ix < len(a)⇒ a[ix]′ = a[ix]). The constraint
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(n ≤ a′ ≤ n+j−i) captures both a lower and an upper bound for all the array elements,
also expressible in the theory of arrays as follows:
∀ix · (0 ≤ ix < len(a)⇒ n ≤ a[ix]′ ≤ n+j−i)
4.6 Deriving Smaller Formulae
An important property of program analysis is efficiency, and this is particularly so for
an inference system based on Presburger arithmetic. Presburger arithmetic can give
highly accurate analysis (with disjunctions and quantifiers) but has double-exponential
complexity, namely 22
cn
where n is the size of its formulae. A summary-based analysis
like ours brings about a smaller number of size variables at each method boundary than
a global analysis approach. With this decrease, the main proviso for efficiency is to
ensure that the pre and postconditions are kept small in size.
A major reason for large formulae is the presence of disjuncts related to the specifica-
tion aggregation problem observed in [94]. To counter this effect, a derived postcondition
can be weakened through the hulling of its disjuncts. However, applying a weakening
process is unsound for preconditions! For preconditions, it is only safe to strengthen and
we propose a new technique that improves the analysis efficiency at a low cost in pre-
cision. We perform the strengthening of the precondition φpre using the gist operation
from the Omega library [130].
Given a check c which occurs at a location with program state s and local variables
VL, we have earlier derived the weakest precondition using pre = (∀VL · ¬s∨c). This
derived precondition is unsuitable due to the negation of a (possibly very large) program
state formula s. To derive smaller preconditions, we may simplify pre using a valid state
s1 for which (∃VL · s)⇒s1 holds.
• One such s1 that can be used is the type invariant inv at method entry. Let us
refer to this technique of using (gist pre given inv) as weak pre-derivation.
• A second technique is to use ∃VL · s itself. Let us refer to this technique as strong
pre-derivation: it uses (gist pre given ∃VL · s) . This technique would strip off all
the avoidance conditions from the derived precondition, which may result in some
loss of precision.
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• To recover this loss of precision, we also propose a third technique, called selective
prederivation, which would first obtain a variant of ∃VL · s that is weakened by
removing conditional tests from s.
For example, consider a symbolic program state derived from the recursive sumvec
method as follows: ∃ iˆ · s>0∧iˆ≤j∧(0≤i<iˆ≤s, j+1). After stripping off its conditional
test, iˆ≤j, we would obtain a weaker state:
∃ iˆ · s>0∧(0≤i<iˆ≤s, j+1)
Simplifying the precondition of (j<s)∨(s≤j∧i≤−1)∨(0≤i∧s≤j, i) with this program
state results in a much smaller precondition, namely j<s, that is obtained by both
selective and strong prederivations. This is in contrast to (j<s)∨(s≤j∧i≤−1)∨(s≤j, i)
that is obtained by weak prederivation.
In our experiments (see Section 4.8), we tested the three prederivation techniques.
When compared to the weak prederivation technique, we were able to reduce the size of
preconditions on average by 63.4% for selective prederivation and by 81.8% for strong
prederivation. We found the selective prederivation to have a reasonable compromise
between efficiency and precision. Furthermore, we achieved a significant reduction in
the inference times needed by some larger programs which fail to complete in reasonable
(allotted) time, otherwise!
4.7 Flexivariant Specialization
The objective of specialization is to place run-time tests (for unsafe checks) at their
respective primitive operations with the objective that array operations become safe,
and the array checks are done minimally. To this end, we specialize the existing method
definitions with information about run-time tests.
To understand the effectiveness of various approaches to specializing method defini-
tions, we examine the following example program:
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void main()
{ · · ·
`5 : p(· · · );
· · ·
`6 : q(· · · )}
t2 p(· · · )
{ · · ·
`3 : q(· · · );
· · ·
`4 : q(· · · )}
t1 q(· · · )
{ · · ·
v1=(`1: sub(a1, i1));
`2: assign(a2, i2, v1);
· · · }
Let us assume that the results of inference are as follows:
Preconditions for q
from `1 from `2
`1.L `1.H `2.L `2.H
true φ1 true φ2
Preconditions for p
from `3 from `4
`3.`1.H `3.`2.H `4.`1.H `4.`2.H
true φ3 φ4 false
Preconditions for main
from `5 from `6
`5.`3.`2.H `5.`4.`1.H `6.`1.H `6.`2.H
true true false false
This corresponds to the following inferred method headers with partially-safe and
unsafe checks.
t1 q(· · · ) where ∆q, {`1.H : φ1, `2.H : φ2}, {}
t2 p(· · · ) where ∆p, {`3.`2.H : φ3, `4.`1.H : φ4}, {`4.`2.H}
void main() where ∆main, {}, {`6.`1.H, `6.`2.H}
Thus, there are three unsafe checks that must be residualized at run-time, namely `4.`2.H,
`6.`1.H and `6.`2.H. The other checks are either safe, or partially-safe with the possibility
82 CHAPTER 4. Deriving preconditions for modular static analysis
of becoming safe using the context of the caller. An aggressive approach to eliminating
checks is polyvariant specialization. This aims at creating multiple specialized methods
for each method definition, such that each specialized version of a method has a different
set of array checks being eliminated. Its application on our example program yields the
following result:
void main()
{ · · ·
p(· · · );
· · ·
q 3(· · · )}
t2 p(· · · ) where .., φ3∧φ4
{ · · ·
q 1(· · · );
· · ·
q 2(· · · )}
t1 q 1(· · · ) where .., φ1∧φ2
{ · · ·
v1 = (sub(a1, i1));
assign(a2, i2, v1);
· · · }
t1 q 2(· · · ) where .., φ1
{ · · ·
v1 = sub(a1, i1);
if (i2 < len(a2)) then
assign(a2, i2, v1)
else error · · · }
t1 q 3(· · · ) where .., true
{ · · ·
v1 = (if (i1 < len(a1))
then sub(a1, i1)
else error);
if (i2 < len(a2)) then
assign(a2, i2, v1)
else error · · · }
Note that three versions of q have been created to handle its three calls under different
calling contexts.
In this section, we propose a flexivariant program specialization scheme. As spe-
cial cases, we can either support polyvariant or monovariant specializations. For poly-
variance, we can achieve it by never attempting to weaken any of the configurations
encountered. For monovariance, we can achieve it by weakening each configuration en-
countered to its most conservative variant with maximal unsafe checks. For this example,
the monovariant case will weaken the configurations of both q 1 and q 2 to q 3. Even
though q 3 is the weakest configuration, it still has two low bound checks eliminated.
A key feature of our flexivariant specialization scheme is its ability to trade-off op-
timization for a reduction in code size. Furthermore, it is possible to achieve such
trade-offs with minimal loss in performance. For example, if it can be determined that
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q 1 configuration occurs infrequently, we may weaken it into q 2 to save on code size
with little loss in performance.
Flexivariant specialization of a program P into an optimized program S is declared as
follows: .flex P ⇀ S. Specializing a method requires information about the set of runtime
tests to which calls in the method body may lead. Thus, a specialized method can be
identified by a triple comprising the original method name, a set of label sequences
associated with the relevant runtime tests, and a new method name uniquely defined by
the first two components of the triple. We call such a triple a specialization signature
(or signature in short), and a set containing such signatures a specialization cache (or
cache in short).
(m, ς, mˆ) ∈ SSig = MName× LSet×MName
σ, σY , σN , σˆN ∈ SCache = P(SSig)
ς ∈ LSet = P(Label+)
The specialization of an expression is defined by:
P, σ, ς .eflex e ⇀ e1, σN
The specialization cache σ drives the process, while ς contains the checks to be resid-
ualized. New specialization points created during specialization are stored in σN . We
highlight the most important specialization rules below.
An array operation is specialized in [Spec−Prim] by calling the respective primitive
method without array checks under the condition that the combined runtime checks for
this operation, e1, is true.
[Spec−Prim]
τ m(τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn) where ∆,Φ,C ∈ Pm
ρ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn]
e1 =
∧{ρ e | `.c ∈ ς ∧ (c : e) ∈ C}
e2 = if e1 then m(v1, . . . , vk) else error
e3 = m(v1, . . . , vk)¢ (e1 = true)¤ e2
P, σ, ς .eflex (` : m(v1, . . . , vk))⇀ e3, ∅
Here, a label sequence of the form `.c occurring in the set ς represents an array check to
be residualized. Its code is available at the corresponding primitive method declaration.
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Variable substitution is needed to residualize the code. All codes thus generated are
combined as a conjunct, named e1, which is then wrapped as a runtime test for the
primitive call to m. If the runtime set is empty – signified by e1 being true – the m call
will not be wrapped by a conditional.
Similarly, user-defined methods are specialized with respect to the set of runtime
tests ([Spec−Call1]). Weakening of configurations by W may enlarge this set of runtime
tests. Specialization produces a signature for this specialized method if the latter has
not been recorded in the current cache. Otherwise, it reuses the specialised method that
has been recorded previously, as specified in [Spec−Call2].
[Spec−Call1]
(τ m(τ1 x1, . . . τkxk) where ∆,Φ,Υ {e}) ∈ P
ς2 =W(m, ς1) ς1 = {`+ | `1.`+ ∈ ς} ∪Υ
(m, ς2, ) 6∈ σ ms = genName(m, ς2)
P, σ, ς .eflex (`1 : m(v1, . . . , vk))
⇀ ms(v1, . . . , vk), {(m, ς1,ms)}
[Spec−Call2]
(τ m(τ1 x1, . . . τkxk) where ∆,Φ,Υ{e}) ∈ P
ς1 = {`+ | `1.`+ ∈ ς} ∪Υ (m,W(m, ς1),ms) ∈ σ
P, σ, ς .eflex (`1 : m(v1, . . . , vk))⇀ ms(v1, . . . , vk), ∅
4.8 Experimental Results
On top of the disjunctive fixed-point analyzer (described in Chapter 3), we have con-
structed a modular inference system together with a program specializer. The out-
put from our system was validated by a separate checking system that we have also
built. The entire prototype system was written in Haskell and compiled using Glas-
gow Haskell compiler[121]. For constraint solving in the Presburger arithmetic domain,
we used the Omega library [129, 88]. A web-demo of our system can be found at
http://loris-7.ddns.comp.nus.edu.sg/~popeeaco/imp/.
We evaluated our prototype using small programs with challenging recursion and two
numerical-intensive benchmarks: SciMark (Fast Fourier Transform, LU decomposition,
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Programs Source Static Checking Inference (secs) Static Checks
(lines) Checks (secs) Weak Selective Strong Eliminated
binary search 31 2 0.17 1.84 1.81 1.79 100%
bubble sort 39 12 0.43 1.55 1.51 1.47 100%
foo 12 4 0.39 0.66 0.67 0.87 50%/75%
hanoi tower 38 16 3.73 11.74 11.53 11.47 100%
merge sort 58 24 7.70 11.21 16.01 13.07 100%
queens 39 8 0.52 2.13 2.11 2.10 100%
quick sort 43 20 0.38 1.92 1.92 1.76 100%
sentinel 26 4 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.15 75%
sparse multiply 46 12 3.27 22.61 17.37 7.09 100%
sumvec 33 2 0.11 0.51 0.48 0.47 100%
FFT 336 62 9.58 * 58.02 28.74 100%
LU Decomp. 191 82 13.10 137.1 93.31 72.91 100%
SOR 84 32 1.15 7.18 4.67 3.8 100%
Linpack 903 166 42.26 * 360.1 162.2 100%
Figure 4.5: Statistics for array bound checks elimination
Successive Over-Relaxation) [112] and Linpack [51]. Our test platform was a Pentium
2.8 GHz system with 1GByte main memory, running Red Hat Linux 9.0.
Our main objective was to show the viability and the precision of the system. Fig-
ure 4.5 summarises the statistics obtained for each program that we inferred. To quantify
the analysis complexity of the benchmark programs, we counted the program size (col-
umn 2) and also the number of static checks present in each program (column 3). The
time taken for inference (columns 5-7) includes parsing, preprocessing, modular type
inference and specialization. For comparison, we present the time taken for checking
pre-annotated programs (column 4), composed from parsing and dependent type check-
ing. The size of the method constraints (preconditions, postconditions and recursive
invariants) is on average around 15% of the size of the source program. Thus, our in-
ference eliminates the effort to annotate methods required of programmers with access
to only a dependent type checker.
Due to the precision of our inference system, we were able to eliminate 100% of array
checks for all the programs we tested, except for sentinel and foo (column 8). The
sentinel example illustrates a pattern where some checks cannot be eliminated by our
method, since it makes use of a sentinel/guard against falling off one end of the array.
Like [149, 147], we were unable to capture the existential property that is required for
check elimination. For the foo example, strong prederivation and selective prederivation
eliminate 50% and 75%, respectively, of the static checks.
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We can compare our experimental results to other analyses that are based on dis-
junctive domains similar to ours, but employ only forward derivation [138, 123]. For
the benchmark set used in our previous work [123], a forward derivation and a fixed-
point analysis with Hausdorff affinity akin to [138] led to 76% check elimination, while
a forward analysis using planar affinity introduced in [123] was able to eliminate 84%
of the checks. Compared to these two previous analyses, our current techniques achieve
100% check elimination. We can attribute this improvement to the combination of the
forward derivation of postconditions with the backward derivation of preconditions. An-
other reason for our improved results was the handling of array indirections present in
the sparse multiply and Linpack benchmarks.
In almost all cases, strong prederivation takes less time than selective prederivation,
followed by weak prederivation. As an exception, the increased precision of weak pred-
erivation allows a faster analysis of mergesort, since some bound checks are proved
redundant at an earlier point than the other two prederivation methods. On the other
hand, for those larger programs we found it crucial to use either selective or strong
prederivation; weak prederivation does not scale up as inference fails to complete in
reasonable time (cases denoted by * signify over an hour inference time).
To summarize our experiences, we observe that our initial goal was to build a precise
inference system and make it practical by employing a modular analysis that computes
method summaries. However, the small number of size variables at each method bound-
ary was not enough to ensure the efficiency of our system. The backward component
of our system proved to be expensive mostly due to two reasons. Firstly, precondition
derivation was done via negation of a (possibly very large) program state formula. Sec-
ondly, array bound checks were specialized by deriving individual preconditions, one for
each check. This was our intention in order to enable aggressive program optimization.
Note that proving program safety does not necessarily require individual precondition
derivation (and, in our setting, can be less expensive). To cope with these additional diffi-
culties, we employed additional approximations to reduce the size of method summaries:
weakening of postconditions via selective hulling and strengthening of preconditions via
gisting. With these techniques, both the inference and the specializer were integrated
into a system that was shown to be practical and precise enough for our purposes.
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4.9 Correctness
The soundness of our type inference is defined with respect to a type checking system
and a specialization process. After type inference (that includes fixed-point analysis),
the inferred program must be specialized to include the runtime tests discovered during
inference, before it becomes well-typed. We state the soundness of our system below
and refer the reader to the technical report [126] for details on the proof.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). Let P be a program and a type inference judgement such
that (Pm `I P ; PI). Let (.flex PI ⇀ PT ) be the specialization of PI to PT guided by
the inferred runtime tests. Then PT is well-typed.
As a special case, if no unsafe check is discovered during inference then PI is well-
typed. However, if unsafe checks are discovered, the use of label sequences (eg., `6.`1.H)
to identify array checks also enables debugging feedback. Specifically, our analysis can
pin-point the exact location of each unsafe check based on the calling hierarchy up until
an unsatisfied precondition.
4.10 Related Work
Traditionally, data-flow analysis techniques have been employed to gather information
for the purpose of identifying redundant array checks [71]. Within the scope of intra-
procedural analysis, these techniques are also used to gather anticipatable information
for the purpose of hoisting partially-redundant checks to more profitable locations. The
techniques have gradually evolved in sophistication, from the use of family of checks in
[90], to the use of difference constraints in [13].
To identify redundant checks more accurately, verification-based methods have been
used by Suzuki and Ishihata [144], Necula and Lee [113] and Xu et al [149]. Xi and
Pfenning have advocated the use of dependent types for array bound check elimination
[147]. Their approach is limited to totally redundant checks. Moreover, the onus for
supplying suitable dependent types rests squarely on the programmers, as only a type
checker is available.
Precondition derivation with respect to a postcondition (or check) has been formu-
lated via generating its Verification Condition (VC) by Flanagan et al [56, 57]. Their
focus was to obtain compact VCs whose size is worst-case quadratic to the size of the
88 CHAPTER 4. Deriving preconditions for modular static analysis
source. However, they do not attempt to make preconditions and postconditions any
smaller through strengthening and weakening, respectively. Furthermore, these VCs
are for totally-redundant checks. In contrast, our technique stresses on modularity and
deals with inter-procedural analysis over recursive methods, whereas they focus on intra-
procedural analysis and loops. Recently, Flanagan [54] introduced the idea of inserting
assertions that cannot be proven during type checking as run-time checks. Our use of a
flexivariant specializer to insert runtime checks (after inference) shares a similar flavour.
However, our proposal is based on inference, while his is formalised for a type-checker.
Identifying redundant array bound checks can also be done using abstract interpreta-
tion techniques over numerical domains. In a seminal paper, Cousot and Halbwachs [43]
introduced the polyhedra abstract domain and defined convex-hull and widening opera-
tors for this domain. Subsequently, various other abstract domains have been proposed,
varying from conjunctive weakly-relational domains like octagons [104], pentagons [100]
or template constraint matrices [139, Chapter 4] to disjunctive domains [138, 123]. In
fact, safety analyzers that scale to large critical programs like Astre´e [12] or C Global
Surveyor [145] use elaborate combinations of abstract domains to achieve maximum
efficiency. For example, the static analyzer that has been described by Cousot et al
[12, 42] succeeds in analyzing a program of 75 kloc with no false alarm. It achieves
this by varying the precision of arithmetic abstract domains from interval domain to
ellipsoid domain. It also uses a decision tree abstract domain and trace partitioning for
path-sensitivity. These relational domains operate on packs of variables for efficiency
reasons. However, our analysis maintains path-sensitivity and the same level of precision
over the entire program by exploiting modularity. Being a summary-based approach,
we have a bounded number of variables at method boundary and we further ensure that
preconditions are kept small via suitable prederivation. Modularity has also been rec-
ognized as an important step for static program analyses to scale up to precise analysis
of large programs [40] and our proposal is a solution in this direction.
To avoid fix-point iteration, Rugina and Rinard [137] proposed an analysis method
(using linear programming) to synthesize polynomial symbolic bounds. While efficient,
fixing a target form (without disjunction) for the symbolic bound may result in loss of
precision. Dor et al advocated for linear constraints, expressed using pre/post conditions,
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to help determine the safety of C pointers to string buffers [52]. For their experiments,
the inference result is, however, less precise than user-supplied annotations. This is
likely due to the absence of disjunction and path-sensitivity during inference.
The idea of deriving preconditions for partially redundant checks was first proposed
in [28] to complement postcondition inference on sized types [27] for a first-order func-
tional language. However, this early work was mostly informal and had no implementa-
tion. We formalize this early idea by inferring a sound dependent-type annotation for an
imperative language, and integrating its results with a program specializer. Moreover,
we now have a practical and precise implementation.
Unlike the work in [24] which uses a separate set-based analysis for properties of
elements in a collection, our current proposal uses arithmetic constraints to represent
such properties directly for indirection arrays. This decision reduces the burden of
using two different analyses. On the other hand, the set-based analysis approach [24]
may give more precise results via universal and existential properties, and deal with
elements which may not be integers.
Flexivariant specialization scheme enables a trade-off to be made, that can give
up some array check optimization for a reduction in code size. Such trade-off can be
guided with the help of suitable path-profiling techniques[146]. Such a compromise was
originally pioneered in a technique, called selective specialization [47], to convert expen-
sive dynamic method dispatches for object-oriented programs into static counterparts,
where possible. Our flexivariant scheme supports the proposed inference with a family
of specializers, with selective specialization as a possible option.
4.11 Summary
We have proposed a new inference mechanism for a dependent type system with size
relations. Our approach captures postcondition in the presence of imperative updates,
and derives safety preconditions for each check encountered. Both the postcondition and
safety precondition are propagated interprocedurally, though in opposite directions. Re-
cursive methods are also handled through a fix-point analysis on constraint abstraction
derived via inference. The resulting analysis is not only flow and context-sensitive, but
is also path-sensitive. It can capture symbolic program states between local variables,
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inputs and outputs. Initial experiences with a prototype implementation suggest that
such an advanced form of type inference is both precise and efficient. Just as the present
analysis is empowered by the use of Presburger arithmetic, it is inevitably limited by
the linearity of expressible constraints. However, by first subjecting the original pro-
gram to pre-processing such as partial evaluation (using constant propagation and loop






Program bugs remain a major challenge for software developers and various tools have
been proposed to help with their localization and elimination. Traditionally, program
testing and model checking [59, 62, 45] have been applied to detect the presence of
real bugs. However, one shortcoming of the testing process is that it is unable to
prove the absence of bugs, compromising on program safety. In contrast, static analysis
which uses abstraction on program states can be used to prove program safety [43, 138].
It achieves this by showing that bad error states are not reachable via an exhaustive
interpretation in the abstract domain. Due to approximation, static analysis may report
false positives that are possible bugs that do not exist in practice. High incidents of false
positives can make static analysis tools impractical to use for finding and eliminating
bugs. This problem is serious enough that Jung et al [87] have resorted to machine
learning (that are neither sound nor complete) to heuristically cut down on the numerous
false-positives that were reported by their static analyzer. Furthermore, as reported in
the Astre´e project [12, 136], manual inspection of alarms (possible bugs) can be a very
time- consuming process and may take several days even for simple alarms.
Recently, there have been some proposals [120, 150, 67] that advocate for over-
approximation techniques (based on static analysis) to be synergistically combined with
under-approximation techniques (based on concrete execution or program testing). One
main goal of this combination, as advocated in [67], is to leverage on the strengths of
the two techniques so that program bugs or their absence can be discovered more accu-
rately and effectively. While such a proposal can exploit the complementary strengths
of its constituent techniques, it is also more complex to construct due to the need to
combine quite different techniques and to consider potential interplays between them.
Furthermore, it is often useful to explore what can be achieved within a single method-
ology before considering synergistic combinations of different techniques, to allow the
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strengths of each technique to be more fully exploited.
In this chapter, we shall propose a dual static analysis that is different from past
approaches as both its components are based primarily on over-approximation. Our
approach is also modular and computes (on a per method basis) trigger conditions for
each bug expressed symbolically in terms of the method’s parameters. Specifically, we
support the concurrent discovery of three conditions for bugs, called must-bug, may-bug
and never-bug, respectively. To illustrate the three different kinds of bugs, consider a
simple example :
int foo(int x, int y)
{ if (x≤y) then { if (x>10) then `1:error else 1 }
else { if complexTest(x, y) then `2:error
else { if x≥y then 2 else `3:error }
}
}
The bugs in our programs shall be flagged using a special error construct. This ap-
proach is simple but general as we can translate the more conventional (assert c)
command for bug detection, directly to (if c then skip else error). The method
complexTest denotes a predicate whose outcome cannot be modelled by the underlying
static analyser, for example modelling the predicate x3+y3≥0 is beyond the capability
of linear arithmetic solvers. According to our analysis, the error at location `1 is a
must-bug as we can determine an input trigger condition x≤y ∧ x>10 that must lead
to the error. In contrast, the error at location `2 is a may-bug as our analysis can only
determine a trigger condition x>y that may lead to this error, since its occurrence is still
dependent on the second conditional with a statically unknown test. Lastly, the error
at location `3 is a never-bug as our analysis can determine a trigger condition x>y∧x<y
that can never happen, namely false.
Our classification of bugs is dependent on the precision of the underlying static
analyser. A more precise analyser can classify more of the may-bugs as either must-
bugs or never-bugs. In our approach, each must (or may) bug is guarded by a trigger
condition that specifies a condition on the parameters of a method that will (or could)
lead to the bug. These trigger conditions are useful for interprocedural analysis as they
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allow their associated bugs at each call site to be either propagated to caller, downgraded
to a may-bug or proven to be safe (as a never-bug). For example, a trigger condition
for a bug in the callee may be propagated as a bug for the caller with a new trigger
condition based on the caller’s inputs. A trigger condition may also be shown to be false
in some callers’ contexts which renders its associated bug unreachable and hence safe.
Alternatively, the trigger condition of a must-bug might be shown to be always true.
This means such a must-bug is always triggered whenever the method is invoked. In
this scenario, a definite (or real) error can be reported for the method. More specifically,
this chapter makes the following contributions :
• We propose a new dual static analysis to support either bug finding or a proof
of the absence of bugs, where possible. This integrated analysis is based only
on over-approximation and tracks concurrently both success and failure outcomes.
Though this idea is simple (and may appear obvious on hindsight), it has never
been used in mainstream work on static analyses.
• Our analysis has adjustable precision based on disjunctive formulae. The overlap
between the two outcomes signifies imprecision of the analysis and can be used to
guide the precision refinement.
• We propose a new technique to classify a sub-class of definite non-terminations
as bugs. Our technique catches this class of non-termination bugs by explicitly
identifying unreachable states during fixed point analysis. We can achieve this
despite its converse problem (termination) being a liveness property, that is not
usually addressed by safety-based static analyses.
• We formalise a correctness proof for our technique, and conduct a set of experi-
ments to validate our proposal.
5.2 Our Approach
We propose a new approach to static analysis that can both detect real bugs and also
be sound with respect to some stated safety property by reporting all of its possible
bugs. Each concrete execution may result in one of three possible outcomes : (i) ok for
a successful execution, (ii) err for a failed execution and (iii) loop for an execution that
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does not terminate. Our strategy is to track two over-approximations, denoted by OK
and ERR, to capture all executions that lead to (i) ok outcomes, and (ii) err outcomes,
respectively. Formally:
Definition 5.1. (Entire Success Outcomes)
Given a method, we can capture a condition on the method’s inputs that leads to all
possible ok outcomes. This condition is named OK and is an over-approximation that
may include some err and loop outcomes. It represents a condition necessary for safety.
Definition 5.2. (Entire Failure Outcomes)
Given a method, we can capture a condition on the method’s inputs that leads to all
possible err outcomes. This condition is named ERR and is an over-approximation that
may include some ok and loop outcomes. It represents a condition necessary for error.
For example, consider the earlier foo example with two input parameters, x and y.
Using our static analysis, we may compute a condition that covers all its ok outcomes :
OK = (x≤y ∧ x≤10) ∨ x>y.
Correspondingly, a condition that covers all its err outcomes can be computed to be:
ERR = (x≤y ∧ x>10) ∨ x>y.
Our analysis may also identify individual errors separately by attaching each ERR out-
come with a distinct program label, but we defer the presentation of this technique for
Section 5.4.1.
Based on the two over-approximation results OK and ERR, we can determine the
conditions for must-bug, may-bug and never-bug for each given method, as follows :
Definition 5.3. (Never-Bug Condition)
A condition c (on the inputs) of a method is a never-bug condition if each of its inputs
leads to either the ok or loop outcomes, but never the err outcome. This condition c can
be computed using OK ∧ ¬(ERR) where ¬(ERR) ensures that none of the err outcomes are
possible. It represents a condition sufficient for safety. 1
Definition 5.4. (Must-Bug Condition)
A condition c (on the inputs) of a method is a must-bug condition if each of its inputs
1For proving program safety, our classification is closer to partial correctness terminology, where the
safety proof does not ensure program termination.
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leads to either the err or loop outcomes, but never the ok outcome. This condition c can
be computed using ERR ∧ ¬(OK) where ¬(OK) ensures that none of the ok outcomes are
possible. It represents a condition sufficient for error (where non-termination can also
be considered a kind of bug).
Definition 5.5. (May-Bug Condition)
A condition c (on the inputs) of a method is a may-bug condition if each of its inputs
leads to either ok, err or loop outcomes. This condition c arises from imprecise analysis
and can be computed using OK ∧ ERR which covers an overlap where all three outcomes
are possible.






















































Figure 5.1: Classifying bugs
Figure 5.1. The two circles denote the conditions for
OK and ERR, while the three areas being partitioned
by the two circles are the conditions for never-bug,
may-bug and must-bug. The goal of our analysis is to
minimise the overlap between OK and ERR outcomes,
so that fewest possible inputs are classified under the
may-bug category. This can be achieved by using a
more precise analysis on the two over-approximated outcomes. Note that ok outcomes
may only appear inside OK, while err outcomes may only appear inside ERR.
Due to our use of over-approximation analysis, our analysis can only guarantee that
a bug will occur, assuming the absence of non-termination outcome. In other words,
we may sometimes report a must-bug when the outcome is actually a loop. Neverthe-
less, we will discuss how to discover some non-termination outcomes in Section 5.4.2.
Even though loop outcomes may appear everywhere, the condition ¬(OK∨ ERR) contains
exclusively loop outcomes.
Going back to the foo example, we may now compute this method’s conditions for
must-bug, may-bug and never-bug :
MUST BUG = ¬(OK) ∧ ERR
= ¬(x≤y∧x≤10 ∨ x>y) ∧ (x≤y∧x>10 ∨ x>y)
= x≤y ∧ x>10
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MAY BUG = OK ∧ ERR
= (x≤y∧x≤10 ∨ x>y) ∧ (x≤y∧x>10 ∨ x>y)
= x>y
NEVER BUG = OK ∧ ¬(ERR)
= (x≤y∧x≤10 ∨ x>y) ∧ ¬(x≤y∧x>10 ∨ x>y)
= x≤y ∧ x≤10
Thus, to analyse for must, may and never-bugs, we only need to determine the
condition for possible successful execution OK and the condition for possible program
errors ERR. Analysing both these outcomes concurrently is the main novelty behind our
approach for capturing both must and may analyses under a dual static analysis. As we
shall see later, our approach supports adjustable precision with the help of disjunctive
formulae to accurately report must-bugs or prove the absence of bugs, where possible.
When none of these scenarios is possible, we can report may-bugs that could be either
real bugs or false positives. May-bugs usually occur when the abstraction domain (used
by our static analysis) is not precise enough.
5.3 Summarizing Dual Over-approximations
The results of our analysis are encoded as summaries Φ computed individually for each
method (excepting mutually recursive methods that are analyzed simultaneously). Sum-
maries shall be inferred bottom-up, starting with the methods lowest in the calling hi-
erarchy. A method summary Φ = {OK : φ1, ERR : φ2} combines all the traces leading to
success outcomes under the OK label as (φ1). The traces leading to failure outcomes
are combined under the ERR label as (φ2). The form of the φ formula depends on the
constraint solver used. Our analysis makes use of a linear arithmetic domain. Due to
its forward nature, our analysis can capture each successful OK outcome with a postcon-
dition that tracks the relation between inputs and output. The output of a method (or
expression) is identified by a special res variable.
Our analysis summarizes entire method bodies, but also parts of the method body
(individual expressions). It models state changes in a symbolic manner through tran-
sition formulae φ. This is done using two symbolic values per program variable for
capturing new and old variable values, respectively. Given a program variable v, the
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prime notation v′ denotes the new value, while v itself denotes the old value of the
program variable. Two transition-based formulae may be composed in a natural way
using an operator compose with update effect on a set of variables W.
Definition 5.6. (Compose with Update)
Given transition formulae φ1, φ2, and a set of variables to be updated W={w1, . . . , wn},
the operator ◦W is defined as:
φ1 ◦W φ2 =df ∃ r1..rn · ρ1 φ1 ∧ ρ2 φ2
where r1, . . . , rn are fresh variables;
ρ1 = [w′i 7→ ri]ni=1; ρ2 = [wi 7→ ri]ni=1
Note that ρ1 and ρ2 are substitutions that link each latest value of w′i in φ1 with the
corresponding initial value wi in φ2 via a fresh variable ri. Unchanged variables in φ2
are used in primed form.
Consider the sequence x:=(x+y)∗2; y:=x+y. Its effect can be captured by composing
two transition formulae, each corresponding to one assignment :
(x′=2∗(x+y) ∧ y′=y) ◦{x,y} (y′=x+y ∧ x′=x)
≡ ∃r1, r2 · (r1=2∗(x+y) ∧ r2=y) ∧ (y′=r1+r2 ∧ x′=r1)
≡ x′=2∗(x+y) ∧ y′=2∗x+3∗y
The use of transition formulae in program analysis has been known since [38], and
intensely studied in [30].
5.3.1 Forward Reasoning Rules
To compute method summaries, we shall now propose a set of forward rules that relies
on transition formulae in Figure 5.2. These rules resemble those from weakest precondi-
tion/strongest postcondition calculi with two important distinctions. Firstly, our inte-
grated approach is entirely forward and does not derive backwards weakest precondition.
Secondly, we use a set of outcomes to compute simultaneously two over-approximations.
Deriving both sound bugs and proving safety is made possible by this combination.
The rules are written in Hoare-style form using the judgement `{Φ1} e {Φ2}. Given
the OK outcome from Φ1 (a transition from the beginning of the current method to the
prestate before e’s evaluation), the judgement derives Φ2: firstly, a transition from the
beginning of the current method to the poststate after e’s evaluation; secondly, an ERR
condition, in part from Φ1 and also from possible errors happening during e’s evaluation.
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[CONST]
Φ1 = (Φ ∧ res=k)
`{Φ} k {Φ1}
[BLK]
`{Φ ∧ default(t, v′)} e {Φ1}
` {Φ} t v; e {∃v′·Φ1}
[SEQ]
`{Φ} e1 {Φ1}
` {∃res·Φ1} e2 {Φ2}










t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)
n
i=m) where Φmn {...}
` {Φ} ` : mn(v1..vn) {Φ ◦V Φmn}
[IF]
`{Φ ∧ v′=1} e1 {Φ1}
` {Φ ∧ v′=0} e2 {Φ2}
` {Φ} if v then e1 else e2 {Φ1 ∨Φ2}
[ERROR]
Φ1 = Φ ◦∅
{OK : false, ERR : true}
` {Φ} ` : error {Φ1}
[METH]
X={v1, .., vn, res, v′1, .., v′m−1} V={v′i}ni=m R={res, v′1, .., v′n}
W={vi}ni=1 `{{OK : nochange(W )}} e {{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}}
Q={mnOK(X)≡∃V ·φ1, mnERR(W )≡∃R·φ2} Φ′mn = fix(Q)
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) where Φmn{e} ⇒ Φ′mn
Figure 5.2: Forward reasoning rules
Our rules use logical operators with set of outcomes as arguments: ∃V ·Φ, Φ ∨ Φ and
Φ ◦ Φ. These logical operators are distributed to the components of Φ as follows:
∃V ·{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2} ≡ {OK : ∃V ·φ1, ERR : ∃V ·φ2}
{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2} ∨ {OK : φA, ERR : φB}
≡ {OK : φ1∨φA, ERR : φ2∨φB}
{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2} ◦W {OK : φA, ERR : φB}
≡ {OK : φ1◦WφA, ERR : φ2∨(φ1◦WφB)}
The rule that involves ◦ is more complex. The ERR outcome of the result (condition:
φ2∨(φ1◦φB)) indicates either failure from the first argument (condition: φ2), or from the
success of the first argument followed by the failure of the second argument (condition:
φ1◦φB). The ◦ operator is not commutative as there is an implied order in the execution
of the two summary outcomes. For brevity, a singleton set can also be expressed as:
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φ ≡ {OK : φ}. In that case, operators like Φ ∧ φ and Φ ◦W φ are shorthands for :
Φ ∧ φ ≡ Φ ◦∅ {OK : φ, ERR : false}
Φ ◦W φ ≡ Φ ◦W {OK : φ, ERR : false}
For the [BLK] rule, we provided some constraints as default values depending on the
respective types. According to the language semantics, a possible set of defaults could be
default(int, v)≡v=0, default(int[], v)≡v=null and default(void, v)≡true. Note that
true may be used if there are no defaults. For the [CALL] rule, we used distinct(V)
to ensure that the list of variables in V are different from each other. This is used to
avoid aliases for pass-by-reference parameters. In the case of boolean values, we encode
them in the integer domain by using 0 for false, and 1 for true, as can be seen in the




i to compute the
initial prestate for the method’s body.
For a recursive method, the rules will derive a set of recursive constraints, one for
each outcome of the method. The recursive constraints can be viewed as an intermediate
form and are represented as constraint abstraction functions [73]. During the inference
of a recursive method mn, the rule [CALL] will use the following placeholder for its
summary: Φmn={OK : mnOK(X), ERR : mnERR(W )}. The rule [METH] collects in Q the
constraint abstractions and then invokes an iterative fixed point analysis to compute
the summary Φ′mn = fix(Q). This fixed point analysis will be described in more detail
in Sec 5.3.2.
While the summary of each user-defined method can be inferred, some methods are
primitives in that they lack a method body and are provided instead with a summary
formula. As an example, consider the following two primitives that may incur divide-
by-zero and some array-related errors, respectively.
int div(int x, int y) where{OK : y 6=0∧res=x/y, ERR : y=0}
void assign(int[] a, int i, int v) where
{OK : a 6=null∧0≤i<a.len, ERR : a=null∨i<0∨i≥a.len}
The div operation succeeds only when the argument y is non-zero, while the array
assign method succeeds only when index i is within the bounds of a non-null array. For
the assign method, we may split its ERR outcome to {ERR.null : a=null, ERR.low : i<0,
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ERR.high : i≥a.len}, so as to capture the null dereferencing, low bound and high bound
errors individually. In general, we expect the outcomes of a primitive to represent non-
overlapping conditions that completely characterize the inputs of the primitive.
Note that null may be modelled by the value 0, while nonnull may be modelled
by a value ≥1. In the implementation, we rely exclusively on an arithmetic constraint
form as our abstraction domain and solver. Due to the use of the integer domain to
encode array lengths (a.len > 0), boolean values (false ≡ 0, true ≡ 1) or nullness
(null ≡ 0, nonnull ≡ ≥1), we ensure that derived formulae always satisfy a type-
invariant. This is not required for correctness; it merely filters out the unnecessary part
of the integer domain. For example, given a variable of boolean sort b, after filtering we
obtain: ¬(b=0 ∨ b=1) ≡ false.
Example: Let us illustrate the forward reasoning process using a simple example, a
method that assigns 0 to those elements in the array a from the range i to 1.
void g(int[] a, ref int i)
{ if (i≤0) then ()
else { assign(a, i, 0); i:=i−1; g(a, i) } }
We will use the forward rules to derive formulae at intermediate points from the method
g. To improve readability, formulae are simplified and we omit the tracking on nullness
of array variables:
For assign(a, i, 0), [CALL] rule is applied:
Φ1 ≡ {OK : i′=i ∧ i′>0 ∧ i′<a.len, ERR : i>0 ∧ i≥a.len}
For i:=i−1, [ASSIGN] rule is applied:
Φ2 ≡ {OK : i′=i−1 ∧ i>0 ∧ i<a.len, ERR : i>0 ∧ i≥a.len}
For g(a, i), [CALL] rule is applied:
Φ3 ≡ Φ2 ◦{i} {OK : gOK(a, i1, i′), ERR : gERR(a, i1)}
For the conditional expression, the [IF] rule is applied:
Φ4 ≡ {OK : i′=i ∧ i′≤0, ERR : false} ∨ Φ3
For the method’s body, the [METH] rule is applied:
Q = {gOK(a, i, i′) ≡ φOK4, gERR(a, i) ≡ ∃i′·φERR4}
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After simplifications, Q reduces to two independent constraint abstractions, one for the
OK outcome, the other for the ERR outcome:
gOK(a, i, i′)≡(i≤0 ∧ i′=i) ∨ (i>0∧0≤i<a.len∧
∃i1· i1=i−1 ∧ gOK(a, i1, i′))
gERR(a, i)≡i>0∧((i<0 ∨ i≥a.len) ∨
0≤i<a.len ∧ ∃i1· i1=i−1 ∧ gERR(a, i1))
5.3.2 Fixed-Point Analysis
Our approach to analysing recursive methods is to first build two constraint abstractions
for OK and ERR outcomes. Once built, we can apply traditional fixed point analysis (for
example, with hulling and widening approximations [43]) to derive a closed-form formula
for each recursive constraint abstraction. The constraint abstractions are monotone
functions and can be interpreted over various abstract domains. We will fix the abstract
domain to the disjunctive polyhedral analysis as recently proposed in [138, 123]. This
abstract domain is essentially based on the seminal work of Cousot and Halbwachs [43],
but is more fine-grained by allowing disjunctions of linear inequalities to be captured.
Though the abstract domain expresses disjunctive invariants, it still uses a (selective)
hull operator reminiscent of the convex-hull operator originally proposed in polyhedral
analysis.
Example: We apply fixed point analysis to gOK obtained previously. The iteration
starts with the least element of the abstract domain represented by gOK0(a, i, i′)≡false.
After few iterations, we can obtain a post fixed point gOK4(a, i, i′) as follows:
gOK1(a, i, i′) ≡ (i≤0 ∧ i′=i) ∨ (i>0∧0≤i<a.len∧
∃i1· i1=i−1 ∧ gOK0(a, i1, i′))
≡ i≤0 ∧ i′=i
gOK2(a, i, i′) ≡ (i≤0∧i′=i) ∨ (i=1∧i′=0∧2≤a.len)
gOK3(a, i, i′) ≡ (i≤0∧i′=i) ∨ (1≤i≤a.len−1∧i≤2∧i′=0)
gOK4(a, i, i′) ≡W (i≤0∧i′=i) ∨ (1≤i≤a.len−1∧i′=0)
Note that ≡W denotes a widening step. A similar analysis would derive the following
closed-form formula for gERR(a, i).
gERR(a, i) ≡ i>0 ∧ i≥a.len
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The input conditions corresponding to the two over-approximations ∃i′ ·gOK(a, i, i′) and
gERR(a, i) do not overlap. Hence, we have a precise result that leads to either never-bug
or must-bug.
NEVER BUG = i≤0 ∨ 1≤i≤a.len− 1
MUST BUG = i>0 ∧ i≥a.len
MAY BUG = false
To compute the never-bug and the must-bug conditions, we make use of the negation
operator ¬ which can be provided precisely for some abstract domains. This is the
case for our disjunctive polyhedron abstract domain. Disjunctions are crucial: for the
(conjunctive) polyhedron abstract domain a sound under-approximating version of the
¬ operator has to be used (which may lose a lot of precision). A simple example of a
disjunctive formula:
¬(x≥0 ∧ y≥0) = (x≤−1) ∨ (y≤−1 ∧ x≥0)
This formula could be approximated in the polyhedron domain by dropping one of its
disjuncts.
Our technique for fixed-point analysis can also be applied to imperative loops. It is
folklore in the functional community that loops are but tail-recursive functions. This
same idea can also be used for imperative languages, except that pass-by-reference pa-
rameters are critical for modelling variables that may be updated across method invo-
cations (or loop iterations). For example, consider the following loop where variables
{r, i} are updated :
while (i<n) do { r := r+ 2; i := i+ 1 }
To model the effect of this loop, our system transforms it automatically to the following
tail-recursive method :
void tail(ref int r, ref int i; int n) {
if (i<n) then { r := r+ 2; i := i+ 1; tail(r, i, n) }
else () }
The following summary is computed for the above loop:
{OK : (i≥n∧r′=r∧i′=i) ∨ (i<n∧i′=n∧r′=r+2(n−i))}
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5.4 Further Improvements
There are at least three avenues to further improve on our static analysis. First, we can
provide a more precise way to capture the origin of each detected error. Second, we can
capture a sub-class of definite non-termination as bugs. Lastly, we shall look at an alias
analysis to support the handling of heap-allocated objects.
5.4.1 Precise Error Tracing
Our analysis may pin-point the precise location of a discovered error by the notation
{ERR.` : e} where ` is a sequence of program locations that corresponds to the method
call chain leading to the specified error. As an example, consider the following :
void foo3(int x) {
`1 : foo4(x, x+ 1);
`2 : foo4(x, 3); }
void foo4(int x, int y) {
if x=y then `3 : error
else () }
The error in foo4 will only be flagged if x=y. We may therefore capture its sum-
mary outcome as {OK : x 6=y, ERR.`3 : x=y}. This ERR.`3 error is impossible when in-
voked from `1:foo4(x, x+1), but can occur when it is invoked from the context of
`2:foo4(x, 3). The summary outcome for the foo3 method is therefore inferred as:
{OK : x6=3, ERR.`1.`3 : false, ERR.`2.`3 : x=3}. The formula false at ERR.`1.`3 indicates
that the bug at `1 can never occur. We can omit this never-bug from the summary out-
come of foo3 which would simplify to {OK : x 6=3, ERR.`2.`3 : x=3}. In contrast, the bug
at call `2 can occur under the input condition x=3. The label `2.`3 is used to indicate
the call chain leading to the bug at final destination `3. Each label and trigger condition
essentially captures a potential counter-example (in the form of a must or may bug) that
violates safety.
To provide precise reporting of errors, we only need to change two rules where label
` is added to trace the calling hierarchy of each error:
[ERROR]
Φ1=Φ ◦∅ {OK : false, ERR.` : true}
` {Φ} ` : error {Φ1}
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[CALL]
V={vi}m−1i=1 distinct(V )
t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)
n
i=m) where Φmn {...}
` {Φ} ` : mn(v1..vn) {Φ ◦V add(Φmn, `)}
The add command is defined as follows:
add({OK: φ, (ERR.`i : φi)∗}, `) = {OK : φ, (ERR.`.`i : φi)∗}
In the case of recursive methods, all bugs that originate from the same location in
the recursive method are grouped under the same error outcome. This ensures that
the label sequences are always finite, and shall be bounded by the static height of the
method call hierarchy. Note that all elements in a set of mutual-recursive methods have
the same height in the call hierarchy.
We can classify each individual bug, as follows:
Definition 5.7. (Individual Bug Classification)
Consider a method with the following summary outcomes :
{OK : φ0, ERR.`1 : φ1, .., ERR.`n : φn}
A bug ERR.`i is said to be a never-bug if φi = false.




A bug ERR.`i is said to be a may-bug otherwise.
Two bugs ERR.`a and ERR.`b are said to be closely-related if either φa =⇒ φb or
φb =⇒ φa. As closely-related bugs may be indistinguishable from each other, we shall
group them together in the must-bug category, if the condition (φa∨φb) ∧ φ0 is unsat-
isfiable. This amalgamation of closely-related must-bugs allows us to report that a bug
from the amalgamated set will be definitely triggered as a must-bug, except that we are
unable to pin-point the exact bug from this set.
5.4.2 Non-Termination as Bugs
Non-termination can be considered another source of bugs that is difficult to detect, since
static analyses are typically formalised for safety property rather than liveness property.
In general, static analyses may be used to partition the input domain of a given program.
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Our analysis computes over-approximations for inputs that lead to all successful execu-
tions (all ok executions approximated by OK), and all failed executions (all err executions
approximated by ERR). Similarly, we can specify an over-approximation for inputs that
lead to all non-terminating executions (all loop executions approximated by LOOP). The
resulting input partitioning is shown in Figure 5.3, where each circle corresponds to one





































































































Figure 5.3: Adding LOOP to the
bug classification
reasonably precise LOOP condition is still an open
problem [33], our computation of both OK and ERR
outcomes has the nice side-effect of being able to de-
tect a sub-class of non-termination bugs. This class
of non-termination bugs are due to recursive methods
and may be discovered by fixed point analysis: with
both OK and ERR outcomes soundly covered, any state
left unreachable after analysis would have to belong
to the non-termination outcome.
For example, consider a recursive method whose summary has been inferred to be
{OK :φ1, ERR :φ2}. As these two outcomes cover all executions that either succeed or
fail, whatever is left in the complement ¬(∃R·φ1 ∨ φ2) can only be executions leading to
non-terminating loop, where R denotes the set of output variables including res from φ1.
We will use MUST LOOP to denote this precondition sufficient for non-termination. This
is on the assumption that all errors have been modelled and captured under the ERR
outcome. For a precise classification of this class of non-termination bugs, we can use
{OK :φ1, ERR :φ2, ERR.fn.MUST LOOP :¬(∃R·φ1 ∨ φ2)}. In this case, fn denotes the name
of the recursive method that is causing the non-termination bug.
To illustrate how non-termination bugs can be captured, consider the following re-
cursive method:
int foo5(int i) { if i=10 then 1 else 2+ foo5(i+1) }
From fixed point analysis, we can obtain:
2This input partitioning is inspired by the seminal work of Dijkstra on semantic characterization
and weakest-precondition calculus [49, pages 20-23]. While our classification is concerned with program
safety and bug detection, Dijkstra’s classification is more concerned with characterizing termination and
whether the final state satisfies a given postcondition.
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{OK : i≤10 ∧ res=2(10−i)+1}}.
Since the ERR condition is false, we can determine ¬(∃res · i≤10 ∧ res=2(10−i)+1)
which simplifies to (i>10) that is clearly a non-termination must-bug. Our summary
can now be modified to the following :
{OK : i≤10 ∧ res=2(10−i)+1, ERR.foo5.MUST LOOP : i>10}}
Once a non-termination bug has been detected for a given recursive method, it can
be treated like any other bug where it could be propagated, downgraded to a may
bug or proven safe, depending on the context of its callers. Lastly, we emphasize that
we can only catch a subset of the non-termination bugs and cannot guarantee that all
non-termination bugs are captured.
5.4.3 Alias Analysis for Heap-Allocated Objects
Heap-allocated objects pose an extra challenge to program analysis as we are required to
undertake a separate alias analysis first. As the problem of alias analysis is orthogonal
to our analysis for bug discovery, we discuss a generic solution for aliasing here. Our
proposal incorporates the major trends in alias analyses, which could be divided into
three broad categories, as follows:
Definition 5.8. (Must-Aliases)
A set of references {x1, .., xm} is said to be must-aliases if they definitely refer to the
same object. We may represent each must-aliased object by the following notation
x:: Obj〈f1, .., fn〉 ∧
∧
i∈1..m x=xi where f1, .., fn denote its fields that can be subjected
to strong updates.
Definition 5.9. (May-Aliases)
A set of references {x1, .., xm} is said to be may-aliases if they are possibly aliased with
each other but may refer to zero or more objects. We shall represent each may-aliased
object by the notation x::Obj〈f1, .., fn〉@M∧x∈{x1, .., xm} where f1, .., fn denote its fields
which can be subjected to weak-updates.
Strong update allows the states of its fields to be directly changed, while weak update
can only support either unchanged or possibly changed weakening of its fields’ states.
Definition 5.10. (Arbitrary-Aliases)
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A reference is said to be arbitrary-aliased if it points to an object where only the im-
mutable fields are tracked. We may represent each arbitrary-aliased object by the fol-
lowing notation x::Obj〈f1, .., fn〉@I. A field fi is said to be immutable if its value is
never changed after the object is constructed. For example, the length field of an array
is immutable and can be tracked using just arbitrary-aliases.
Arbitrary-aliases are the least precise but simplest to analyse. May-aliases are typi-
cally obtained with the help of points-to graph, while must-aliases require also linearity
analysis. Our current prototype system only supports arbitrary-aliases and may-aliases
but not must-aliases. Nevertheless, we design alias analysis as an orthogonal component
to dual analysis, as it can help improve the precision of dual analyzer without affecting
its correctness.
5.5 Experimental Results
We have implemented the proposed inference mechanisms in a tool named Dualyzer
(from Dual analyzer). The goal of Dualyzer is to analyze imperative programs for
proving safety or discovering bugs. We have also implemented the enhancements (except
must-aliasing) described in the preceding Section 5.4. The prototype system was built
using the Haskell language and the Glasgow Haskell compiler [121]. We use the Omega
library [129] to simplify and check for satisfiability of Presburger formulae. Our test
platform was a Pentium 3.0 GHz system with 2GBytes main memory, running Fedora
4. A web-demo of our system can be found at http://loris-7.ddns.comp.nus.edu.
sg/~popeeaco/bugs/.
One objective of Dualyzer is to prove the absence of bugs, whenever possible. For
this purpose, we tested our system on a set of small programs with challenging recursion
and some programs from two benchmark suites: SciMark (Fast Fourier Transform, LU
decomposition, Successive Over-Relaxation) [112] and Linpack [51]. These programs are
free from array bound check errors. We capture array accesses in primitive methods with
an OK outcome (when the index is within the bounds of the array) and an ERR outcome
(when the index is out-of-bounds). In our experiments there was no programmer effort
required to place error/assert constructs, since for array bound checks such assertions
can be generated automatically.
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Benchmark Source Rec. All Dualyzer
Programs (lines) constr. checks May (secs)
binary search 31 1 2 0 3.16
bubble sort 39 2 12 0 0.82
init array 11 1 2 0 0.26
merge sort 58 3 16 0 4.63
queens 39 2 8 0 1.47
quick sort 43 2 12 0 1.50
sentinel 17 1 4 1 0.12
FFT 336 9 62 0 13.50
LU Decomp. 191 10 82 0 14.34
SOR 84 5 32 0 3.50
Linpack 903 25 166 0 38.91
Figure 5.4: Statistics for a set of array-based programs without bugs
Figure 5.4 summarizes the statistics obtained for each program. To quantify the
analysis complexity of the benchmark programs, we counted the number of lines of C
code (column 2) and also the number of recursive methods and loops present in each
program (column 3). Column 4 presents the total number of array accesses (counted
statically) from the original programs. The number of array accesses that cannot be
proven safe (may-bugs) is shown in column 5, while the analysis time is given in column
6. Our analysis determines automatically the number of disjuncts for fixed point analysis
of each method. Consequently, by using at most three disjuncts (m=3) during fixed point
analysis, we can prove all array accesses safe, except for sentinel program with a may-
bug. This program uses a guard against falling off one end of the array. To eliminate
this may-bug, we require an existential property on the collection of array elements
which is beyond the capability of our current system.
To evaluate the bug finding credentials of Dualyzer, we used a simple procedure
Faulty Dualyzer
Programs May Must (secs)
bsort 0 1 2.44
initarr 0 1 1.12
qsort 0 1 2.24
sentinel 0 1 1.31
Figure 5.5: Buggy codes
to seed bugs into a subset of the correct programs
from Figure 5.4. Arbitrary array accesses were
changed using an offset by a random value con-
strained to exhibit true errors. The results of this
experiment are shown in Figure 5.5 where we are
able to report some of the new errors as must-
bugs. Note that we were using precise error tracing to capture the exact location and
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trigger condition of each individual bug. While the programs we used to validate Du-
alyzer are small in size, we believe they show the versatility of dual static analysis in
both proving program safety and finding true bugs.
5.5.1 Comparison with BLAST
Benchmark BLAST Dualyzer
Programs Result (secs) Result (secs)
binary search * 0.06
√
3.16






































Figure 5.6: Comparison with Blast
We used the same set of programs (shown in Figure 5.4) to make a comparison with
the Blast software verification system [80].3 With a similar goal to Dualyzer, the
Blast software verification system aims at statically proving safety or finding true bugs
otherwise. We present the results in Figure 5.6. Compared to our prototype, Blast
performed as well in proving safety for init array, queens, quicksort, LU and SOR.
However, Blast was not able to prove the safety of binary search, merge sort and
FFT for which it reported (false) bugs due to division being treated as an uninterpreted
function[10]. Blast also reported a false bug for bubble sort; for Linpack the analysis
ended prematurely with an exception (raised in the Simplify prover).
Though an intended goal of BLAST is to report true bugs where possible, the rep-
resentation of program states by symbolic constraints ultimately leads to some approxi-
mation (for e.g. via uninterpreted functions) that could lead unwittingly to false alarms.
This scenario does not occur for Dualyzer since we rely on dual analysis to help dis-
tinguish program safety from must-bug, but can revert to may-bug reporting whenever
3We used the latest version of Blast 2.4, available from http://mtc.epfl.ch/software-tools/blast/.
The running times reported for Blast correspond to several runs of abstraction refinement as we invoked
Blast with the default set of arguments.
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Benchmark Synergy Dualyzer
Programs May Must
ex fig1 BUG 0 1
ex fig3 SAFE 0 0
ex fig4 BUG 0 1
ex fig6 SAFE 0 0
ex fig7 BUG 0 1
ex fig8 SAFE 0 0
ex fig9 ABORT 0 1(MUST LOOP)
Figure 5.7: Examples from the SYNERGY paper [67]
there is uncertainty.
5.5.2 Comparison with SYNERGY
Synergy [67] is a recently proposed system that complements the capabilities of pred-
icate abstraction refinement (as in Blast) with Dart-style testing [62] to prove safety
and also find true bugs. To test the Dualyzer capability, we shall use a set of illustrative
programs that were highlighted as figures in [67] with at most one bug per program. Col-
umn 2 from Figure 5.7 shows on what examples SYNERGY would discover a true BUG,
prove that the program is SAFE or time-out during the refinement process (ABORT).
Our analysis took less than a second on each of these programs. Compared to Synergy,
we performed equally well in finding real bugs in ex fig1, ex fig4, ex fig7, and also
proving safety for ex fig3, ex fig6, ex fig8. We highlight three examples. The first
example is reproduced below:
void ex fig1 (int a) {
int i, c; i := 0; c := 0;
`1 : while (i<1000) { c := c+ 1; i := i+ 1; }
if (a≤0) then {`2 : error; } else {}
}
This example is difficult for tools like Slam [5] and Blast [80], that have to discover
1000 predicates, before finding a feasible path to the error. In contrast, Synergy finds
the error quickly using Dart-style testing by generating input constraints for a>0,
and then a≤0. Our solution is also fast but relies on static analysis. It first discovers
a postcondition (c′≥c ∧ i′≥i ∧ i′≥1000) for the loop at `1. Subsequently, it reports a
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precise must-bug condition at `2 from the outcome {OK : (a>0), ERR.`2 : (a≤0)} of
method ex fig1.
The code ex fig3 is an example where both Synergy and Slam-like tools make
use of path-sensitivity to prove correctness. By using intraprocedural path-sensitivity,
we discover a precise set of outcomes and characterize the error at `4 as unreachable.
Specifically, the outcome for the loop at `3 is computed as {OK : (lock′=1∧x′=y′∧y′≥y)}
which can subsequently confirm that `4 is unreachable.
void ex fig3 (int y) {
int x := randInt();
int lock := 0; //0 means Unlocked
`3 : do {
lock := 1; //1 means Locked
x := y;
if (randBool()) then {
lock := 0;
y := y+ 1;
} else ()
} while (x != y);
if (lock != 1) then {`4 : error; } else{}
}
While able to prove safety and also find bugs, the Synergy system may fail to
terminate due to abstraction refinement. The last example from [67] illustrates a case
when Synergy fails to terminate as it generates longer and longer test sequences start-
ing with the predicates (y<0), (y+x<0), (y+2x<0), and so on. The code ex fig9 is
reproduced below:
void ex fig9() { int x, y; x := 0; y := 0;
`5 : while (y≥0) { y := y+ x; }
`6 : error; }
Our system is able to initially confirm a must-bug at `6 with conjunctive fixed-point
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(m=1). The loop outcomes are computed as follows:
loop(m=1) = {OK : (x′=x ∧ y′≤y ∧ y′<0)}
This conjunctive formula is unable to capture the non-termination of the loop. Combined
with the information prior to the loop (x=0 ∧ y=0), the outcome for the entire method
can only confirm the presence of a must bug at `6 (if the program terminates):
ex fig9(m=1) = {OK : false, ERR.`6 : true}
However, using disjunctive fixed point analysis (m=2), we can capture non-termination
in the outcome of the while loop and prove that the error at `6 is unreachable:
loop(m=2) = {OK : (x′=x ∧ y′=y ∧ y′<0)
∨ (x′=x ∧ x≤y′≤x+y ∧ y′<0),
ERR.MUST LOOP : (x≥0 ∧ y≥0)}
ex fig9(m=2) = {OK : false, ERR.`5.MUST LOOP : true}
Thus, with increased precision, our analysis is able to re-classify a must-bug more
accurately and indicate the source of non-termination, where possible.
5.5.3 Examples from Verisec Benchmark
We have also analyzed several buffer overflow vulnerabilities from the CVE database
as grouped in the Verisec benchmark suite [91]. This suite contains testcases with the
actual vulnerabilities as well as corrected versions of these testcases. We were surprised
that Dualyzer found two must-bugs in the corrected versions of the testcases, bugs
that were later confirmed by the authors of the Verisec benchmark. The first must-bug
is from the Samba implementation of the SMB networking protocol (CVE-2007-0453). It
corresponds to a buffer access with an off-by-one error in the r strncpy function. The
second example is from the SpamAssassin open-source email filter and corresponds to a
non-termination must-bug. We show the relevant C code below, originally split in two
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different files:
#define BASE SZ 2
#define BUFSZ BASE SZ+2
void message write (char ∗ msg, int len) {
char buffer[BUFSZ];
int limit = BUFSZ− 4;
for (int i=0; i<len; ){






Since both the local variables limit and j are initialized to 0 and the value of j is
increased through the inner-loop, the loop condition (j<limit) cannot be satisfied
causing a non-terminating execution.
5.5.4 Beyond Safety to Memory Bounds Inference
Though Dualyzer has been originally formulated for finding bugs or proving safety,
its ability to determine numeric trigger conditions can be put to other uses. In this
experiment, we formulated the memory usage needed by each program into a safety
problem, and raised a memory adequacy error whenever memory use exceeded a given
initial memory bound. We achieved this by tracking two values : memory usage and
memory bound. The former symbolically tracks the current memory that is in use, while
the latter denotes the memory upper bound (high watermark). This tracking can be
automatically instrumented for each given program. More details on the formalization
of this analysis can be found in [26].
Dualyzer is able to infer statically both a lower-bound and an upper-bound for
the memory needed. The more useful is the upper-bound: our analysis can guarantee
that, if given at least this amount of memory, the program execution will be free of
memory adequacy errors (never-bug condition). Secondly, the analysis guarantees that
a memory adequacy error will definitely happen when the program execution is given
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Benchmark Source Bounds Stack Inf. Heap Inf.
Programs (lines) Inferred (secs) (secs)































Figure 5.8: Memory bounds estimation
less memory than the inferred lower bound (must-bug condition).
We have carried out experiments to infer stack/heap bounds for a set of small pro-
grams with challenging recursion and for some programs from two benchmark suites:
SciMark [112] and MiBench (sha, susan) [74]. Figure 5.8 shows the statistics obtained
for each program that we inferred. Column 3 captures time taken for stack-bounds
inference, while Column 4 is for heap-bounds inference.
The time for inference roughly correlates with the program size and with the com-
plexity of the relations between program variables. Specifically, the time taken for stack
inference was more significant due to the intensive use of the stack by all of the pro-
grams. All stack usage bounds were successfully captured, except for the Ackermann
function which requires a stack space that is exponential to its parameters’ sizes. This
stack bound is beyond the linear arithmetic form used in our current system. The time
taken for heap inference was less substantial, due to the nature of our programs. Most
of the benchmarks used few heap objects, with the exception of the susan benchmark.
Susan is an image processing package that uses more heap-allocated arrays to represent
patterns for image recognition.
5.6 Correctness of the Dual Static Analysis
In this section, we shall prove that our forward reasoning rules are correct in the following
ways:
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• the inferred summary outcomes for both success and failure are safe approxima-
tions of the expected final program state.
• each program never fails from an input of never-bug condition, never succeeds from
an input of must-bug condition, and diverges from an input of loop condition.
• the forward analysis algorithm terminates.
5.6.1 Consistency between Static and Dynamic Semantics
The dynamic semantics for our core imperative language was defined previously in a
small-step operational style (see Section 2.2). Here, we extend the source language with
a new construct representing the intermediate result of a method call: the evaluation of
the expression ret(v∗, e) proceeds first with the method’s body e (rule [D−RET−2]) and,
after its reduction to a value, the parameters passed by value v∗ are removed from the
current stack (rule [D−RET−1]). If the evaluation of the body reaches an error, then the
rule [D−RET−3] will throw the error back to the caller. A forward rule will be used in
the static semantics for the ret construct, as follows:
[RET]
` {Φ} e {Φ1}
` {Φ} ret(v∗, e) {∃(v, v′)∗ · Φ1}
The correctness proof requires analogous rules in static and dynamic (concrete) se-
mantics. The static semantics rules for local variable declaration and method call are
modified to be closer to their dynamic counterparts:
[BLK]
fresh x ρ = [v 7→x]
`{Φ ∧ default(t, x′)} ρe {Φ1}
` {Φ} t v; e {∃x′·Φ1}
[CALL]
t0 mn((ref ti wi)m−1i=1 , (ti wi)
n
i=m) where Φmn {...}
W={wi}m−1i=1 distinct(W) ρ = [wi 7→vi]ni=1 + [w′i 7→v′i]m−1i=1
`{Φ} ` : mn(v1..vn) {Φ ◦ρW ρΦmn}
While the concrete state is captured by the stack s∈S, the abstract state that we
infer is captured by a relational constraint φ∈D between the program variables. When
used with both unprimed and primed variables, φ∈D×D actually denotes a transition
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between abstract states. In this situation, we shall use two operators to distinguish
between the original and final abstract states, as follows:
Definition 5.11 (Prestate and Poststate). Given an abstract state transition
φ∈D×D, its prestate PreSt(φ) captures the relation between unprimed variables of φ.
Correspondingly, its poststate PostSt(φ), captures the relation between primed variables
of φ.
PreSt(φ) = ∃X · φ, where X = V ′(φ) ∪ {res}
PostSt(φ) = ρ(∃X · φ), where X = V(φ) and ρ = [x′ 7→ x | x ∈ V(φ)]
To formalise the relation between the concrete and abstract domains, we introduce
an abstraction operator: α(s)=
∧{v = δ | [v 7→ δ] ∈ s}. If the stack contains two
or more variables with the same name, only the leftmost variable is considered. For
example, α([x 7→ 1, y 7→ 1, x 7→ 0]) = (x=1 ∧ y=1).
Two consistency relations between the concrete and abstract domains are defined
to either agree in the current state, or in a pair of both pre- and post-state. These
consistency relations rely on an implication operator for the constraint language:
α(s)⇒ φ
s |= φ
α(s1) ∧ ρα(s2)⇒ φ ρ = [x 7→ x′ | x ∈ V(α(s2))]
(s1, s2) |= φ
In general, (s1, s2) |= φ implies s1 |= PreSt(φ) ∧ s2 |= PostSt(φ), but the implication
does not hold in the other direction (for constraints relating both primed and unprimed
variables).
5.6.2 Proof Methodology
In general, we want to prove that the results obtained by the static semantics correctly
reflect what happens during execution, as predicted by the dynamic semantics. The
dynamic semantics is formulated in small-step style and the proof proceeds by showing
that some property is preserved by each step of (dynamic) evaluation:




`{P1} e1 {O1, E1} ` {P2} e2 {O2, E2} ` {Pn} en {On, En}
5.6. Correctness of the Dual Static Analysis 117
Thus, we will proceed by induction on the length of the (dynamic semantics) reduc-
tion sequence:
• base case: prove the property for 〈s1, e1〉.
• induction step: assume the property holds for 〈si, ei〉 and prove it for 〈si+1, ei+1〉.
To prove the property for a configuration 〈si, ei〉, the proof proceeds by induction on
the height of the (dynamic semantics) reduction tree:
• base case: prove the property for those reduction rules without premises.
• induction step: assume the property holds for the premises and prove it for the
concluding reduction rule.
The proof is completed when all the reduction rules are shown to preserve the required
property. More details on the induction principle and proof examples for various program
analyses can be found in the “Principles of Program Analysis” book [117, Sec 2.2, Sec 3.2,
Sec 4.5.2, Sec 5.2, Appendix B].
Method Summaries: Checking and Inference
We formalize the notion of a sound method summary meaning that the summary is
an over-approximation of the outcomes collected from the method’s body. A summary
is checked to be sound using an alternative static rule for a method declaration:
[CHECK−METH]
W={vi}ni=1 V={v′i}ni=m R={res, v′1, .., v′n}
` {nochange(W )} e {{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}}
∃V ·φ1 ⇒ Omn ∃R·φ2 ⇒ Emn
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) where {OK : Omn, ERR : Emn}{e}
Using this soundness notion for method summaries, we can split the main proof in two
parts. For the first part, the proof is done assuming a program where all methods are
given sound summaries. For the second part, we show that our fixed-point analysis
always infers sound method summaries.
5.6.3 Main Theorem and Its Proof
The summary outcomes that we infer are a conservative approximation of the program
state that we expect for our program. We can prove this by the following soundness
theorem:
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Theorem 5.1 (Soundness of Summary Outcomes). Given an arbitrary expression
e1, an initial state s1 and a transition formula P1 consistent with s1 such that α(s1) ∧
nochange(V(s1))⇒ P1, where V(s1) returns the variables defined by the state s1.
Using P1, we may obtain the following judgement `{P1} e1 {{OK: O1, ERR: E1}}.
The success outcome O1 is sound as we can show that the following holds, namely: if
〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉, then it must be the case that (s1, [res7→δ]+sn) |= O1. The failure
outcome E1 is also sound as we can show that the following holds: if 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn,⊥〉,
then it must be the case that s1 |= E1.
Proof:
This result can be shown using induction on the length of the reduction sequence.
We consider an arbitrary reduction step 〈si, ei〉↪→〈si+1, ei+1〉 and inference judgements
such that the prestate is consistent with dynamic state: Pi = P1 ◦ ρα(si).
Success outcome is sound: (s1, [res7→δ]+sn) |= O1
The base case proves the property for the last expression in a successful reduction
sequence. When en is a constant expression δ, we can infer using the rule [CONST]:
`{Pn} δ {{OK: On, ERR: En}} such that On = Pn∧(res=δ) = (P1 ◦ ρα(sn)) ∧ (res=δ).
As a consequence, the following consistency relation holds: (s1, [res 7→δ]+sn) |= On.
The main part of the proof is based on a subject reduction lemma. This lemma proves
the induction step corresponding to an arbitrary reduction step: 〈si, ei〉↪→〈si+1, ei+1〉.
In particular, the lemma proves that the success outcome for ei+1 is more precise than
the one inferred from ei: Oi+1 ⇒ Oi. By repeated applications, we can conclude that
the success outcome obtained from the inference of the original expression e1 is sound:
(s1, [res7→δ]+sn) |= O1.
Failure outcome is sound: s1|=E1
The base case proves the property for the last expression in a failed reduction se-
quence. When en is an error expression then from the rule [ERROR] we can deduce
`{{OK : Pn, ERR : false}} l : error {{OK : On, ERR : En}} such that En = Pn ∧ {OK :
false, ERR : true} = Pn. From the definition of Pn we can conclude that s1 |= En.
The subject reduction lemma is used to prove the induction step. As a direct conse-
quence of the lemma, the failure outcome for ei+1 is more precise than the one inferred
from ei: Ei+1 ⇒ Ei. From the base case and the induction step, we can conclude that
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the failure outcome is sound: s1 |= E1.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is based on induction over the length of reduction sequence
and uses a subject reduction lemma as induction step. This lemma states the properties
that are satisfied by an arbitrary reduction step.
Lemma 5.2 (Subject reduction). Consider an execution started from the initial
state s1 and some arbitrary reduction step: 〈s1, e1〉↪→ . . . ↪→〈si, ei〉↪→〈si+1, ei+1〉↪→ . . ..
Further, consider a transition formula Pi consistent with the execution states: (s1, si) |=
Pi and an inference `{Pi} ei {{OK : Oi, ERR : Ei}}.
Then there exists Pi+1 consistent with the execution states (s1, si+1) |= Pi+1 and
the results of the inference `{Pi+1} ei+1 {{OK : Oi+1, ERR : Ei+1}} satisfy the following
relations:
• Oi+1 ⇒ Oi. We also have PreSt(Oi+1)⇒PreSt(Oi) and PostSt(Oi+1)⇒PostSt(Oi).
• Ei+1 ⇒ Ei. We also have Ei ≡ PreSt(Ei).
Proof: We will prove that there is a relation between the inference result for ei and the
inference result for ei+1 by induction on the height of the (dynamic semantics) reduction
tree. The induction hypothesis assumes that this relation holds for the reduction steps
for the subexpressions of ei. Various cases are denoted by the name of the evaluation
rule that applies in the conclusion.
• Case [D−VAR]: With si+1 = si, si(v) = δ, we have the following reduction step:
〈si, v〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, si(v)〉xy xy
`{Pi} v {Pi ∧ res = v} ` {Pi+1} δ {Pi+1 ∧ res = δ}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi.
– We can prove Pi+1 is consistent with the execution states (s1, si+1) since Pi
is consistent with (s1, si) and si+1 = si.
– Oi+1 ⇒ Oi since Oi+1 = (Pi+1 ∧ res=δ) and Oi = (Pi ∧ res=v).
– Ei+1 ⇒ Ei since Ei+1 = Ei = false.
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• Case [D−ASSIGN−1]:
〈si, v := δ〉 ↪→ 〈si[v 7→ δ], ()〉xy xy
`{Pi} v := δ {Pi ◦{v} v′=δ} ` {Pi+1} () {Pi+1}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi ◦{v} v′=δ.
– By definition of the consistency relation, (s1, si[v 7→δ]) |= Pi+1 reduces to
α(s1)∧ρα(si[v 7→δ])⇒ Pi ◦{v} v′=δ. To prove this implication, we rely on the
hypothesis that Pi is consistent: α(s1) ∧ ρα(si)⇒ Pi.
– Oi+1 ⇒ Oi since Oi+1 = Oi.
– Ei+1 ⇒ Ei since Ei+1 = Ei = false.
• Case [D−ASSIGN−2]:
〈si, v := e〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, v := e′〉xy xy
` {Pi} e {Φ}
` {Pi} v := e {Φ ◦{v} v′=res}
` {P ′i} e′ {Φ′}
` {Pi+1} v := e′ {Φ′ ◦{v} v′=res}
We use the induction hypotheses corresponding to the following reduction step:
〈si, e〉↪→〈si+1, e′〉. By these hypotheses, there exists P ′i that satisfies the consis-
tency relation: (s1, si+1) |= P ′i . Also, the results of the inference judgements
`{Pi} e {Φ} and ` {P ′i} e′ {Φ′} satisfy the relation Φ′ ⇒ Φ.
Let us choose Pi+1=P ′i , where P
′
i is the prestate constructed using the induction
hypothesis.
– (s1, si+1) |= Pi+1 from the induction hypothesis (s1, si+1) |= P ′i
– From the induction hypothesis Φ′ ⇒ Φ, we can deduce that (Φ′◦{v}v′=res)⇒
(Φ ◦{v} v′=res). This fact implies that Oi+1 ⇒ Oi .
– From the induction hypothesis Φ′ ⇒ Φ, we can deduce that (Φ′◦{v}v′=res)⇒
(Φ ◦{v} v′=res). This fact implies that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei.
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• Case [D−SEQ−1]: We have si+1 = si:
〈si, δ; e2〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, e2〉xy xy
`{∃res · (Pi ∧ res=δ)} e2 {Φ}
` {Pi} δ; e2 {Φ} ` {Pi+1} e2 {Φ′}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi.
– We can prove Pi+1 is consistent with the execution states (s1, si+1) since Pi
is consistent with (s1, si) and si+1 = si.
– From the construction, Pi does not refer to the variable res. Consequently,
Pi+1 = Pi = ∃res · (Pi ∧ res=δ). Two inference judgements starting with
equivalent prestates will have equivalent summary outcomes: Φ′ = Φ. This
implies that Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– Φ′ = Φ implies that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei.
• Case [D−PRIM]: Since the code for primitive methods is not available for analysis,
we assume that the summaries of primitives methods are sound with respect to
the operational semantics of the primitive’s implementation.
〈si,mn(v1, .., vn)〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, δ〉xy xy
` {Pi}mn(v1, .., vn) {Pi ◦V(Φmn) Φmn} ` {Pi+1} δ {Pi+1 ∧ res=δ}
The soundness of the primitive summaries can be formalized with the following
condition: (si, [res7→δ]+si+1) |= Φmn∧nochange(X), where X = V(si)−V(Φmn).
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi ◦V(Φmn) Φmn.
– From (s1, si) |= Pi and (si, si+1) |= Φmn ∧ nochange(X) we should be able to
prove that (s1, si+1) |= Pi ◦V(Φmn) Φmn.
– Using the chosen Pi+1, we can derive trivially Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– Using the chosen Pi+1, we can derive trivially Ei+1 ⇒ Ei.
• Case [D−CALL]: For this reduction step, we assume that each method is annotated
with a sound summary. Using the soundness of the method summary, we can
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successfully apply the rule [CHECK−METH] to the method declaration mn:
t0 mn((ref ti wi)m−1i=1 , (ti wi)
n
i=m) where Φmn{e}. Consequently, the result of the
judgement `{nochange(W )} e {{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}} is more precise than Φmn as
follows: ∃V ·φ1 ⇒ Omn and ∃R·φ2 ⇒ Emn.
The reduction step corresponding to a method call follows:
〈si,mn(v1, .., vn)〉 ↪→ 〈[wi 7→si(vi)]ni=m+si, ret({wi}ni=m, e′〉xy xy
`{Pi}mn(v1, .., vn) {Pi◦ρWρΦmn}
` {Pi+1} e′ {Φ′}
` {Pi+1} ret({wi}ni=m, e′) {∃(wi, w′i)∗·Φ′}
where e′ = [vi/wi]m−1i=1 e, W = {vi}ni=1 and ρ = [vi/wi]ni=1 + [v′i/w′i]m−1i=1 .
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi ∧
∧n
i=m(wi=vi).
– From the induction hypothesis (s1, si) |= Pi, we can prove that the following
holds: (s1, [wi 7→si(vi)]ni=m+si) |= Pi ∧
∧n
i=m(wi=vi).
– We can prove a pre-transition lemma that allows us to use a given judgement
`{nochange(W )} e {Φ} to deduce a related judgement where a transition for-
mula Φpre is used to translate both the prestate and the poststate: `{Φpre◦W
nochange(W )} e {Φpre ◦W Φ}. Note that the formula (Φpre ◦W nochange(W ))
can be simplified to Φpre.
Using this lemma with Φpre=ρ−1Pi, the judgement `{nochange(W )} e {{OK :
φ1, ERR : φ2}} can be transformed to ` {ρ−1Pi} e {ρ−1Pi ◦W {OK : φ1, ERR :
φ2}}. After proper renaming, this last judgement is equivalent with the
following judgement `{Pi} ρe {Pi ◦ρW ρ{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}}, which we denote
as (JUDG-1).
The judgement from the induction hypothesis `{Pi+1} e′ {Φ′} can be used
together with (JUDG-1) to conclude that Φ′ ≡ Pi ◦ρW ρ{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}.
Since we know that {OK : φ1, ERR : φ2} ⇒ Φmn, we can finally conclude
that Φ′ ⇒ Pi ◦ρW ρΦmn. From this implication, we can directly derive that
Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– From the above proof, we can also conclude that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei.
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• Case [D−BLK]:
〈si, t v; e〉 ↪→ 〈[x 7→δ]+s, ret(x, ρe)〉xy xy
`{Pi ∧ default(t, x′)} ρe {Φ}
` {Pi} t v; e {∃x′ · Φ}
` {Pi+1} ρe {Φ′}
` {Pi+1} ret(x, ρe) {∃(x, x′) · Φ′}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi ∧ default(t, x′).
– From the induction hypothesis (s1, si) |= Pi and δ=default(t), we can prove
that (s1, [x7→δ] + s1) |= (Pi ∧ default(t, x′)).
– From the induction hypothesis Φ′ ⇒ Φ and the fact that x does not ap-
pear in the formulae Φ and Φ′, we can conclude that ∃(x, x′) · Φ′ ⇒ ∃x′ · Φ.
Consequently, we have Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– By a similar reasoning as above, we can conclude that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei.
• Case [D−RET−1]:
〈si, ret(v∗, δ)〉 ↪→ 〈si−{v∗}, δ〉xy xy
`{Pi} δ {Pi ∧ res=δ}
` {Pi} ret(v∗, δ) {∃(v, v′)∗ · (Pi ∧ res=δ)} ` {Pi+1} δ {Pi+1 ∧ res=δ}
Let us choose Pi+1 = ∃(v, v′)∗ · Pi.
– From the induction hypothesis (s1, si) |= Pi, we can prove that the following
holds: (s1, si−{v∗}) |= ∃(v, v′)∗ · Pi.
– We have Oi = ∃(v, v′)∗ · (Pi ∧ res=δ) and Oi+1 = (∃(v, v′)∗ · Pi) ∧ res=δ,
where v∗ are either local variables or parameters passed by value. We can
conclude that Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– We can conclude that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei from Ei+1 = Ei = false.
• Case [D−ERROR]: We have si+1 = si:
〈si, l : error〉 ↪→ 〈si,⊥〉xy xy
`{Pi} l:error {{OK : false, ERR : true}} ` {Pi}⊥{{OK : false, ERR : true}}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi.
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– (s1, si+1) |= Pi+1 since (s1, si) |= Pi.
– We have Oi+1 = Oi = false.
– We have Ei+1 = Ei = true.
• Case [D−IF−1]: We have si+1 = si:
〈si, if v then e1 else e2〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, e1〉xy xy
`{Pi ∧ v′=1} e1 {Φ} ` {false} e2 {false}
` {Pi} if v then e1 else e2 {Φ ∨ false}
` {Pi+1} e1 {Φ′}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi.
– We can prove Pi+1 is consistent with the execution states (s1, si+1) since Pi
is consistent with (s1, si) and si+1 = si.
– The reduction step assumes that si(v) = true. Since Pi is consistent with
the execution state si, we can conclude that the prestate Pi ∧ v′=0 simplifies
to the false formula. Consequently, two inference judgements for e2 with
equivalent prestates Pi and Pi+1 will have equivalent poststates: Φ and Φ′.
This implies that Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– Φ′ = Φ implies that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei
• Case [D−IF−2]: We have si+1 = si:
〈si, if v then e1 else e2〉 ↪→ 〈si+1, e2〉xy xy
`{false} e1 {false} ` {Pi ∧ v′=0} e2 {Φ}
` {Pi} if v then e1 else e2 {Φ ∨ false}
` {Pi+1} e2 {Φ′}
Let us choose Pi+1 = Pi.
– We can prove Pi+1 is consistent with the execution states (s1, si+1) since Pi
is consistent with (s1, si) and si+1 = si.
– The reduction step assumes that si(v) = false. Since Pi is consistent with
the execution state si, we can conclude that the prestate Pi ∧ v′=1 simplifies
to the false formula. Consequently, two inference judgements for e1 with
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equivalent prestates Pi and Pi+1 will have equivalent poststates: Φ and Φ′.
This implies that Oi+1 ⇒ Oi.
– Φ′ = Φ implies that Ei+1 ⇒ Ei
• Case [D−SEQ−2]: by induction hypothesis (similar to [D−ASSIGN−2]).
• Case [D−RET−2]: by induction hypothesis (similar to [D−ASSIGN−2]).
5.6.4 Soundness of the Fixed-Point Analysis
To complement the proof of the main theorem 5.1, we will show that our fixed-point
analysis always infers sound method summaries.
Theorem 5.3 (Soundness of the Fixed-Point Analysis). Given a method decla-
ration, we can show that the fixed-point inference applied to the constraint abstraction
(obtained via the forward reasoning rules) would result in a sound summary Φmn.
Proof: The proof is done using induction on the height of the call graph dominated
by the method mn. The base case where mn does not call methods other than itself,
can be proven as a special case of the induction step. For the induction step, the
induction hypothesis assumes that the inference of methods called by mn has computed
sound summaries. Using this hypothesis, we aim to prove that the fixed-point analysis
computes a sound summary for the method mn.
The first step in the inference process is to derive constraint abstractions from a
given method declaration using the forward reasoning rules. These rules are applied
recursively on sub-expressions of the method body and, with one exception, derive con-
straints equivalent to the respective sub-expression. The exception is the rule [CALL],
where, rather than equivalent, the constraint that is derived is an over-approximation of
the method call since the callee has a sound summary (from the induction hypothesis).
Consequently, we can show that the constraint abstractions mnOK and mnERR are
consistent with the method declaration from which they are derived using the forward
reasoning rules. Furthermore the constraint abstractions are monotonic functions de-
fined on the abstract domain (e.g. disjunctive polyhedron domain) with values in the
same domain. The domain contains elements that are formulae over a fixed set of vari-
ables {v1, .., vn, v′1, .., v′m−1}, where v1, .., vm−1 are parameters passed by reference and
vm, .., vn are parameters passed by value.
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The fixed-point analysis computes iteratively a sequence starting with the least ele-
ment of the domain (the formula false). Being applied to a monotonic function, this
computation will result in an ascending sequence. To ensure convergence of this se-
quence, a widening operator is used. The result is then guaranteed to be an upper
approximation of the least fixed point for the constraint abstractions mnOK/mnERR.
Given that the results of the fixed-point analysis Omn/Emn are over-approximations
of the least fixed points (lfp) of mnOK/mnERR abstractions, we can apply the judge-
ment for the method body e and prove that the implications required by the checking
rule [CHECK−METH] hold as follows:
`{nochange(W )} e {{OK : φ1, ERR : φ2}}
∃V ·φ1 ⇒ Omn ∃R·φ2 ⇒ Emn
` t0 mn((ref ti vi)m−1i=1 , (ti vi)ni=m) where {OK : Omn, ERR : Emn}{e}
The formulae φ1 and φ2 correspond to the constraint abstraction functions mnOK and
mnERR where the recursive calls are replaced by Omn and Emn. Since Omn and Emn
are over approximations of the lfp, they are reductive points of these functions [117,
Sec 4.2, Appendix A.4]. As a consequence, the results from the judgement are more
precise formulae and the following implications hold: ∃V ·φ1 ⇒ Omn and ∃R·φ2 ⇒ Emn.
Thus the premises of the checking rule are satisfied and Φmn is shown to be a sound
summary for its corresponding method declaration.
The current proof can be extended to handle mutual recursive functions. In this
case, fixed points are computed simultaneously for all the mutually recursive constraint
abstraction functions.
A further lemma shows that our fixed-point analysis always terminates:
Lemma 5.4 (Termination of Forward Analysis). Forward analysis comprises of
two main parts (i) to build two constraint abstractions per method, (ii) fixed point anal-
ysis for each recursive abstraction. Both parts terminate.
Proof: The forward reasoning traverses each program via a well-founded recursion
over the expression and is therefore guaranteed to terminate for programs of finite code
size. The termination property of fixed point analysis is dependent on the abstraction
domain and techniques used for approximation and widening. For linear arithmetic do-
main, we can use the result of [37] whereby hulling and widening are used to ensure that
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constraints encountered during conjunctive fixed-point have at most finite variations.
This result extends also to k-bounded disjunctive formulae [138].
5.6.5 Corollaries of the Main Theorem
We shall now show four results that are corollaries of the Theorem on Soundness of
Summary Outcomes. The first corollary confirms that we have a true error from the
must-bug condition; secondly, we can guarantee a safe execution from the never-bug
condition. Thirdly, we have a diverging execution from the loop condition. The fourth
corollary applies when neither of the previous three cases holds: for inputs that satisfy
the may-bug condition, it is possible to have either a safe execution, a true error or a
diverging execution.
Corollary 5.5 (Definite Error from Must-Bug). Given an arbitrary expression
e1, consider an inference judgement as follows: `{P1} e1 {{OK:O1, ERR:E1}}. For each
state s1 such that s1 6|=PreSt(O1), it is never the case that 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉. This means
that either 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn,⊥〉 or 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not terminate.
Proof: Theorem 5.1 confirms that if the execution is successful then the consistency
property s1|=PreSt(O1) holds. Consequently, if the consistency property does not hold
s1 6|=PreSt(O1), then the execution cannot be successful; it either fails or diverges.
Corollary 5.6 (Definite Safety from Never-Bug). Given an arbitrary expression
e1, consider an inference judgement as follows: `{P1} e1 {{OK:O1, ERR:E1}}. For each
state s1 such that s1 6|=PreSt(E1), it is never the case that 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn,⊥〉. This means
that either 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉 or 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not terminate.
Proof: Theorem 5.1 confirms that if the execution fails then the consistency prop-
erty s1|=PreSt(E1) holds. Consequently, if the consistency property does not hold
s1 6|=PreSt(E1), then the execution cannot fail; it is either successful or it diverges.
Corollary 5.7 (Definite Non-termination from Loop Condition). Given an ar-
bitrary expression e1, consider a judgement as follows: `{P1} e1 {{OK:O1, ERR:E1}}.
For each state s1 such that s1 6|=PreSt(O1) and s1 6|=PreSt(E1), it is neither the case
that 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn,⊥〉, nor that 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉. This means that 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not
terminate.
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Proof: Using the previous two corollaries, we denote by s1 a state that does not
satisfy neither of the following consistency properties s1 6|=PreSt(O1) and s1 6|=PreSt(E1).
Then the execution is neither successful nor failed. The only possible alternative is that
〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not terminate.
Corollary 5.8 (Indefinite kind of execution from May-Bug). Given an arbitrary
expression e1, consider an inference judgement as follows: `{P1} e1 {{OK:O1, ERR:E1}}.
For each state s1 such that s1|=PreSt(O1) and s1|=PreSt(E1), all the following three
alternatives are possible: 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn, δ〉, 〈s1, e1〉↪→∗〈sn,⊥〉 or 〈s1, e1〉6↪→∗ does not
terminate.
Proof: This corollary is vacuously true.
5.7 Related Work
Most program analyses working towards the goal of bug-free programs can be divided
broadly depending on their goal: proving safety of programs, finding bugs or synergistic
approaches trying to prove safety and, at the same time, find bugs where possible.
We summarize the main approaches from these three categories in Figure 5.9. The
second column from the figure lists the direction in which the program is traversed,
either forward (FW), backward (BW) or a combination of the two. The presented
approaches can also be classified depending on the approximation done: either over-
approximating, under-approximating, exact symbolic execution or a combination. Note
that the effectiveness of the symbolic execution is inherently limited by the constraint
solver or the theorem prover that is used. We also list if the analysis is designed to be
modular, where each method is analysed in isolation to derive a summary. The method
summary would further be used instead of reanalyzing the method at each of its call
sites. Column 5 shows if the respective approaches are either meant to terminate or
run until a time limit is reached. In general, it is difficult to have a converging answer
from approaches based on abstraction refinement or by testing an unbounded number of
execution paths, so in practice a time limit is imposed. Finally, column 6 shows what is
the general goal of the analysis: safety, bugs or a combination of the two. Additionally,
the alarms reported by the analysis can be classified as bugs(1) (an alarm that is either
a true bug or a false positive), bugs(2) (an alarm that is a true bug, if the program
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Analysis Direction Approximation Mod Term Goal
Suzuki et al.[144] BW under NO YES safety
Astre´e[12] FW over NO YES safety
VeriSoft [59], CMC [111] FW under NO NO bugs
DART [62], EXE [17] FW under+sym NO NO bugs
SMART [61] FW under+sym YES NO bugs
Saturn [148] FW over+under YES YES bugs(1)
Slam[5], BLAST [80] FW+BW over+sym NO NO safety+bugs(2)
Pasareanu et al. [120] FW under+over NO NO safety+bugs
Synergy [67] FW+BW over+under+sym NO NO safety+bugs
Syntox [15] FW+BW over+under NO YES safety+bugs(2)
Rival [136] FW+BW over+under NO YES safety+bugs(2)
Dualyzer FW over YES YES safety+bugs(2)
Figure 5.9: Classification of various analyses for proving safety and finding bugs
terminates), or bugs (an alarm that is unconditionally a true bug).
Proving safety: The first camp is concerned with proving safety of programs and
its proponents are shown in the top lines of the Figure 5.9. It needs to find a way to
abstract all the possible concrete executions into a statically computable form. The
abstraction may represent an over-approximation of the state at some program point
computed using a forward traversal of the program as in the seminal paper of Cousot and
Halbwachs [43]. Conversely, the statically computed abstraction may represent an under-
approximation of the state leading to a program error derived using a backward traversal
of the program. This second approach computes loop invariants using the induction-
iteration method pioneered by Suzuki and Ishihata [144] and later enhanced by Xu et al.
[149]. Various trade-offs between precision of the underlying abstraction and efficiency of
the safety analysis have been explored: the interval domain, the polyhedron domain [43]
and the octagon domain [104] are just a few of the proposed abstractions. In fact, safety
analyzers that scale to large critical programs likeAstre´e[12] or C Global Surveyor [145]
use elaborate combinations of abstract domains to achieve maximum efficiency. Two
other approaches towards proving safety are extended static checking [55] and program
verification. In these cases, pre/post annotations have to be designed by programmers
to provide further guidance on over-approximation, especially for recursive methods.
As a summary for all these analyses, when they cannot prove safety, alarms that may
include false positives will be signaled. The user of the analyzer is left with the job of
manually distinguishing false alarms from real bugs.
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Our modelling of error outcomes is related to the specification of exceptional con-
ditions that has been pioneered for SPEC# [97]. However, this work focuses on safety
guarantee for exception-based programs, and is not designed for bug finding purposes.
Moreover, it currently requires users to specify each exceptional behaviour, while our
approach automatically infers both success and failure outcomes.
Finding bugs: The second camp is primarily concerned with finding bugs in soft-
ware, so that faulty programs could be quickly patched. Traditionally, program testing
has been used for detecting incorrect programs. More recently, systematic testing or
concrete state space exploration has been implemented in model checkers like VeriSoft
[59] or CMC [111]. It attempts to search through all the feasible paths of the program,
uncovering real bugs (no false positives). Systematic testing cannot achieve full path
coverage, so its results represent an under-approximation of all the concrete executions
of the program. As search may not terminate in a reasonable amount of time, a limit is
set in practice on the number of paths that are covered.
A recent project, called DART [62], attempts to find more errors in a systematic
fashion by keeping a stack of conditional tests encountered during execution. The gath-
ered conditionals are used to generate new test cases that would allow deeper branches
to be explored, so as to find real bugs, where possible. It also combines concrete with
symbolic execution in order to alleviate the limitations of the constraint solver used in
symbolic execution. Whenever the constraint solver does not know how to resolve a
conditional test, DART simplifies this constraint using the concrete values of the in-
puts involved in the test. EXE [17] even used symbolic execution to explore conditional
branches exhaustively. One problem with exact symbolic execution is that it requires
heuristic to analyse each loop/recursion that is not bounded by a constant, and would
fail for infinite loop. Another issue is that symbolic solvers are typically restricted in
scope and may be inefficient, but [17] provided some solutions to this difficulty. To re-
duce the complexity of the automated testing approach, an extension of DART named
SMART [61] generates the tests compositionally on a per method basis. On the whole,
the bugs that are discovered are sound, but some bugs may remain undiscovered.
Closer in spirit to over-approximating static analyses, bug-finding tools like xgcc [78],
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FindBugs [83], Saturn [148] or FastCheck [22] take some unsound (under-approximating)
decisions in order to minimize the number of false positives. For example, Saturn only
considers some aliasing possibilities between the parameters of a method and only an-
alyzes a bounded number of iterations through a loop. Due to this combination of
over and under approximation, these tools aim to report few false positives, but neither
guarantee program safety, nor report only true bugs.
Proving safety + finding bugs: Synergistic approaches for both proving safety and
finding bugs usually rely on a combination of over and under approximation. In contrast,
our proposal is more integrated as it computes forward only over-approximations.
Model checking based on abstraction refinement is often referred as CEGAR (counter-
example guided automated refinement) and tools like Slam [5] or BLAST [80, 81, 11] are
based on this paradigm. In a first step, Slam and BLAST perform a forward-directed
over-approximating search for possible bugs. If no bugs are found, then the safety of the
program has been proven. Otherwise, starting with a possible bug, a counter-example
trace is analyzed backward via symbolic reasoning in order to derive its weakest liberal
precondition. If the counter-example is shown to be feasible, then a true bug is reported.
If the counter-example is shown to be infeasible, the abstraction is refined and the search
process is iterated. More recently, a model checking algorithm has been devised around
refinement of under-approximations to better preserve the bug detection ability of the
checker [120]. Yet another abstraction refinement is based on mixed transition systems
that represent both must and may transitions [72]. This approach can reason about
both safety and true bugs, but is (as yet) restricted to non-recursive programs. Simi-
larly, as elaborated earlier, Synergy [67] extends predicate abstraction and refinement
mechanism with DART-style program testing.
Syntox [15] is a system for abstract debugging of imperative Pascal programs. It
can prove safety and find bugs by using a combination of forward over-approximating
analysis and backward under-approximating analysis. We highlight the main differences
compared to our approach. Firstly, our analysis does not require a separate backward
phase, since it is based on a relational semantics and can derive input conditions directly
from the forward phase. Secondly, Syntox uses a less precise interval abstract domain,
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where in general the complement of an interval cannot be represented as an interval.
Thus a separate greatest fixed point computation is used to determine must-bug condi-
tions. Finally, the correctness conditions determined by Syntox are necessary, but not
sufficient like the never-bug condition derived by Dualyzer.
In order to investigate the origin of the alarms raised by the static analyzerAstre´e[12],
Rival used iterated forward-backward over-approximating analysis to prove safety of as-
sertions [136]. Despite elaborate combination of abstractions, some alarms cannot be
resolved by over-approximation alone. Understanding if an alarm is a true bug is fa-
cilitated by under-approximating techniques such as input selection or restriction to an
execution pattern. The input selection process is not currently automated, but made
easier by semantic slicing techniques. The process of restriction to an execution pat-
tern and guiding the analysis towards true bugs is in general incomplete and may not
converge. However, [136] reports that in practice all considered alarms from their set of
benchmarks could be classified by the above-mentioned techniques. The classification of
alarms is similar to ours in that an alarm indicates either a true bug or a non-terminating
program.
In the absence of runtime errors, over-approximating static analysis may conclude
that, if a program location is unreachable, then the program exhibits non-terminating
behaviour. In general, in the presence of runtime errors, an unreachable location may
indicate either non-termination or a runtime error [15, 41]. In our approach, we can
prove non-termination by tracking reachability of both successful and failed executions.
A different approach to proving non-termination [70] proceeds in two steps: first it
dynamically enumerates possible non-terminating program paths and then statically
proves their feasibility by inferring a recurrent set of states.
In a recent position paper [60], Godefroid likens may- and must- analyses to the
Yin and Yang of program analysis. He advocated for greater efforts to be devoted to
must-analysis, especially because practitioners found it more useful, while researchers
(on program analysis and verification) have focused mostly on may-analysis instead.
Our proposal can be viewed as heeding this call, as we attempt to achieve a balance




Our approach is based on a modular static analysis and is aimed at proving safety or
discovering true bugs. To achieve both goals, our key innovation is the simultaneous
capture of error outcomes and successful outcomes. Moreover, we have also shown that
our static analysis technique is able to detect a subclass of definite non-termination when
identifying unreachable states of recursive methods. Our experiments have shown that
this approach can also use may-bug conditions to guide precision improvement based
on disjunctive abstract domain. While we have focused our efforts on bugs discovery,
our use of dual static analysis can be viewed as an instance of a general framework that
simultaneously infers trigger conditions for an arbitrary property P and its complement
P. We believe that this exploration might open up a fertile ground whereby better may-
and must-analyses can be more effectively developed.




The focus of this thesis was to investigate modular static analysis with the goal of
proving program safety and detecting program errors. This chapter reviews the main
results of the current work and then makes suggestions for future research and possible
applications.
6.1 Main Results
In this thesis, we described three main results. Firstly, we presented a new disjunctive
abstract domain meant to enhance analysis precision at a reasonable cost. Secondly, we
proposed a modular technique for deriving preconditions sufficient to guarantee program
safety. With these two techniques, we were able to derive both postconditions and
preconditions and realized a completely modular analyzer for proving program safety.
Since an analyzer that aims to prove program safety may report alarms that correspond
in part to false positives, there is a need to (manually) classify the feasibility of alarms.
Our third proposal was a dual static analysis that can identify (automatically) a part
of the alarms as being true errors. More specifically, our dual static analysis was able
to identify both a never-bug condition that implies program safety and a must-bug
condition that leads to true errors (modulo program termination).
6.2 Future Work
In this section, we make some suggestions on how to improve the research presented in
this thesis and increase its practical impact.
CIL front-end : Being based on the core Imp language, our prototype implementation
was restricted to smaller-sized programs. In our experiments, we circumvented this
restriction by building a code pre-processor. We plan to extend it to the point that it
can accept CIL programs as input. The CIL framework [114] is a widely used tool for
analysis of C programs and should help in making our analyses more widely available.
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Indirectly, by this extension we hope to successfully analyze larger programs.
Disjunctive weakly relational abstract domains : Another opportunity for im-
proving the efficiency of our analyses is to adapt the proposal from Chapter 3 to a more
efficient but less precise base domain. There we used the affinity function for lifting
a base (conjunctive) abstract domain to its (disjunctive) powerset extension, and we
demonstrated this idea in the context of the base polyhedron domain. It seems promis-
ing to extend this proposal to weakly relational abstract domains like the octagons [104]
or the template constraint matrices [139].
Fixed-point analyzer : With the general applicability of fixed-point computations
to static analyses, we believe in the utility of making Disj-Fix as a separate application
package. To increase its applicability, we should make its implementation parametric in
terms of abstract domain and disjunctive heuristic function.
Abstraction refinement : Our dual static analysis generates method summaries that
are useful for abstraction refinement. Computing both an input condition that leads to
safety (never-bug) and an input condition that leads to errors (must-bug) allows an
abstraction refinement procedure to concentrate on those inputs that do not satisfy
either of these conditions. We used this observation to selectively increase the precision
of the abstract domain. A natural extension is to provide more strategies for abstraction
refinement, including the iteration of the forward analysis assuming as precondition the
may-bug determined previously. Inspired by the refinement techniques proposed in
[68, 66], we speculate that it should also be useful to refine abstract operations like
selective hulling or powerset widening when they are performed with a value less than
100% affinity.
Non-termination and termination analyses : With the dual static analysis, we
proposed to classify inputs based on whether they are sufficient/necessary to guarantee
safety or the encounter of an error. Our classification is related to the classification given
in the weakest precondition calculus of Dijkstra [49, Chapter 3]. While our classification
is concerned with program safety and bug detection, Dijkstra’s classification is more
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concerned with characterizing termination and whether the final state satisfies a given
postcondition. In addition to this semantic classification of inputs, our static analysis
also provided algorithms that compute a precise input partitioning. A further challeng-
ing task is to provide algorithms that classify inputs with regard to program termination.
There are some promising forays in finding inputs that lead to non-termination [70] and
inputs that lead to conditional termination [33].
Parallelization of analysis : For the analysis of larger programs, we should consider
an unavoidable increase in the analysis time. To counter this increase, we could effi-
ciently parallelize our analyses due to their modular characteristic. The parallelization
algorithm would naturally follow the method boundaries for dividing the analysis tasks,
as proposed and implemented in other summary-based analyses [20, 50].
This thesis has focused on investigating modular static analysis in the context of nu-
merical abstract domains. To this goal, we derived efficient method summaries and
obtained precise method abstractions by using disjunctive invariants. We hope that
the techniques developed here will be helpful in devising more general modular static
analyses, increase their applicability and finally lead to more dependable software.
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